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List of Recommendations 
- indicates that by the t ime of our final meeting i n  May 1971 
action had been taken by the authority or organisation 
concerned. 
Paragraph Page 
That the BAA sets up at Heathrow a Standing Commillee 
with representation from the other authorities or 
organisations involved, to keep the emergency arrangements 
under review and to provide a focal point for dealing with 
suggestions or criticisms. 
That the BAA institutes a procedure which requires the 
ATe Watch Supervisor, on duty when an aircraft accident 
occurs outside the aerodrome boundary, to inform the BAA 
Fire Senice of the occurrence and i ts location. 
That the BAA Fire Service continues to allend aircraft 
accidents, occurring \\ ithin the aerodrome boundary, with 
all available appliances; for accidents occurring beyond 
the boundary and thought to be located not more than 
2 m.iies from the airport perimeter road, the attendance 
should not exceed 50 per cent of the media; beyond 2 miles 
no automatic allendancc should be made although, at the 
discretion of the BAA Fire Service Onicer-in-Charge, one 
appliance may be despatched in response to a request from 
the accident site for technical advice or for support with 
specialised equipment. 
Th.t the BAA Fire Sen ice attends all calls to fires occurring 
in aerodrome bulk fuel inslallUlions, in aircraft parked on 
aprons or in hangars. Allendance should be "ith all the 
available appliances in the fir�t instance due to the nature of 
these fires and the ri�k they present to operations at  the 
aerodrome, and because of the special equipment which the 
BAA Fire Service has available. 
That the BAA Fire Service makes a predetermined allen-
dance for calls to all other fires involving premises, technical 
installations or structures or for incidents where persons 
are known or are thought to be at risk. This will normally 
be one appliance capable of fire-fighting operations. The 
decision in respect of an additional attendance in response 
to a message from the incident shall be at the discretion of 
the BAA Fire Service Officer-in-Charge, having regard to 
the anticipated attendance and response time of the London 
Fire Brigade. 
That the BAA Fire Service continues to inform the Air 
Traffic Control if, through the discharge of extinguishing 

















media or ror any other reason, the available strength or the 
Service drops by two or more categories in terms of the 
sC�lle set out  in Section VI of the licensing document 
CAP 1 68. 
That the BAA Fire Service makes available Junior Officers 
or a grade not less than Sect ion Leader with responsibility 
ror the conduct or parts or the fireground operations at 
an aircraft accident, leaving the Officer-in-Charge of the 
overal l  attendance, usually an Aerodrome Fire Officer 
Grade 1 1 , to  direct a l l  phases or the operation. 
That unless a rescue tender can be provided which meets 
the recommended response lime to a l l  parts of the aero-
drome frolll one fire �lalion. the BAA provides a rescue 
tender i n  each fire station at Heathrow. 
That if  the lwo rescue tenders recommended for Heathrow 
are provided, each should be manned by a two-man rescue 
tcal11. Onc of I he se rescue lenders should also carry the 
Officer-in-Charge or the Watch. Ir only one rescue tender is 
available, both two-man rescue crews should ride this 
appliance. 
That the Department or Trade and I ndustry ensures that 
research be continued to improve aircraft escape 
Paragraph Page 




equipment, and a study be made of the need for. and design 
of, a ground device to faci litate evacuation. 
That the Department or Trade and I ndustry provides 75 27 
shorter courses, probably lasting 3 to  4 days, specifically 
for police and local authority fire and ambulance personnel, 
at an attractive fee \\ hich recognises that these courses wil l  
consi�l of lectures and discussions but wil l  not involve 
participation in fire exercises. 
That the BAA holds a reserve or 50 Furley stretchers (or 106 38 
their modern equivalent) a nd 30 carrying canvases with 
6 pairs or carr) ing poles. 
That the Department or Trade and I ndustry amends 106 38 
Scale 5 or Table V II�I or Section VII or the new Licensing 
Document (CAP 1 68) to  require a minimum holding or 
80 stretchers comprising 50 Furley type and 30 carrying 
canvases with 6 pairs of poles. 
That the BAA holds 300 blankets on the emergency 107 38 
medical equipment \-ehiclc. 
That further enquiry and research into a more suitable 1 08  39 
and economical bag to  contain corpscs be made by those 
directly concerned. When a source or suitable bags is 
found, some should be acquired. There is, however, a 
division of responsibility involved because aircraft accidents 
may occur both on and off the aerodromc. Accord ingly the 
2 Rf!l'Ollll1lell(/aliOlH 
Recommendation No. 
1 6  
1 7  
IS· 
1 9  
20 




BAA should provide 100 bag, to be held against incidents 
occurring on the aerodrome; \"hilst the local authorities 
concerned should consider \\ hcthcr they have a similar need. 
That the responsible authorities review the changes in  1 1 0 
passenger loads that wi l l  be carried by the larger aircraft, 
both in  service and coming into service, so that the 
emergency plans may be amended to meet the new demands 
that may be made upon them. 
That an ambulance service continues to be provided at  I I I  
Heathrow. But, if the BAA withdraws its service, the most 
effective alternative would be for the GLC to establish 
an ambulance station at the aerodrome. 
That the N W  Regional Metropolitan Hospital Board 
draws up a list of second and third line hospital . I t  
should be issued to the Ambulance Service (for executive 
action), to the BAA, the Heathrow Port Health Control 
Unit and to Ihe police (for information). Amendmenls 
should be circulated when necessary. 
That, whenever possible, the medical services attend with 
the Aerodrome Fire Service at 'off-aerodrome' accidents 
within the area covered by that service. 
That the BAA eSlablishes procedures for reporting or 
directing passengers, to ensure that any slightly injured 
or apparently uninj ured survivors found away from the 
sceoe arc assembled with Ihe olhers "I Ihe casually 
receiving or reception centres. 
That Ihe limited medical facilities on Ihe aerodrome are 
kept manned. When only one ursing Officer is on 
duty at Ihe Airport Medical Centre it is essenlial that she 
remains there. 
1 1 7 
1 19 
1 2 1  
1 2 1  
That Customs Immigration Officers examination, where 123 
this is considered necessary in  respect of the survivors of 
an accident involving an 'ex�foreign' or a 'departing for foreign' 
aircraft, should be undertaken at  Ihe designated 
reception centres. 
That in future the following terms be used : 
I .  First aid post/casualty collectillg poillt. This will mean 
a point usually in the vicinity of the accident where t hose 
persons requiring treatment and/or transport to hospital 
wi l l  be collected. 
2. Casualty receiving celllre. Is a centre on the airport set 
aside for minor injuries. At Heathrow such centres are the 
ACJMS and Airport Medical Centres. 
3. Reception centre. This i s  a centre for seemingly uninjured 
survivors. At  Heathrow such centres are located in  the 
airport VIP lounges in  the terminal complex. 



















3 1  
32 
That hospitals, given the role of >upPorling hospital in an 
exercise, should consider assuming that of designated 
hospital when it  appears necessary to them to  train their 
stafT in this role. 
That the BAA gives consideration to  means of finding 
thc I1cccs::,ary extra manpower for searching for and 
collecting survivors. 
That the airlines introduce into the briefing given to  
passengers in an aircraft about to  make a landing which is 
likely to involve an emergency evacuation, instructions 
that they should remain in the vicinity o f  the aircraft 
after the evacuation has been completed, and contact an 
official as soon as  possible. 
That the BAA includes in the guidance issued to airline 
operators a reference to the latter's responsibility to  
provide adequate transport for passengers at an aircraft 
accident. 
That the BAA issues a management memorandum at least 
once a year, but more freq uently if necessary, to all 
organisations concerned on the aerodrome, reminding 
existing stafT and instructing new stafT as to their responsi­
bilities and duties in the event of an aircraft accident. 
New organisations concerned \\ ilh emergency procedures 
on the aerodrome arc to  be issued with a comprehensive 
set of relevant emergency orders and guidance. 
That the Department of Trade and Industry seeks to  
obtain international agreement o n  procedures which will 
ensure that accurate information as to the number of 
persons on board is readily a\ailable lo the aerodrome 
authority or emergency services in the event of an 
accident. 
That the Heathrow Emergency Orders should contain 
procedures for obtaining from the airline operator, or his 
agent, information as to the number of persons on board 
an aircraft involved in an emergency, and passing iL as 
soon as possible to the emergency services via the fire 
service watchrooI11. When thi::, inrormation cannot be 
obtained at the aerodrome, arrangemenrs should be made 
to  try to obtain it  from the aircrart whilst in  flight if  this 
can be done without aggravating the emergency situation. 
That whenever possible the Rendezvous Point Officer 
should remind crews of incoming emergency services 
vehicles that flashing lights should be put out  on arrival 
at the incident. 
That the airlines issue their non-uniformed personnel 
with some simple form of identification, which will  be 
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That the BAA, the police and the local authority se"ices 153/ 1 54 
ensure that plans arc made to provide adequate mortuary 
52 
faciUties to be used in the event of an aircraft accident 
at  Heathrow. 
That the BAA continue to provide accom modation and 1 55 
faciUties as at present, to be used as a temporary 
mortuary and properly bureau for accident at Hcathrow. 
That only the BAA/FS north side station watch room 165 
acknowledges the 'first alert call'. The 'second call' 
procedu re, whereby the PABX Emergency Supervisor 
reads back the mes agc, remains unchanged. 
That where any question of c ircuit discipline is involved 165 
the Station Telecommunications Officer (STO), Heathrow 
Airport, should make available transcripts from, or  a 
recording of, the 'crash line' channel to facilitate 
investigation by all  those concerned. 
That the BAA and the Metropo�tan Police consider the 170 
cost/benefit and provision of Post Office priority 
signalling facilities between Heathrow and the Hayes and 
West Dray ton Police Stations. 
That the BAA/FS north side station watcluoolll console be 
ergonomically designed and rc-engineered to alleviate the 
work-load on the Watcluoom Attendant during an 
emergency alert. 
That the GMC tone call facility on the BAA/FS channel 174/ 175 
be withdrawn from the vehicles and placed under tbe 
control of the walchroom, vehicles communicating with 
GMC first requesting the facility from their watchroom 
control. 
That hospitals ensure that new staff are fully briefed on 1 8 1  
the communications facilities that are available and how 
best they may be utilised. 
That for incident control purposes, the Metropolitan 1 83 184 
Police details police officers to provide liaison between the 
ambulance, fire and police services. 
That ready interchange of information on tcrminology 1 9 1  
and other matters be encouraged between the services, 
either by regular discussion at an appropriate level or  
through the regu lar exchange of information between all 
• 
services. 
That the BAA adopts the minimum area and surface 
conditions listed in paragraph 197 as the standard 













Recommendation o. Paragraph Page 
44 That the BAA retains the emergency access (previously 200 67 
known as RVI' NW) leading from the nort hern perimeter 
road to Block I as an alternative exit point to be used 
in the e'ent of an accident on Runway 28R/I OL. 
45 That the J3AA retains RVI' North-East until the facilit ies 200 68 
at RVI' East arc fully restored. 
46 That the BAA designates the section of the old 200 68 
perimeter road oppo;ite No. 1 0  sub-station as the 
as;embly area for RVI' Wes\. 
47 That the BAA considers how best to pro\ ide some form 203 69 
of t raffic control to ensure f reedom of mo,ement for 
e mergency "chicles \\ ithin thc aerodrome. 
48- That the BAA prO\ ides conspicuous reflective directional 203 69 
s igns for I urn-ofT points from the outside roads and acccss 
routes \\ ithin the a irport boundary. 
49 That the BAA introduces an operational procedure to 204 69 
permil a change in the initially nominated RVP. 
50 That the BAA provides in the Heathrow Emergency 206 71 
Orders that there should be a minimum of 4 guides 
available at the nominated RVP within 4 minutes of the 
alert. 
5 1  That Ihe BAA \\ilh the services concerned ensure that 207/208 7 1  
there \\ ill  be adequate guidance throughout the duration 
of the incident for ambulances con\ cying injured persons 
to hospitals; bearing 111 mll1d that more than onc route 
may be needed. 
52 That the BAA relocates the RVI' South telephone. now 2 1 0  72 
on the perimeter road, al sub-station 8 .  
53- 1 hat the BAA ensure, that the RVI' Officer wears some 2 1  I 72 
distinguishing mark to identify himself. 
54 That the BAA arranges for suitable instructions to be 2 1 6/2 1 8  74 
included in the Hcathrow Emergency Orders to ensure 
that mcssage� to the external emergency services employ 
standard terminology in referring lO locations on the 
acrodromc. 
6 Rf!commem(tlliolls 
Chapter 1 General introduction 
Origins 
I The Working Party was rormed rollowing a recommendation in the 
report published in August 1 969 on the accident to Boeing 707 G-ARWE 
that a broadly based Working Party be set up to consider the problems 
of fire and rescue services at Heathrow. This recommendation was 
accepted by the Board or Trade (now the Department or Trade and 
I ndustry) and invitations to serve on the Working Party, together with 
its terms of reference and some guidance notes were sent out by the 
Director-General or Sarety and Operations in October 1 969. (These are 
reproduced at Appendix I .) 
Representation 
2 Tbe response to the invitation resulted in a very welcome full  
representation at senior and d irecting level from the Metropolitan Police ; 
the Fire and Ambulance Services or the Local Authorities; the British 
Airports Authority and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee. Tllis, 
together with the representatives of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
made a total or 24 members and provided the opportunity to consider 
in detail the problems or post accident services. (The membership is 
,hown at Appendix 2.) 
\Vorking arrangements 
3 The Working Party held its first introductory meeting on 1 8  December 
1 969 to discuss working arrangements. In order to facilitate and expedite 
the work we agreed to divide into three main Groups to consider the 
problems or: 
(a) The police 
( b) The fire services 
(c) The ambulance and medical services. 
We also arranged ror special Groups 10 consider and report on the 
problems common to the above three services. These were: 
(i) Communicalion� 
(i i)  Rendezvous point,. 
Terms of reference 
4 Our terms or rererence \"ere: 
to re\ iew and report on the problems of fire and rescue operations in re:;pect of aircraft 
accidents a t  Heathrow. including the problem of co-ordination beH\CCn British Airport 
Authority services and those of local authorities and to make recommendations. 
Gefltralmtroatlrlio/l I 7 
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The guidance notes sent out with the invitation to serve on the Working 
Party were accepted as a basis for our work. We did not consider it to be 
parl of our task to re-examine the circumstances of the accident to 
G-ARWE or to review each recommendation or criticism ill  the report 
that related to fire and rescue services to see whether or not we agreed 
with it; we decided rather to  look afresh and i n  detail at every aspect of 
the post-accident services and their co-ordination to discover where 
i mprovements could be made and to put forward recommendations 
accordingly. 
5 We also considered i t  inappropriate for us 10 tackle the problen1s of 
the long term policy on aviation fire fighting media and scales o f  equipment. 
This is being examined internationally by a Panel on Rescue and Fire 
Fighting sel up by the I nternational Civil Aviation Organisation. The 
Deparlment of Trade and Industry which is represented on the Panel, 
\\ i l l  be considering these aspects during the next year or two and will be 
forming policy in cOllsultation with the various organisations thal arc 
involved. 
Working Party findings and progress achieved 
6 The results of our studies and our recommendations are set out in this 
Report. I t  is probably the first time that all  the organisations concerned 
have been able to get together a t  a senior level and over a period 
attend a series of meetings to consider in detail the problems and 
organisation of post-accident services, I t  has been a most useful exercise 
and, although wc found no major deficiency, a number of detailed items 
\\ here improvement could be made were agreed. 
7 \Ve were not, however, dealing with a �tatic situation a� it was at the 
time of the accident. When we first convened many changes had already 
tJkcn place and improvements introduced by the British Airports 
Authority. Also, during our deliberations. each of the Services has been 
able to make improvements by accepting and adopting immediately 
findings of the Working Party without waiting for the final Report and 
its recommendations. This proce�� of evolution and improvement 
:-,hould continue in the future. A list of illlprovel11ent� carried out  by BAA 
at  Heathrow �ince lhe G-ARWE accident is  included in Appendix 13; 
this excludes those items which have been dealt with in this Report 
and \\ hich arc marked with an a�tcrisk against the recommendation where 
action ha� been takcn by the authority or organisation concerned. 
lntcr-scnicc co-ordination-cmcrgcucy plans 
8 1 he Airport A uthority i� concerned primarily with aircraft accidents 011 
or near the aerodrome, and the organisation and procedures which arc 
�el in motion following an accident arc set out in detail in the Heathrow 
emergency Orders. Every licensed civil aerodrome is required under 
Section V I  of the Licensing Document (CAP 168) to i>sue Emergency 
Plans and Orders. They are compiled by the aerodrome managements and 
give precise guidance, which can be implemented at short notice, to 
the authorities or organisations that will  be involved in the event of an 
emergency or accident at, or adjacent to, an aerodromc. The Department 
of Trade and Industry examines the emergency plans of each l icensed 
8 I Gel/eral introdllctioll 
aerodrome, and advises on their content and scope in relation to the 
aerodrome's resources and the support that may be obtained from the 
local authority or other agencies in the immediate area. The Department 
issues a copy of model Emergency Orders upon wilich aerodrome 
authorities are invited to base their particular versions. 
9 Heatilrow Emergency Orders which arc written and promulgated by 
the British Airports Authority, indicate the responsibilities of, as well as 
the action to be taken by the British Airports Authority, the National 
Ajr Traffic Control Service personnel and others at Heathrow Airport 
i n  the event of: 
(a) Aircraft accident/aircraft accident imminent 
(b) A ircraft ground incident 
(c) Full emergency 
(d)  Local standby 
(e) Domestic fires and special service, 
Since these Orders also �erve as an action guide for other per�ol1s and 
organisations, they arc distributed to the Metropolitan Police, the local 
authority emergency service , the medical and hospital authorities, the 
airways corporations and some other airline operators. All  other 
airljne operators have summaries of the Orders which outline (he 
emergency organisation for information and action by tbe recipients. 
(Nole: We have been informed that during our enquiry the BAA ha> made 
arrangements for every airline company to be provided with an 
up-to-date copy of the complete Heathrow Emergency Orders . )  
10 The local authorities arc concerned not only with aircraft accidenl� 
but also with other d i�asters which may need urgently the services of the 
police, fire, ambulance and hospital organisations. They have a 
responsibility for the protection of life and property within their area. 
Most local authorities have Disaster Plans which include the mobilisation 
and deployment of police, fire, ambulance, hospital and medical services 
in the event of a major accident irrespective of the cause. Within this 
wider framework the particular emergency services integrate their OWII 
major accident plan�. This is an important point because the organisation 
and arrangements for dealing with aircraft accidents should fit in with 
those for other disasters, to obtain the benefits of uniformity and a 
well-drilled service. I n  the case of Heathrow Airport, the Greater London 
Council and the Hil l ingdon Borough Council arc tile main local 
authorities involved in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police which, 
unlike the majority of U K police forces, is not part of the local authority. 
I I We examined the Heathrow Emergency Order> and other emergency 
services' plans especially where they referred to aircraft accidents. 
\Ve considered that our task was not to attempt to rewrite them but to 
determine whether t hey adequately met the known requirements as far a'> 
these could be foreseen. I n  our opinion it is most important tbat, after 
our enquiry is complete, al l  authorities res pOll ible for the plans should 
ensure that these are reviewed each year to take account of changing 
requirements. To ensure the effectivenes and the co-ordination of the 
various services following an accidelll - and the fire, police. ambulance 
and hospital services of more than one local authority may be involved -
it  is essential that their emergency orders and those of the airport are 
Genual llllrodllctioll I � 
compatible. We consider that there should be an interchange of orders 
and procedures between a l l  organisations involved in order to  eliminate 
as far as is possible deficiencies caused by poor liaison, ignorance or 
misunderstandings. Changes should not take place without immediate 
i nter-service notification and an explanation of the underlying reasons. 
To deal effectively with a major crash requires not only detailed plannjng 
of the actions to be taken by the various organised emergency services, 
but also the rapid mobilisation of any assistance which can be made 
available by other bodies. Such arrangemellls should be included in the 
emergency planning. 
We recommend thal the BAA selS up at Heathrow a Standing Committee 
with representation from the other authorities or organisations involved, 
to  keep the emergency arrangements under review and to provide a focal 
point for dealing with s uggestions or criticisms. 
Policy and cost-effccthrenes� 
12 The primary objective of an aerodrome fire service is to save live�. 
This means taking steps to  ensure the rapid and safe evacuation of the 
occupants of the aircraft. Secondary objectives are to save aircraft, 
property and equipment. 
13 I n principle an aerodrome fire service is located, equipped and manned 
with the aim of reaching the scene of an aircraft accident on the aerodrome 
within some two or three minutes, controlling the fire in one or two 
minutes and providing conditions �uitablc for rescue and evacuation. 
Aviation may thus be thought 10 be beller served than other forms of 
transport. However, the resuHs of an accident on an airport, especially 
in the case of a large aircraft, may be immediate and massive and may 
need not only the re�ources of an aerodrome fire service, but abo large 
scale assistance frolll outside a� �oon a� it can be mobil ised. 
1 4  Although we were a�ked 10 lake into account the 'cost-effectiveness' 
of any recommendations which we might make, we have not subjected to 
economic study and analy�is any of the improvements that we have 
considered. This is due partly to the lack of readi ly available resources 
lo  do this, partly because the majority of our recommendations do not 
1J1volve major expenditure, and also because we believed that policy 
on matters of aerodrome safety services is to  some extent a question of 
subjective judgement, there being insufficient meaningful values o n  
which the 'effectiveness' of safety can be costed. However, we have borne 
in mind the probable costs in making Ollr recommendations. 
IS We know that opinions on the need for a fire service and on its 
strength vary from one extreme - that no aerodrome flre service is 
economical ly or statistically j ustiJied - to the other which advocates 
bigger and better services than those now provided. We have accepted 
the general policy inherent in the Department of Trade and Industry's 
licensing requirements which have been bui l t  up over many years of 
experience and which arc broadly equivalent to the internationally agreed 
guidance on the subject, and concentrated our attention on how best they 
could be deployed, organised and co-ordinated with the large scale 
assistance available from local resources. 
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Recommendation No. J 
Localion of accidenl 'on' or 'off' Ihe aerodrome 
1 6  We have given particular allention to the responsibiuties of the 
aerodrome's and local authorities' services in cases where the location 
of the accident is on, near or away from the aerodrome. The aerodrome's 
services are normally only concerned with those on or near the 
aerodrome. 10 these cases their action i s  to hand over progressively to the 
local authorities' services when they arrive while the aerodrome ervices 
withdraw, replenish and get themselves into a stale of readiness to permit 
the aerodrome to resume full flying operation�. 
Application of Working Party findings to other aerodromes 
1 7  We have dealt exclusively with Heathrow and its problems. These may 
vary in the case of other aerodromes, depending on their location and the 
resources of the aerodrome and local emergency �ervices. 
Nevertheless, \\<c belic\'e that our findings and recommendations may be 
helpful to othels and that in a number of cases the formation of a local 
\Vorking Party such us this onc will be useful in pinpointing problems, 
working out �olut ions and co-ordinating the emergency order\ and 
i Ilst ruct io ns. 
Report of the Departmental Committee on Fire Services 
1 8  Towards the end of our deliberations the Holroyd Report was brought 
10 the allention of the Working Party. (Reporr of rhe Deparrlllelllai 
COllllllirree 011 rhe Fire Service. Cmnd 437 1 .  HMSO. 1 970. The relevant 
extracts are at Appendix 4.) The report suggests thal this Working Party 
considers whether operational advantage� would flow from integrating 
airport fire scr\'ices \\ i th the public flre service. They conclude that 
full  integration would be more efficient operationally (but more costly) 
in those cases where the local authorities control civil airports. 
1 9  This Working Party's terms of reference are limited 10 the 
consideration of the I-Ieathrow fi re and rescue services. We have not 
vi ited other airports or  examined their organisation. The following 
comments on this subject arc, therefore, of a general nature. 
20 Two important factors are fundamental to providing an effective 
airport fire and rescue service - one operational and [he other managerial. 
Firstly, the problems of fire fighting and rescue following an aircraft 
accident are specialised ones in respect of the fire situations which may 
be encountered and the materials and structures involved, which call for 
specialised knowledge, s k ills, techniques and training, and specialised 
equipment and media which need to be deployed at high speed, but 
probably for a l imited duration pending the arrival of the local authority's 
brigade. This is in line \\ i th the view expressed in the Holroyd Report 
(paragraph 1 46) in support of industrial f ire brigades which face similar 
specialised problems. and we find it difficult to accept the statement in 
paragraph 1 42 which implies that the techniques required for dealing with 
the fire and rescue problems following an aircraft accident on an 
aerodrome are not basically different from t hose carried out by the 
local authority fire service in dealing with domestic fires. Secondly, the 
control and direction of the airport fire services should be under the 
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control of the airport management so t hat they are able to meet their 
licensing obligations and to fulfill their safety obligations to the aircraft 
operators. TillS means not only the operational control, but also decisions 
on equ.ipment, manning and training. They also need to exercise financial 
control in respect of their own trading accounts. 
2 1  After an aircraft accident on or near an airport, which is first attended 
by the airport fire service, the normal procedure is for the local authority 
fire service to attend and take over control allowing the airport fire service 
to withdraw and replenish. This irnplies planning and collaboration 
between the two services. 
22 1n the case of aerodromes where the licensee is the local authority 
we believe that an effective and efficient service can be provided by 
either integrated or separate fire services. This is supported by the 
evidence of the Department of Trade and Industry from their inspections 
of these services. The question of integration should be onc for each 
tocal authority to  decide after considering the relative advantages or 
disadvantages from the points of view of organisation, operational 
efficiency and cost. 
23 I n cases where the aerodrome operator is not a tocal authority, and 
may be a government department, another authority (such as the BAA) 
or a private or commercial orgallisation, t here would be considerable 
management problems involved in  integration and we can think of no 
over-riding operational advantage that would suggest that t his should 
be the recommended system. We consider that integration should be a 
matter for mutual agreement between the two authorities if they wish 
to pursue It .  
Heathrow Airport London 
General description 
24 The map of the aerodrome at Appendix 7 shows that it consists of 
2 main runways running east/west and a subsidiary aligned northeast! 
southwest. The main fire station is situated on the nonh side, the passenger 
buildings, control tower, BAA management offices and a second fire 
station in  the central area, and the eargo terminal and general aviation 
areas on the south side. The offices and maintenance bases of BEA 
and BOAC are to the cast and the main fuel farm to the west. The 
aerodrome covers 2721 acres. 
25 The annual passenger flow exceeds 1 4  million and the aircraft 
movements 258,000. The number of passenger aircraft using the airport 
continues to  increase a t  a rate of about 7} per cent per annum, although 
a ceiling may be reached in  the future as the number of movements 
approaches the airport's maximum capacity. About 25 per cent of alt 
movements consist of large four-engined jet aircraft. The Boeing 747 
currently operated by Pan Am and TWA commenced operations in  
January 1 970. Movements by this type of aircraft wil l  increase when 
BOAC, Lufthansa and other airl ines bring their aircraft into service. 
Their average passenger capacity exceeds 350 but this may in  the future 
exceed 450 for some charter flights. 
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26 From the fire and rescue point of view, Heathrow is already in the 
highest category envisaged under the licensing document CAP 1 68 .  The 
potential number of casualties from an aircraft accident will tend to 
increase as larger a ircraft are brought into service. The emergency servjce�' 
plans therefore need to be tailored to provide for the potential risk. 
I n considering this problem we reaJjse that the statistics refer only to 
persons on board. There is always the possibility that houses, factories and 
third parties may be involved in aircraft accidents both 'on' rmd 'off' the 
aerodrome and the numbers of casualties may thus be increased. 
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Chapter 2 Fire and rescue 
Introduction 
27 Using the pattern or a hypothetical aircrart accident as a guide we 
examined the procedures of the organisations involved in the fire and 
rescue operations from the initial alarm through to the ultimate 
fircground activities. \Ve considered concurrently any related questions 
arising frol11 this examination. 
Aerodrome fire service 
Licensing 
28 Onc of the cOl1dition� of the aerodrome licence issued by the Department 
or Trade and Industry under Article 65 or the Air N3\ igation Order 1970, 
requires the licensee to provide an aerodrome fire service to an appropriate 
scale as set out in Section V I  of the licensing document : Civil Aviation 
Publication (CAP) 1 68. This document also specifics minimum standards 
and operational requirements in respect of the quantities of fire 
extinguishing media, scales of rescue equipment, personnel) training and 
emergency organisation. In the case of Heathrow this service is provided 
by the British Airports Authority (BAA). (An extract or Section V I  
or CAP 1 68 is at Appendix 5.)  
FUllction 
29 The primary objective of an aerodrome fire scn ice is to save lives. 
I ts achievement can depend on the rollowing: 
(a) t he effect i\ eness or the eq ui pment ; 
(b) the speed with which the equipment and personnel can be brought into 
action ; and 
(c) the training received - hence the effectiveness of the personnel. 
Operational planning for major aircraft accidellf situations 
30 As it would not be economically practicable 1 0  provide at an aerodrome 
a fire and rescue organisation capable of dealing with a major accident 
\olcly from its own resources, the development of effective emergency plans 
to ensure the prompt mobilisation of fire, ambu lance, medical and 
police support from externally based authorities is an important 
requirement in the licensing of civil aerodromes. 
Local authority fire services 
S((I(Ulory responsibility 
3 J  The Fire Services Act 1 947 (Section I )  provides that i t  shall be the duty 
of every fire authority in Great Britain to make provision for fire fighting 
purposes; and in particular every fire authority shall secure : 
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(a) the services for their area of such a fire brigade and such equipment "' 
may be necessary to meet efficiently all normal requirements; 
(b) the efficient training of the members of the fire brigade;  
(c) efficient arrangements for dealing with calls for the assistance of the 
fire brigade in ca�e of fire and for summoning members of the fire 
brigade ; 
(d)  efficient arrangements for obtaining, by inspection or otherwise, 
information required for fire fighting purposes \\ i th respect to the 
character of the buildings and other property in  the area of the fire 
authority, the available water supplies and the means of access thereto, 
and other material local circumstances; 
(c) efficient arrangements for ensuring that reasonable McpS are taken to 
prevent or mitigate damage to property resulting from measures taken 
in  dealing with fires in the area of the fire authority; 
(r) efficient arrangements for the giving, when requested, of advice 1 1 1  
re;pect of buildings and other property in the area of the fire authority 
a� 10 fire prevention, restricting the �pread of fires, and means of 
escape i n  case of fire. 
The Greater London Council hU\e this responsibility in  respect of lIeathrow 
Airport, nearly all of which lies within the Greater London Council area. 
A small section of the southern part of the aerodrome come:, within 
the area of the Surrey County Council, but by arrangements wnh the G LC 
under Section 1 2  of the Fire Sen ices Act 1947 the latter undertake; 
fire fighting respon;ibilit ies for the \\hole of the aerodrome, \Vith Surrey 
Fire Brigade giving assistance and SUppOrL as requested and carrying 
out fire prevention work in  their sect ion. The Buckinghamshire Fire Brigade 
assists the London Fire Brigade (LFB) with attendances at the aerodrome. 
Such i nter-fire brigade arrangcmcnts for reinforcemenl arc in accordance 
with Section 2 of the Fire Services Acts 1 947 and 1 959. 
Transfer of command at aircraft accidents 011 I-Ieathrow A irport 
32 Although the LFB has overall responsibility for fire fighting at 
Hcathrow. the first attack at aircrafl accidents on the aerodromes is 
normally made by the Brit;,h Airports Authority Fire Senice (BAA FS). 
The initial role of the LFB in these circumstances is to act i n  support, 
and the senior BAA FS officer prescnt is in o\erall command of the fire 
attack on the aircraft. When a senior LFB omcer arrives he assumes 
command of the combined fire service operations; however, i t  has been 
agreed between the two fire services that he will not, \\ ithout consultation 
with the BAA/FS officer-in-charge, alter the deployment of appliances, 
equipment and manpower, or withdraw tactical control of the situation 
from the BAA/FS unless he deem; this to be absolutely necessary. 
Local authority fire sel'l'ices' operational role at aircraft accidellls 
011 Heathrolf A irport 
33 Aircraft accidents may be accompanied by fire because of the large 
quantities of flammable fuels and liquids which may have been released 
in the presence of sources of ignition. A characteristic of t hese fires is 
that they spread and reach major proportions very quickly. This rapid 
development jeopardises survivability within the aircraft ; the permanent 
need therefore is to be able to make an immediate and effective attack. 
with all available resource�, to protect the surviving occupants and to 
create conditions in which their c:,capc or rescue is po�sible. 
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34 At He"thrml , the BA A/ � S i; able to prol ide tl1l5 initial inte",ive 
fire attack because of their specialised equipment and training and 
becau�e the position of the fire �lalioll:' gives the moM immediate access 
to accidents in the nreu. 
35 Local authority fire services have an important contribution to make 
at aircraft accident!, occurring on the aerodrome. They provide expert 
fire and rescue support aftcr the aerodrome fire service has made the 
first attack 011 the fire and arc also available la consolidate any 
advantages gained. 
36 The first appliances of the LFB aim to arrive at the I-Ieathrow 
rendezvous points 5 minutes after gelling the 'alert' call. A pre-delermined 
attendance is seIll comprising : 1 0  pumping appliances, I hose layer, 
1 foam tender, I emergency lender, I breathing apparatus control van 
( BACV), I control unil. Addltionall), " unit comprising I hose laycl 
and I pumping appliance \land� by at the aerodromc main fire !:,tation. 
and I turntable ladder 1\ ordered to the nominated rcndezvou� POIlll .  
TllI� attendance 1\ capable of atlJcking re�idual and �econdary fire� and 
�upprc!:,!:,jng fre�h oUlbreak�. I t  is invaluable a� a source of the extra 
equi pment and manpower \\ hich may bc needed at a major accident 
In\ ohing the rescue of many ca�ualtie�. Where building� are included 
I II  lhe post-accident fire the L F B  i'> able to dnl\\ on a wealth of experience, 
lIsing its �pecial skills and equipment. How these L F B  rcinforcements 
are u!:'cd. whether on fire fighting, water supply or resclIe work, is 
dependent upon the part icular circumstances of each accident and on the 
Judgcment of the ofllcer-in-charge. 
LU('lt/ lIl1l/zoriIY fire �en'lces II'/I/z aerudrullle.� fI1 {/zeir area 
37 I t  IS not in our terms of reference to cOJ1!:'ider aerodromes other thall 
Ileathrow. Howc\cr. we note that some local authorities (including 
London. Surrey and Buch.) ha\c acquired, or are considering the 
prOVI:::' lon of. foam appliance� and ho:::.e laycrs (a!:' appropriate) with some 
regard to aerodrome fuel farm 01" a\ ialion rish in their areas. We consider 
t h b  to be a sound development. and ,>ugge�t that othcr local authorities 
\\ith aerodromes in their arca� may \\i�h to rcvic\\ their capability of 
giving a�!:'i:::. lance at aircraft accident,. 
OI)Crations at aerodroJlles with dCI,lctcd firc :')cn icc:') 
rhe 1I1eaning allll e.f(ec/ of depleled fir" ,sel'l'ices 
38 The operation of aerodrome", u�ed by public Iran:::.port passenger­
carrying aircraft is subject to the tel"ms or thc aerodromc l icence which 
require, amongst other thing'> that : 
'No aircraft shall tahe-oIT or land at the aerodrome unle:::.� such fire fighting 
and re�cue !:'ervice:::. and �uch medical \ervicc\ and equipment a� are 
required in re:::.pect or such an aircraft i n  the Department or Trade 
and Indu'try publication CAP 1 68 ( LicenSi ng of Acrodromcs) arc 
provided t here. Such �ervice\ and equipment �hall at al l  times when thc 
aerodrome is available for t he take-oO' or landlllg of aircraft be kept fit 
and ready for immediate turnout'. 
19 The Dep .. Htmcnt or Trade and I ndu ... try i".,uc\ to liccn,ees, management ...  
opcrator� and others cuncerned with civil aerodrol1lc�. l1lel11or3nd�\ 
containlllg advice and guidancc on policy. At Appendix 6 i�  a copy or 
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such a memorandum - DAT 1/70, (now being revised to take account of 
of the new Licensing Documcnt) which deals with the subject of depleted 
fire service cover. The aerodrome fire service may be partially or wholly 
depleted for a number of reasons including being aLready committed to an 
accident, 'domestic' fire, or other incident from which i t  cannol disengage, 
or because the extinguishing media carried by the appliances have been 
discharged. ( I  n this context 'domestic' fire is defined as any fire on the 
aerodrome not included i n  the categories 'aircraft accident" 'aircraft ground 
incident', 'full emergency' and 'local stand by'). When an aerodrome fire 
service is  substantially depleted i t  cannot provide an adequate service in 
the event of al l  emergencies, the normal consequence of this is for aircraft 
operations to be restricted in accordance with OAT Memorandum 1/70 
until the fire and rescue service is again restored, wholly or in part. 
Policy governing res/ticled operatiolls 
40 We recognise that it is the responsibility of the managements of 
licensed aerodromes to keep themselves informed of the statc of availabi lity 
of their aerodrome fire service and 10 take appropriate action when Ihc�c 
are depleted. I n  the case of the BAA Fire Sen ice at Heathrow the effect 
of depleted cover upon aerodrome operations and the consequential 
action to be taken arc a matter of policy for the BAA within the limits 
set out in the OAT Memorandum o. 1 /70. This policy needs lo be 
flexible if  i t  is to lake account of the economic penalties of reMricling 
operations, and the cost of additional fire cover. The airline companies, 
although appreciative of BAA FS allendances a l  domestic fires on lhe 
aerodrome, can be faced with costly diversions caused by the resultant 
depIction of cover, and the aerodrome would lose part of it!) revenue from 
landing fees. 
Tile /leed /01" gllida/lce 
4 1  We consider that to enable the BAA Fire Service to make effecllve 
decisions i t  needs clear guidance and discretionary powers from 
management. We therefore examined the present situation at Heathro\\ 
concerning the effects of BAA FS attendance at domestic fires and speCial 
service calls on the aerodrome and at accidents off the aerodrome. The 
following paragraphs contain our recommendations which aim to provide 
this basic guidance. 
(Note. We understand that during the course of our enquiry the ne \I ..
procedures that \\e have ,uggc'ted for BAA/FS attendances at dome'tlc 
fires and off-aerodrome aircraft aecidcnts have been accepted by the BAA, 
and that implementing instructions have now been issued to all BAA 
aerodromes.) 
Respollsibility /01' selldi/lg the 8A A/ FS of  tile aerodrome 
42 Whilst the BAA has no responsibility for attending aircrafl accident' 
outside the licensed area of the aerodrome, i t  has, for humanitarian 
reasons, been the practice to make an attendance within a li mited area. 
At the outsel of our e,"mination of the problem of depleted fire co\er 
at Heathrow. we noticed that the relevant instructions in the Emergency 
Orders were misleading since lhey implied that Air Traffic Control had 
responsibility for deciding on BAA/FS attendance off the aerodrome. The 
resultant depiction could involve a restriction on aircraft operations \\hich 
is a BAA management responsibility to impose. When both the Fire Sen ice 
and the ATe were under common management by a government 
department, the wording in the Emergency Orders was correct. Since the 
formation of lhe BAA. lhe Fire Service come!> under their cOlllrol. \\ hil'it 
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the ATe remains wi t h the Department of Trade. We consider that the 
precise responsibilities should be clearly stated. 
We therefore recommelld that the BAA institutes a procedure which Recommelldation No. 2 
requires the Air Traffic Control Watch Supervisor, on duty when an 
aircraft accident occurs outside the aerodrome boundary, Lo inform the 
BAA Fire Service of the occurrence and its location. 
( Nole. We note that the BAA has now clarified this question in consu ltat ion 
with the Depart ment of Trade.) 
Strel1gth and area of operatioll of (I BAA/FS ot/ent/allce olf Ihe aerodrome 
43 Given that t he aerodrome management must decide policy in respect 
of how far from the aerodrome and in what strength the BAAjFS should 
attend olT-aerodrome accidents and for the aerodrome operations to 
continue, we con�idercd the present conditions under which t he BAA/FS 
attended. From lhc�c \\e formulated a recommendat ion which we suggC&t 
will,  if incorporated in Heuthrow Emergency Ordcr�, givc clcar gu idance 
'" to BAAjFS attendance in future. 
44 I t  i, normal practice al present for the BAAjFS to make a full 
attendance at aCl:idcnl!:> occurring on the aerodrome. For ai rcraft accidenb 
occurring off the aerodrome, but within 2 miles of the airport perimeter 
road, the BAAjFS makes a partial at tendance. This ensures that sufficient 
cover remains to protect cont inu i ng operations. \Ve consider that the size 
of BAA/FS attendance off the aerodrome must be a matter of judgement 
based on the BAA/FS tactical position at the t i me but, in view of present 
equipment held, a l imit of 50 per cent of the available media should 
cause no major change in aerodrome operat ions. 
45 A� to the di&tance that the F i re Sen ice �hould go from t he aerodrome, 
\\e consider 2 miles from the airport perimeter road to be a reasonable 
general l imit.  "Ne rea Use that in practice a fixed dbtance may seem 
unrealistic with regard to the \urying road and traffic condition� on dilTerent 
�ides of  the aerodrome, but consider that an arbitrary limit :,hould be 
!:>wted a� an adminbtrati\c eApedient for the benefit of t he surrounding 
local authority emergency sen ice� a� welt a� those of the aerodrome, 
Wc therefore recommend that the BAA Fire Service continue& to attend 
aircraft accidents, occurring within the aerodrome boundary, with alt 
available appliances ; for accidents occurring beyond the boundary and 
thought to be located not 1110re than 2 m i les from the airport perimeter 
road, the allendanee should not exceed 50 per cent of the media; beyond 
2 miles no automatic attendance should be made although, at the discretion 
of the BAA Fire Service officer-in-charge, one appliance may be despatched 
in response to a request from the accident site for technical advice or for 
support with specialised equipment. 
Strength alld durm;oll of BAA/FS allelldallce at domestic fires 
46 Although there i s  no obligation upon the BAAjFS to at tend domestic 
catls, i t  has always done so. The LFB Inakes an attendance whether or not 
the BAAjFS has responded and regard less of the strength of their 
attendance. H owever, there was a need to consider the extent to which 
the BAAjFS attendance at a domestic call would reduce its capabi lity 
of dealing adequately wit h a n  aircraft accident should one occur al the 
same time. We therefore considered the operationa l need for the BAAjFS 
to atlend domestic fires and special service catls at Heathrow. We 
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ReCOl1llllefld(lf;ol/ No. 3 
Recommendation No. 4 
ReCOlllmefldarioll No. 5 
Recommendatioll No. 6 
considered that a separate appliance and crew for domestic purposeo; 
was not required but that any response to  domestic fires and special 
,ervices should be made from the appliances and crews provided to meet 
the licensing requirement. We accordingly made the following 
recommendations. 
We recommend that the BAA Fire Service attends al l  calls to fires occurring 
in aerodrome bulk fuel installations, in aircraft parked on aprons or  in  
hangar). Aucndancc should be with all available appliances in the fir.,t 
in')tance due to the nature of these fires and the risk they pre ent to 
operations at the aerodromc, and because of the special equipment which 
the BAA Fire Service has available. 
We recommend that the BAA Fire Service makes a predetermined 
attendance for calls 10 all other fires involving premises, technical 
installations or structures or for incidents where persons arc known or are 
thought to  be a t  risk. This will normally be onc appliance capable of 
fire fighting operations. The decision in respect of an additional attendance 
in  response to  a message from the incident shall be at the discretion of the 
B \ A  Fire Sen ice officer-in-charge, having regard to the anticipated 
attendance and response time of the London Fire Brigade. 
\Vc recommend that the BAA Fire Sen ice continues to  inform the Air 
Traffic Control if, through the d ischarge of extinguishing media or for 
any other other reason. the available strength of the Service drops by 
two or more categories i n  terms of the scale set OUI i n  Section VI of the 
licensing document CAP 1 68 .  
iting of BAA fire stations at Heathrow 
47 The need for an aerodrome fire !loervice to  ha\e the shortest possible 
response times is self-evident. A definition in current LCAO documentation 
describes response time as 'the time taken between the initial call to the 
rescue and fire fighting service and the first effective intervention by a rescue 
and fire fighting vehicle'. Of the many factors which can affecl a fire 
�ervice's response time, the l eAO 'Aerodrome Manual', considers the 
location of the aerodrome fire station to be one of prime importance. 
It recommends that fire and rescue equipment should ha\e i n  tant acce�s 
to  aerodrome movement areas and be capable of reaching the extremities 
of  the aerodrome and runways in minimum time and desirably within 
three minutes under optimum conditions of visibility and surface condition ...  
Preselll sites of BAA fire slat ions tit HeathroH' 
48 There are 2 BAA fire stations at Heathrow. The main (north) station 
is just to the north of and aboul midway along Runway 28 R/IOL. 
The central fire station is situated to the south of the central terminal area 
at the extremity of No I passenger pier (see the map at Appendix 7). 
BAAIFS respollse lime trial'l 
49 Tests carried out in February and April 1 970 demonstrated that it  is 
possible for vehicle to reach the extreme ends of both. main runways 
within the 3 minutes recommended by ICAO. We realise that only part 
of the total force may reach the accident scene within this time but consider 
that these tests at Heathrow adequately demonstrate that the BAA/FS 
can meet the l e AO recommendation and a similar requirement i n  the 
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rcvi,cd CA P 168. Wc al;o note the pre,ent dispo.ition of vehicles between 
the two ,tallons and under;tand that onc further bay " to be provided 
at the central ,tation, so that when full Category X cover I; provided, 
with 3 minimum of 8,000 gallons of waler carried 011 vehicles, the 
d"po"lIon of the available media will  be broadly equal between the two 
stations. Accepting the demonstrated response l Ime� as a true indication 
of capability and a�sumJng tha1 the first \chicles from the nearest station 
d ischarge at maximum capacity, the duration of the firM attack will be 
more than 2 minute') and therefore long enough for the vehicles from the 
other station 10 arrive Hnd continue the attac).... We note that the BAA 
re�cqulpment programme provides that the initial d ischarge rate from two 
foam lenders from either station exceeds the licensing requirements for 
a ategory X aerodrome. 
50 From our examination of the response t i mes, it is clear that the 
north station has an advantage ovcr the central station in onc casc, has 
panty II I  anolher and is l)fed ictably worse i n  the case of Runway 28L/ I OR .  
The north �Iation. on i ts  present sitc. scrvcs Runway 28R/lOL and gives 
rCJ"onably d i rect acces ... to the central area complex where a fuelling 
firc Illay present ... criou� problems. The central station is sitcd to provide 
IIllmediate cover for the central area and to serve Runways 23/05 and 
28L, 1 0R.  The prinCipal buildings in the new Freight Terminal and in the 
mallHenance areas have built-in fire protection systems. Aircraft fire 
ri�ks outSide thcsc buildings arc not likely to involve a risk to many lives, 
ncvcrtheless, for any call to an emergcncy involving an aircraft on the 
ground the BAA/FS would make a full attendance. We consider. therefore, 
that tactically the pre,ent location of the fire stations otlers reasonable 
responsc times to both areas. 
Possihle re-siting of [ire stations 
5 1  On the possibility of re-siting it is reasonable to consider what 
advantages might be gained in improvcd response timcs. The original plan 
\\hcn Ilcathrow was bcing developed was to site the main station i n  the 
central area but this was changed because it was thought that better use 
could be made of the hmited space available if a smaller station ,v>, buil t  
there. Other proposals considered a t  that t ime were to site one station 
to the south, i n  '0 2 maintenance area, or to  build the fire stations at 
Ihc cast nnd we�t cnd.., of the aerodromc. The prcsent configuration with 
Ihe main station on thc north side wa� adopted after an analysis of the 
plotted pOSition, of all m rcraft accident> \\ hich had occurred on or 
around lIeathro\\ up to 1 96 1 .  This analys" showed Ihat the shortest 
responsc li mes for all appliances would have been from fire stations 
at the central and northern sires, and four significant accidents which 
occurred subsequently have borne out this theory. 
Conclusion 
52 On the evidence available we do not consider thal any change 
i n  the prc�cnt siting of the fire stations at Heathrow is justified. 
Command and manpower of the BAA/F� 
S3 Although present arrangements at  Heathrow more than fulfil tile 
l equircl11ents described in CAP 1 68 in terms of watch and overall 
command, we consider that the related questions of command and 
manpower exert a strong influence on the scope and efficiency of fireground 
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tactics. We thererore examined the BAA/ FS "ructure in relation to the 
pre,ent equipment. Wc comider that the BAA/ FS i, making effectivc u'c 
of the trained firemen under its command. Wc note that the BAA/FS 
is implementing a programme of rc-equipment, with appliances of 
improved flreground and operational flexibility, which will modiry present 
fireground tactics and manpower requirements. This, coupled with any 
future changes i n  licensing requirements that may occur as a result of the 
continuing ICAO studies. precludes any prcci"e forecast of Ihe future 
BAA/FS manning structure. 
54 rn the past some criticism has been made about command and i t  
has been suggested that t here is a requirement ror a high calibre or 
appliance commander. We suggest that lllis should be interpreted i n  tcrm� 
or ability. Fire service aim, by allracting the right type or recruit and by 
selective employment and training processes, to produce competent 
appliance commanders who arc qualified by experience and by their 
qualities or leadership. 
\Vc recommend that the BAA Fire Service make� a\'ailable junior officer>; 
or , grade nOl less than Section Leader with responsibility ror the 
conduct of parts of the fireground operations at an aircraft accident, 
leaving the officer-in-charge or the overall allendance, usually an Aerodrome 
Fire Officer Grade 1 1 , to d irect a l l  phases or the operation. 
(Note: We understand that this organisation is in operation. ) 
Equipment 
General obsel'l'orioll.'t 
55 \Ve considered whether the e\isting equipment and media at HeathrO\\ 
now work adequately and meet the criteria and requirement') laid down 
by the Department or Trade and Industry in CAP 1 68 ;  and we round 
this to be the case. Since 1 968 considerable effort has been made by 
the BAA to improve equipment aod to correct equipment defects. 
Maintenance procedures (including testing and inspection) for equipment. 
eg. delivery hose, have been revised and we have no rea�on to believe 
that present maintenance procedure') are inadequate. 
Foam and water-tenders 
56 ' ubian Major' appliances are now in service at Heathrow. The 
capabilities or this appliance are markedly greater than those or the 
ordinary ' N ubian' appliances which were in service i n  1 968. The present 
' M ajor' model carries nearly twice as much water, 1 500 gall. in place 
or 800 gall . ;  260 gall. of foam liquid compared with a previous 1 00 gall. 
and, whereas the older type or monitor had an output or 200 gall. per min .. 
t he output or the new onc is 660 gall. per min.  - a capability that may 
be increased. Further important advantages of the ' M ajor' arc the ability 
to produce foam whilst moving at reduced speed, a sideline pressure 
adjusting device. and the availability or engine speed control at the 
monitor operator's position. The first provides an appliance commander 
with greater tactical flexibility which can increase the efficacy of the vital 
initial attack on the fire, and the second is a device designed to prevent 
transmission of excessive pressures from the main pump 10 the sideline 
hoses when these are being used at the same time as the monitor. 
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57 One of the safety advantages enjoyed by Heathrow Airport is an 
e,tensive hydrant and deluge system. The deluge systems are in the larger 
hangars and freight terminal, whilst the hydrants are arranged i n  3 rings: 
an inner ring around the central area; a middle ring within the area 
formed by the centre portions of the runways; and an outer ring round the 
outside edge of the outer runways. The hydrant system operates on stored 
pre�:-,ure and has pumps which start automatically as the hydrants are 
operated. A constant pressure of I 25/lbs/sq. in. is provided throughout 
the system making available approximatcly 450 gall. of water per min. 
from each of the twin hydrant outlets. Although the availability of 
thi:-, hydrant system is at pre5CI1t accepted as meeting part of the 
licen�ing requirement for water supply, this wi l l  no longer be necessary 
after the introduction of the new appliances since they carry the required 
quantity. The Department of Trade has already advised the BAA to this 
effect. The hydrant system and the hose-laying vehicle will continue to be an 
invaluable reserve should one of the major foam-making appliances become 
unserviceable and they wi l l  be u,eful in  the support of foam producing 
appliances after the initial attad • . The hydrant system is also needed to 
facilitate the fighting of fires in buildings and technical installations. 
A/ollitors 
58 I n  view of the increasing fuselage heights of new large aircraft (the 
Boeing 747 is approximately t\\ ice the height of the Boeing 707) wc 
considered the desirabil ity of elevating t he fire appliance monitor above 
vehicle roof level. I n  theory this should give a more accurate t rajectory 
for the delivery of foam. The precise need for elevated monitors has sti l l  
to be established and we recogni:-,e that there arc a number of difficulties 
to be overcome should it be decided to provide them. These include the 
:-,tability problems \\ hich will arise \\  hen an elevated monitor is operated, 
and the loss of water-carrying caraCil) caused by the weight of the monilOr­
clevating structure. We note that the Departmcnt of Trade is examining 
the problems of an elevated monitor based on a vehicle \\ ith a larger 
chassis capable of carrying 3000 gallon, or more. 
Rescue tenders 
59 Our discussion on the operational role of rescue tenders revealed 
a difference of opinion within the Working Party. The basic concept, 
\\ hich had the support of the majority and i!:t contained in the ICAO 
Aerodrome Manual Part 5 Volume I ,  is of an appl iance capable of rapid 
re:-,ponse and carrying rescue tools and equipment, a small quantity of an 
cxtingubhing agent and a crew whose primary dUlY is to initiate rescue 
operations or to assist the evacuation of aircraft's occupants. As the 
performance of this vehicle !:thou Id enable it to reach the scene ahead of 
the major fire fighting appliances the officer-in-charge riding on this 
vehicle could U5e this advantage to a:-,sess the situation and to direct the 
taCllcal disposition of the appliances. ICAO recognises the need for 
re:-,cue tenders to have a superior performance and recommends that they 
should accelerate from 0-50 mph in 35 seconds, as compared with 
45 seconds for major fire fighting appliances. 
60 The difference of opinion centered on the measure of advantage to be 
gained by the superior performance of rescue tenders and the overal l  
effect on manning which is caused by providing separate crews for rescue 
tenders. I t  was argued that over the relatively short distances travelled 
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by aerodrome fire applianccs the rescue tender would reach the accidcnt 
�ite only a few seconds ahead of the main appliances, and this would not 
give the officer-in-charge any significant tactical advantage. Any advantage 
claimed had not been clearly substantiated. I n  respecl of manning, 
the difference of view was on the question of the optimum use of all 
crew-members i n  the total attendance. 
6 1  The precise function of a rescue tender, crewed by the officer-in-charge, 
a driver and two men intended to operate as a rescue-team, was examined 
and one view was that this may not be the most effective arrangement. 
Any men required to form the rescue element might well ride on the 
major fire fighting appliances and thus have the operat ional flexibility to 
assist in the fire attack, if this were necessary on arrival, or to conduct 
rescue operations if the;e were possible. As all men in the BAA Fire 
Service are trained in the whole range of fireground duties each could 
take part in fire fighting or rescue work as required. We noted that the 
BAA provides more men on the foam-producing appliances than arc 
necessary to achieve the minimum discharge rates required by the licence. 
62 1 n  considering these opposing views we had regard to the technical 
development incorporated in BAA's new foam tenders and to the possible 
development of rescue tenders. I t  is accepted that the foam tenders have 
the ability to discharge their contents very rapidly which could mean that 
the crew-members would become available for other duties when the 
foam tenders were exhausted. The majority were not satisfied that this 
lIould provide an adequate level of rescue eft'ort in the earliest phase of 
an operation where, with a serious fire situation, the opportunities for 
rescue may be brief. I t  is our view that with large aircraft with high 
passenger loads the rescue element should arrive with appropriate 
equipment in a separate vehicle which will not be liable to diversion 
for major fire fighting activities, which may be conducted on the movc. 
The rescue personnel may need to don special clothing and breathing 
apparatus and to deploy apparatus to gi\e acccss to, or egress from, the 
aircraft. These considerations led us to the conclusion that rescue tenders 
should be separately crewed (although when there are no immediate 
rescue operations to perform, these men can undertake other duties at the 
direction of the officer-in-charge). 
63 I n  considering (he need for a device which will  provide a means of 
rapid descent for escaping passengers we recognised thal there may be 
problems in incorporating this equipment in the rescue tender. 
We were aware of studies which are in progress within BAA and by an 
inter-departmental committee under the chairmanship of t he Department 
of the E nvironmenl. Whilst it is too early to anticipate the outcome of 
these we are of the opinion that i t  would be undesirable to require the 
reScue tender to carry the escape device in addition 10 its normal equipment 
if the effect would be to restrict the performance and the deployment of the 
,ehicle. Similarly, wc feel that (0 carry more than a small quantity of 
the supplementary extingulshing agents on the present type of rescue tender 
may not only affect its performance but would also present unacceptable 
problems in operational deployment. 
64 \Ve find a special operational situation exists at Heathrow because two 
fire stations are provided to meet the essential re ponse time. As there 
b only one rescue tender its operational advantages are limited to those 
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Im':�l l Iom, \\ 11Ieh can be reached fir\l from the fire �tation i n  which i t  i� 
ba\cd. \Ve consider t his to  be undesirable and are of the view that the 
operat ional advantages of a rescue tender should be available regardless of 
the location of the incident. This, and the views expressed in paras 65 
to  67 IOclusl\e, arc those of the majority of the Working Party. 
\Ve therefore recommelld that, unles� a re�cue tender can be provided 
which mect� the recommended response t ime to a l l  parts of the aerodrome 
from onc f i re station, the BAA provides a rescuc tender in each fire 
... tatlon al I leathro\\. 
A/aflllillg Jor (I ,.e�clle tellder 
65 We accepted t hat the manning of appliances I�  a maller fOf agreement 
bel\\een the licensing authority and the aerodrome authority. At each 
I!cen�ing in�pection I here are a number of factors which together determine 
Ihe acceptability for licensing of the fire fighting and re�cue service. and 
the sole objective of the assessment must be to  en:,ure that the manner 
of proYl!ooion satisfies the terms of the licensing document. We \\cre 
therefore 111 some difficulty i n  expressing the manning which \\ e fel t  to be 
nc(c!'sary to operate re:,cue tender:,. si nce this reqUIred consideration of 
only onc aspect or the o\crall manning requircment. The situation \"as 
made more d lflicuh becau ... e thc BAA Fife Sen Ice I� mld\\ay through ;1 
re�eqUlpmcnt programme. 
66 It  wa� our opinion. notwithstandll1g thc�e dlmcultIC�. that havlIlg 
recommended the provi ... lon of rcscue tenders, \\e �hould also expres!> 
a \ IC\\ on the mannlllg of Ihcse applia nces so as to prOVide a complete 
picturc of their opcrational employment. For re�cue tenders designed to  
:-.ene a dual role. combll1111g the carriage of  �OIl1C fire fighting agent and 
the rc�cue eqUlpmcnt, the crcwillg mu�t recogni')e the pos\lble need for 
the � l Il1ultaneou.., performance of both funct ion,.  Rescue tender ... which 
urc dC�lgncd primarily a ... appliance:, c;lrrYlllg looh and equlpmcnt for 
lI�e I n  re!!tcue operalloll� !!thould bc manned so as to provide not less t han 
one t\\O�l1lan group tramed and equi pped for entry IOta the occupied 
porllol1 of the aircraft and for search and rescue operallol1!oo. I n  addition 
a rc!!tcue tender may C .. HfY the omcer-in�chargc of the total allendance 
\\ho \\ 1 1 1  ha"e o\crall direction of lire light ing and rc�cue operations. 
67 Onc t\�o-mal1 UIlIt. making entry ilt .1 \Ingle POl11t nhly not be 
��mcleJ1t to deal \\·Ilh the rcscue requirement in  accident\ 1 Il\'01v1l1g aircraft 
.,eatlng 1 50 or more pas�engers; and l i t t le assistance can be expected 
from the crews of the fire fighting appliance.., during the early stages of nn  
accident with fire when the need for rc!!tcue Illay be most urgent. For thil) 
,lIuallon the re�cuc clcment should consist of at least two two-man 
ul1lh not including the officer-in-charge but. for the rea ... ons \\e have already 
gl\cn. we would accept that the manner in  which thc�c men �hould be 
prOVided IS a �ubjecl for agreement between the aerodrome and the 
licenSing authority. I n  the case of IleHlIHO\\, and based on our current 
t...no\\ledge or the types of rescue tender tl\allable. \\c have recommended 
that lWO �hould be pro\ ided unless onc can meet the recommended respo nse 
t ime. \\'e make the follo\\ ing recommendation i n  fe'pect of manning. 
We recommend that, If t he two rescue tender:. recommended for 
I leathrow arc provided, each should be manned by a two�ll1an rescue 
team. One of lhe�e re�cue tenders should al')o carry the officer-I ll-charge 
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of the Watch. If only one rescue tender is available, both two-man rescue 
crews should ride this appliance. 
J\1il1orily opinion of the British Airports A whority 
68 The British Airports Authority, having recently conducted tests which 
show that ei ther their ubian Majors or their rescue tenders can meet 
the [CAO response times from eith.er the north. or the central fire stat ion . 
note that, as they accord with the proviso in Recommendation No. 8, 
it is unnecessary to provide a rescue tender in each fire station. J ndeed, 
I CAO requirements are met without a second fire station, but the BAA 
intend to keep the central (or subsid iary) fire ;tation in u e to provide 
:-,horter first 3ltendance limes to �ome parts of the aerodrome. The BAA 
consider the value of rescue tenders, which are not required by the 
aerodrome licence, has been over-estimated. As there has been no change in 
ICAO advice, particularly in the Aerodrome Manual since 1 957, it is time to 
re-think the need for and role of rescue tenders. Fourteen years ago they 
had a speed advantage over then current major appliances, but tests now 
show that the Nubian M ajor is little behind a rescue tender, if at all . 
The idea that the rescue tender enable the officer-in-charge to arrive 
first and, after assessing the situation, to order deployment of his appl iances, 
the BAA therefore belie,e is i l lusory. Initial deployment is on the 
initiative of the appliance commander, based 011 sound training. L n  any 
case. it is impossible for the officer-in-charge to be at the same time in 
two fire stations geographica lly well separated, and he may not be in the 
station nearer the incident. The �mall quantity of supplementary media 
carried on rescue tender� is of little use i n  a major conHagration and a 
separate rcscue team of firemen, riding a rescue lender, can be left helplc�� 
by not having a good supply of ext inguishants ready to hand. With the 
new methods of mas�lve foam attack, the crews of most foam tenders, 
having exhaustcd their media in about two minutes, are wholly available 
for rescue, for wruch they are equally trained. 1 1  is better for the rescue 
clement to be provided out of the crews riding major \ chicles, capable 
of qwck ly discharging their contents. For this reason. the BAA consider 
that when men are provided solely for rescue, assuming that is necessary, 
i t  is better to have some riding major appliances from the nearest fire 
station and not concentrate them all in one lightly equipped vehicle startIng 
from a fire station which may be further from the scene of an accident. 
Present rescue tender� do carry the small quantities of rescue tools 
prescribed in the Licensing Pamphlet, some of them only suitable 
for wooden aircraft, but it is also acceptable to carry them on a major 
appliance. It is just as possible to don special clothing and carry breathing 
apparatus on a major vellicle as on a rescue tender, and hence this 
advantage of a rescue tender quoted in para. 62 is also the BAA believe, 
i llusory. The BAA believes that a 'cost-elTectiveness' study would not 
substantiate the provision of re cue tenders and supplementary media 
vehicles nor of crew without substantial quantities of extingu.ishanb to 
hand. 
Ground rescue devices 
69 Under Articles 1 0  and 1 2  and Schedule 5 of the fur avigation Order 
1 970, certain U K  registered public tran'port passenger carrying aircraft 
are required to carry equipment to enable passengers to reach the ground 
safely i n  an emergency whilc the aircraft is on the ground. However, 
there is evidence of an undesirably h.igh rate of failure of in-bui l t  aircraft 
escape devices. They fai l  either for mechanical reasons or because they 
are destroyed by fire. We therefore consider that a ground rescue dcvice 
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could be u,erul pending the Improvement or escape ,Iide equipment. 
Wc note that the Derence Mate,.,."; StandardISation Commlllec ( D MSC), 
rire fighting Equipment Sub-Committee, is considering the operational 
requirement for such dc\ ices. 
\Ve recommend that the DTt ensures that research be continued to improve RecommendaJioll No. 10 
aircrart e;cape equipment, and a ;tudy be made or the need ror, and the 
design of, a ground dc\ ice la facilitate evacuation. 
70 We find that other pos;lble means or sare descent,  \\ hlist all occa,ionall) 
cfficaciouh, have each got l imitatio n s :  
(a) Ladders 
These, �parL from problems of length and \\<cighl, l imit  Lhe exH rate 
to one at a t ll lle at  a speed dependent upon the ability or the individual 
to use a ladder. 
( b) Slel'.\ 
These afC c'pcnSI\lC i.lnd bulky, and \\ Ilh larger aircraft frol11 \\ hieh 
occupants may emerge 2 or 3 abrca� L , steps of the req uisite size w i l l  
be too large to be deplo)ed rapidly . 
(c) IlItlaluble or olher I.lpes oJ SOJI ClIshioll or pad 
The problem of escape frol11 elevated, unfcachable part:.. of an aircraft 
may occasionally be ;olved by the use or a cushion or pad as a breaHall .  
Limitatlon� are the reluctanc!.! of �ome e�caper!) to jump, and the 
:;Iow [ollo\\-on rate due to the lime taken for each � uccc��ful jumper 
to recoyer and move away. 
rraining 
Gener,,1 
7 1  \VC regard trall1JJ1g as most important and note that � Ince 1 968 
more tftu n l l1 g  facilit ie'\. including two out-of-::aervice aircraft carcase�. 
have been made �l\'ailable at I l eathrovv. RealiMic. 'hol'-fire pract ices � t l l l  
tcnd to  be infrequent. bccau�e such acti\ ilies at Heathro\� are often 
cramped by the need 10 m�l intall1 the required fire-cover. and becau�e of 
the �ugge!\tcd effects of �uch aClivitie� on the public and o n  the airline 
pa��enger�' morale. I t  1\ hoped that the limitations imposed by fire-co,"cr 
requirements \v ll l  be largely overcome w ith the advc:nt of ne"" cquipment 
which \\- i l l  create a greater operational rc�ef \'c. \Vc note that the BAA 
Fire Service hold 'hoC-firc c.'(ercises with the London Fire Brigade. 
A l l  BAA FS firemen are given continuation training at lhe Department 
of Trade and I ndustry Fire Service Trai n ing School, at intervals not 
exceeding 3 years - a rrequency higher than Ihat recommended in  CAP 
1 68 which reflecls the Imponance \\ 11Ieh the BA \ place on regular 
training at a central training eSlabli�hment. I n  add it ion there arc 
facilit ie!) at thc aerodrome for them to receive continuation training 
throughout their period of �ervice. 
Combined exercises 
72 We consider overall, large-scale combined exerei es, held regularly -
110t less than once a year afC cIT'eclive in revealing the 'itrengths and 
wea�ne��e!) 111 aerodrome emergency procedures. \Vc reali\c the dimcultic� 
involved in holding major e'(erci!'e� at I leathrO\\ and we note that it  I� 
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the intemion of the BA \ to hold at least onc 1:.1rge�scalc exerci�e 
annually as in the past. I n  addition, l imited exercises can be beneficial 
i n  testing individual aspects of emergency procedures. 
Co-operafion alld facilities af orded by airline companies 
73 We note that the BAA/FS enjoys good co-operation and help with 
training from the airlines, especially those with terminal facilities on the 
aerodrome. Since our enquiry began, arrangements have been made, with 
the assistance of the Airline Operators Commil lee, to improve 
OPI)ortunilie\ for the BA AjF to hU\'e aircraft familiarj,ation training. 
and \\e note that the local authority cmergency services will be included 
i n  the scheme. 
Tee/mica/ training 
74 We consider that there is undoubtedly an interdependence between 
fire brigades involved in fire and rescue work at aircraft accidents. These 
accidents call for a shared knowledge of the aerodrome and its problems, 
a clear chain of command and an underManding of each other's specialilies. 
I t  is important that t here should be appropriate training in  aircraft 
fire fighting for personnel from non-aerodrome fire services which attend 
airport incidents. This will  ensure lhat there is a full understanding of 
the various operational contributions which each can make, as well as 
providing some familiarisation with aircraft fire fighting and rescue 
techniques and the problems I Ilvolved. During our enquiry the 
representatives of the police and the local authority fire and ambulance 
service expressed a wish to receive training in some aspects of aircraft 
fire fighting and rescue, to  assist them in the operational planning and 
performance of their duties and enable them to produce instructor5. 
capable of continuing training wirhin the indh idual serviccs. 
75 We consider that suitable courses of training i n  aircraft fire figbting 
and rescue techniques can best be provided at the Department of Trade 
and I ndustry Fire Sen-ice Training School. Howe\"er, the nature and 
duration of the normal range of course� for aerodrome studenb are not 
suitable for police and local authority fire and ambulance personnel who 
are primarily engaged in duties other than aerodrome duties. Furthermore 
the present lVeekly charge of £75 ("hich includes accommodation but 
not  meals) for normal courses is related to the cost of providing realistic 
fire fighting and rescue ,ituations. Charges of this order would not be 
appropriate for special. shorter courses, nor would t hey encourage 
local authorities or other sponsoring agencies to take ad\'anlage of them. 
Recommellc/arion No. / /  \Ve recommend that the Department of Trade and fndustry provides 
shorter courses, probably lasting 3 to 4 days, specifically for police 
and local authority fire and ambulance personnel, at an attracti\e fee 
which recognises that these courses will  consist largely of lectures and 
discussions but will not involve participation in fire exercises. 
Conclusions 
7 6  At the t ime of our enquiry no serious defects were dbcovered i n  the 
fire and rescue arrangements at Heathrow. \Ve were pleased to note, 
early on in our enquiry. the very close and effective liaison and will ingncs� 
to  co-operate which exists between the British Airports Authority Fire 
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Service and the Constabulary, the local aUlhority Fire Brigades, Ambulance 
Services and the Metropolitan Police, all  of which have responsibilit ies 
at the airport. 
77 Wc came across several problems i n  the emergency arrangements 
la which solutions have either been suggested in Ollr recommendations, 
or have already been effected o r  put i n  hand by the organisations 
concerned. 
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Chapter 3 M edical and ambulance services 
Introduction 
78 Our examination of the arrangements for the provision of medical and 
ambulance services at Hcathrow, and of problems of post-accident care, 
was based on a broad consideration of what could arise following an 
aircraft accident. As part of our study we also considered relevant pariS 
of the Emergency Orders and Schemes of all the emergency scrvice; and 
hospitals concerned and of the Airport Authority. 
Responsibility to provide ambulances. medical �ervices and equipment 
at licensed aerodromel.o 
79 The relevant section of CAP 1 68 requires the l icensee to ma�e 
arrangements la provide or procure various medical services and 
equipment. ( An extract of Section VI I of CAP 1 68 is at  AppendIX 8.)  
A mbulance.'i 
80 There is an obligation in certain circumstances for the aerodrome to 
provide an ambulance or other suitable vehicle. Paragraph 3 of CAP 1 68 
Section Vll states: 
3 Unless an ambulance or arnbul�nces from oUlsidc sources can arrive at the 
aerodrome within 1 5  minutes or bemg summoned an ambulance or other vehicle capable 
or conveying not less than two stretchcr cases shall be provided on the aerodromc_ 
In respect of Heathrow the Greater London Council has responsibilities 
under Section 27 of the National Health Service Act, 1 946, for meeting 
a mbulance needs arising on the aerodrome. It is apparent from our 
examination (see paragraph 109) that external ambulances are available 
within 1 5  minutes from the London Ambulance Service_ There is therefore 
no obligation for BAA to provide any ambulances at Heath row, although 
in fact they do so (see paragraph 84{ii i» . 
Other medical services alld equipmel/f 
8 1  Our examination of the emergency medical arrangements at Heulhrow 
shows that the services and equipment provided are in excess of the 
requirements of CAP 1 68. 
lVledical, ambulance and hospital services available and their deployment 
Afedical and ambulance services available 011 the aerodrome 
82 The following organisations have qualified medical and nursing staft· 
on duty at  the aerodrome_ Some or all  of these wil l  assist in the treatment 
or  after-care of casualties resulting from an aircraft accident ,  but the 
number of staff available depends upon the time and day of the week. 
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83 " I  he Health Control Unit at I leathroll con,i>ls of 8 Medical Officers 
and 50 c1er� receplJonists under the direct control of the Principal Medical 
Omcer 11 ho, in turn, is responsible to the Director of Health and Welfare 
for the Bo,ough of H i l l ingdon. The formal duties of the Medical Officers 
arc mainly routine port health work, immunisations, and the examination 
of Commonwealth il11migrants and aliens. The I lealth Control Unit has 
110 nursing sisters on the staff, or beds under its control. The Medical 
Officers and clerk/receptionists are located 111 t he passenger terminal", 
During normal office hours the distribution allows for a lllaximum of 
three Medical On-leers in Terminal 3, and onc or two 111 Terminals I and 2. 
Dunng the working week only one Med,cal Omcer is available at night 
and he is based in 1 erminal 2. At weekends two are available. The Medical 
Omcers 11 i l l  offer assistance to the BAA nursing staff on request, and 
their dUlic� in the event of an aircraft accident are defined in the Heathrow 
emergency Orders, Pan 1 1 ,  Section F. If  a Medical Oflker is required 
to attend a n  a ircraft emergency at the aerodrome during office hours, 
he comes from Terminals I and 2 because these are closest to the BA" 
Medical Centre, Queens Building. He is, " described in Emergency Orde". 
the Medical Omcer-in-Charge at the scene of the accidenl .  
British Airports Authority 
84 ( i )  " "rsing s,a}]. The BAA Medical Organisation at Heathroll ha, 
eight Nursing Officers and one Principal Nt1r�ing Officer \"ho provide 
a 24-hour service. This nursing �taff carries out occupational health duties 
and offer> limited medical care for BAA employees at the aerodrome. 
I t  is  also available for emergency treatment to other cmployees and the 
public 11 here no alternati\e medical facility is available. I t  is responsible 
through the administration manager at I lcathrow to  the general manager, 
for day to da) admini,tration, and to the BAA Chief Medical Omcer 
for profeSSIOnal matters. The nursing staff IS accommodated in t he Medical 
entre, Queen� Building. 1 his centre comprise one large treatment 
room, and 2 reco\cry r00111S \"ith six to scvcn bcds. There are 
plans to enlarge thl� centre In the near future. BAA have an arrangement 
with the Ilealth Control Unit  whereby the nursing stafl' is  able to ask 
for the aSSt;!ance of one of the unit's Medical Omcers either for the daily 
routine or for emergency work at the centrc. I n  thc event of an aircraft 
emergency, the nU"lIlg >Ialf work> closely \I i th the Health Control Unit  
Medical Officer>. 
Ui )  Medical <'qllipmellf. The BAA Medical Service holds surgical dressings. 
Instrumenl!s. drugs and first aid equipment. I n  addition i t  has resuscitation 
equipment, two large inflatable tents, 200 blankets, 50 stret hers and 
a quantity of plastic �hecl!s. A l l  the above are held in immcdiate readiness 
on a vchiclc for Iran\pOnatlOJl 10 t hc ... cenc. (Sec abo paragraphs 106 
and 107.)  
( I ii) Ambulollces. Actlllg as agents of the airl ines and the London 
Ambulance Service, the BAA at present provides a service of two 
ambulance, between 0700 hrs and 2300 I"" and onc between 2300 Ius 
and 0700 hrs. These vehicles, l ike those of the local authority, arc of t he 
two-wheel drive type and do not have a cross country capability. There is a 
BA" four-II heel drive vehicle (not an ambulance) at Heathrow which 
carries stretchers and other bulky equipment. This is a useful addition 
10 the vehicle force 11 hich can help in  the deploymell1 or ferr) II1g ca,uailie, 
at  aircraft accidents and is particularly u�eful on the soft grass areas. 
BAA ambulances are primarily for the transfer of sick and invalid 
30 .1 Afet/iral Ollti ambulallce strr-lre.f 
passengers to and from aircraft or hospital, but they arc also available 
for accidents or other emergencies. I n  the case of aircrart accidents they 
are driven to the scene where their crews - two firemen to each veh_icle ­
function as ambulance drivers and attendants. They carry the injured 
to the flrst aid tents and may convey patients to hospital. A t  the discretion 
of the BAAjFS officer they may be directed to assist with rescue work. 
However, they are primarily regarded as ambulance crews by BAA and 
it is intended that they should function as such. The resuscitation 
equipment, stretchers, blankets, plastic sheets and dressings carried on 
the BAA vehicles arc available for the use of the S MO and medical 
staft" at the scene as required. 
Air Corporatiolls Joillt Medical Service (ACJMS) 
85 The Air  Corporations Joint Medical Service provides an occupational 
health service for BEA and BOAC, with its headquarters at  the airport. 
The Service has onc of its doctors always wiLhin telephone reach and on 
call a l l  the week. Four occupational health units, manned by a minimum 
of I or 2 of the Sen ice's nursing staff throughout the 24 hours, are located 
in the BOAC Maintenance Complex, Speed bird House; the BEA 
Maintenance Complex (West Pen ) ;  the Central Area Medical Unit, South 
Office Wing, central area ; and in  the cargo terminal, southern area. 
There are no wards but each unit has small re t rooms and one small 
emergency resuscitation room. I n  the event of an accident at Heathrow, 
affecting any airline, the full resources of the ACJMS are at the disposal 
of the British Airports Authority. A local instruction regarding action to 
be taken when there is an aircraft or serious ground accident, is issued 
to ACJMS medical staff. [n addition a precis of this instruction has been 
distributed to a l l  ACJMS and BEAjBOAC units so that they arc fully 
aware of the essentials of the action required (copy at Appendix 1 1 ) .  The 
ACJMS Central Area Medical Unit is the co-ordinating medical centre for 
the Service. This is because although the BOAC duty room is advised 
of a disaster affecting any airline they, as a maller of procedure. inform 
the Central Area Medical Uni t  with which they have a d irect 
communications l ink. 
Department of Trade alld Industry 
86 There are 2 doctors and I Ilursing sister accommodated in the 
Queens Building but with no facil ities for treating casualties. 
Under the control of the Chief Medical Officer, their duties consist of 
the medical examination of aircrew and air traffic control officers in 
connection with licensing. They are at the aerodrome only during office 
hours. In the event of an accident whilst they arc on duty. their instructions 
are to report to the Medical Officer-ill-Charge and act upon his orders. 
Medical and ambulance serL'ices Ol'ailable olltside the aerodrome 
87 When large numbers of casualties are involved it is unlikely that 
as many doctors or nurses as would be desirable could be concentrated at  
the scene of the accident in the time available. Neither would i t  be 
appropriate to denude the local hospitals of a large part of their qualified 
staff. They are better util ised where the equipment and faci lities arc 
available. In the event of a major emergency the aim of the medical and 
ambulance services is to give injured persons essential treatment on the 
spot and t ransfer them to the hospitals as quickly as possible. The 
following paragraphs describe the external medical and ambulance services 
which respond i n  the event of an aircraft accident. 
6" 
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88 LOIlt/oll A mbulallce Sel"t'ice 
( i )  SIr""Kt" nlld dispositioll. The London Ambulance Service can call upon 
resources of some 1 600 fully traincd ambulancemen/\\omen plus 400 
others \\ ith a simple first aid qualification, and about a thousand vehicles, 
320 of "hich arc fully-equipped accident ambulances. The ability of the 
London Ambulance Service to respond on a large scale to a call to 
I leathro\\ Ai rport is governed by two factor� how far ambulanccs 
in  �ufficlent numbers are from the aerodrome and whcthcr they are 
immediately available or are dealing a t  the time \\Ith other emergencies. 
The ncarc�t ambulance station is in Sipson V"'ay on thc north sidc of 
the Bath Road only a few hundred yards from the aerodrome entrance. 
This Malion houses one ambulance which might at any time be allending 
an accident on the nearby motorway or some other cmcrgency outside 
the aerodrome. Seven other ambulance stations arc within a straight-line 
distance of 5 miles from the aerodrome. These stations together with that 
in  Sipson Wa) normally provide 27 emergcncy ambulance, during the 
main part of the day reducing to 9 at night. Additional ambulances could 
be brought in readily from further afield especially at night when t raffic 
condillons are l I1..ely to permit a fast journey. 0 ai rcraft accident invoh ing 
Injured �uf\i\"ors to thc extent nO\\ contemplated has occurred in this 
country but the experience of the London Ambulance Servicc in 
attending train accidents indicates that 3 suffiCient number of ambulances 
can be mobilised to pro\ ide a satisfactory shuttle service bet ween Heathrow 
Airport and the ho'pitai>. Rescue operation, coupled with the need for 
a medical check 3::. to the nature of injuries and the application of essential 
treatment on the �pot mcan that large numbers of casualties are unl ikely 
to require \imuhancous removal and that a �hullle service can be quickly 
e'tabli,hed. Emergency calls are received at the Central Emergency Control 
at Waterloo ( London SE I )  and at sub-control> at Kenton ( Middlesex) and 
I l ford ( [" e,). all of which can init iate the Ambulance Service Major 
Fmergency Plan. Call' from Heathrow Airport ore at present routed to 
the Kenton ,ub-control but b) about the end of 1 9 7 1  the ,ub-controls at 
Kenton and IIford will ce",e to be m\ olved and the call, w I I I  be routed 
direct to Central rmergency Control. 
( i i )  j\!ajor Eml'rgt.!lll,), Plall. I n  c:,scncc the London Ambulancc Service 
emergency Plan i,  de,igncd to deal w 1Ih al l  );lrge-scale aCCidents irrespective 
of their C�1U:,e. I lo\\e\ cr, because of the specialised nature of air transport, 
certam modification) are necessary. Aerodrome emcrgency plan:, IJ1volve 
the u!:le of rendelvous points on the aerodrome perimeter to \\hich 
outside emergency services report before being guided to the scene of the 
accident .  Modifications to the ambulance emergency plan adapt it to 
these special arrangements and ensure prompt, co-ordinated action when 
an ail craft is Involved \vJlhin the aerodrome boundary. Beyond the 
aerodrome boundary the normal major emergency procedures wi l l  apply. 
Table No. I show\ the principal actions that would be taken. some 
:'lInullallcous)y, by Ambulance Control on receipt of a disaster alert i n  
respect of a large, luden passenger aircraft. I f  the magnitude of the disaster 
was apparcnt from the first call the \\ hole of the major emergency plan 
would be put into operation immediately. 
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( i )  Assi.rllll1l'e to, (Jlld l'o·operation with, LOlldoll Ambulance Sefl'icl!. The 
major part of Heathro\\ Airport lies within the Greater London Council 
area. Therc is. a small part \\ ithin the Surrey County Council area, but by 
)2 3 MediC'(1i ami amllll!t1lfC'(! serriC'(!f 
Table I 
All extract oJ the prillcipal items show" 011 a step-by-step chart which is kept ready to 
ha,,:' b� the Senior Ambulance Control Officer to el/able hilll to el/sure that emergency 
actloll IS takell lIIetllOdical/y. 
Ambulance services 
Order in ambulances from nearby stations with instructions for the first crew to arrive 
to radio a situation report and then to start organising ambulance operations on the 
spot. This means setting up casually collecting points, ambulance loading points and 
so on. 
2 Mobilise ambulances further afield. 
3 Alert neighbouring ambulance services and ask for assistance - either to send 
ambulances to the scene or to cover parts of London from which ambulances had 
been sent to the incident. 
4 Despatch the nearcst emergency conlrol vehicle wilh ils equipment trailer and follow 
up with one or more of the other three similar units, if considered necessary, and other 
stocks of equipment. 
5 Detail the appropriate senior officer 10 attend 10 take charge of ambulance operations 
a t I he scene. 
6 Send an ambulance officer with radio to each hospital. 
7 Call i n  off-duty ambulance crews and control staff. 
S SlOP non-essential \\ork in Ihe area affected and redIstribute the remaining resources 
over the whole of Greater London. 
Other services 
Alert the appropriate hospital according to the agreed plans and classify as the 
Designated Hospital. The hospital recognises this term and PUiS its own disaster plan 
into effect. 
2 Alert other nearby hospitals and classify as Supporting Hospitals. These hospitals, 
100, take action according t o  prepared plans. 
3 Request medical teams from the hospitals and send ambulances to fetch Ihem if 
required. 
4 Check that the police and fire brigade have been alerted. 
5 Alert the emergency bed service. 
arrangement with the London Ambulance Service the laller accept 
responsibiJjty to cover the entire airport and the Surrey Ambulance Service 
gives assistance and support when requested. This arrangement is in  
accord with the official policy that in  emergencies t here are in effect no 
boundaries between the services of adjacent COUlllies. 
(ii) Strength and disposition. Surrey Ambulance Service has a maximum 
of 65 fully equipped emergency ambulances operational at peak t imes, 
and a minimum of 20 at off-peak t imes. These are stationed throughout 
the Surrey County Council area, and although a first allendance at 
Heathrow would probably be drawn from the Ambulance Station at 
Ashford, this could be reinforced by other ambulances from Egham, 
Chertsey and elsewhere in Surrey if  the situation warranted it .  There are 
also 4 control and equipment vehicles, permanently manned and loaded 
with reserve stretchers and first aid equipment. One of these is stationed 
at Chertsey. 
90 Buckinghamshire Ambulance Service 
Strength and disposition. Buckinghamshire Ambulance Service has a total 
of 40 fully equipped ambulances for deployment on emergencies at peak 
t imes, based at main and sub-stations within the Slough, High Wycombe, 
Aylesbury and Bletchley areas. Of these, 10  ambulances are always 
available at off-peak t imes and would remain for local emergency cover 
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by backing-up if initially deployed. Attendance at I leathro\\ would in the 
fir�l instance be from Slough Ambulance Station with support from 
Chalfont-St .-Peter, Amer;ham and lIigh Wycombe. I n  addition there 
are 2 radio-controlled, fully-equipped (dressings, blanket;, stretcher;) 
ambulance control vehicles for immediate deploymenl based at Slough 
and Aylesbury. 
Hospital facilitie. 
9 1  Desigllated (fml SlIl'l'Ol'fillg hospilals 
Hospitals in the London area have been grouped into four metropolitan 
regions: E, SE, SW and NW. Within each region certain hospitals are 
listed by the Regional Hospital Boards as those which, in the event of 
a major emergency in the area, are able to provide mobile medical learns 
and act in a 'de�ignatcd' or 'supporling' role for the reception of 
casualties. 
92 Heathrow Airport lies within the North West Metropolitan Hospital 
Region and the three nearest major hospitals arc Ashford, Hillingdon, and 
West Middlesex. At Appendix E of the Heathrow Emergency Orders 
each of these has been allocated areas of the aerodrome identified by 
lettered squares on the crash grid map. Ashford has the responsibility 
for mO�l of the aerodrome. 
Under this scheme in the event of accidents occurring in the areas covered 
by the reference letter the relevant hospital automatically becomes the 
'designated' hospital. The remaining two becoming 'supporting' hospitals. 
93 A 'de;ignated' hospllal is that one most acces;lble to the scene of 
the accident .  1 he decision as to \\ hcther :1 hospital is to have a 'designated' 
or 'supporting' role is made by the London Ambulance Service. and is 
includcd in the 'major acciden L' message passed to the ho!:'pitais. The 
designated hospital is re�pon�iblc, inter alia, for pro\iding a senior medical 
officer to go to the accident scene. I n  the case of an accident \\ ithin the 
boundary or I lea throw Airport, medical control j!:, vested in the Port 
Health Medical Officer, who is in charge. E lsewhere the Senior Medical 
Officer from the designated ho;pital \\ i l l  act as Senior Medical Officer­
in-Charge. I n  addition the designated hospital \\ i l l  if required provide a 
mcdical team or team� to go to the accident. A ho!:'pilal mobile unit 
usually compri�e� : at le3,){ I member of the medical staff, I sister and 
4 trained n ur�e ... , together \\ ilh medical equipment anJ drugs. 
94 A 'supporting' hospilal is onc \\ hich is alerted with, or subsequently 
to, the de;ignated ho;pital and will be required to support the latter. 
Because they need to have the rull facil it ies necessary to treat severely 
injured casualties. supporting hospitals arc selected by the London 
Ambulance Sen ice from the list of hospitals i;sued by the Regional 
Ho;pital Board. 
95 I/ospi{o/s Major Aaidel/{ Scilemes 
J 11 collaboration with the Regional Hospilnl Boards \\ ho have responsibility 
for the disa!:,ter plans in their areas, each hospital has dc\cloped a Major 
Accident Scheme. ( Extracts fr0111 a relevant example may be round at 
Appendix 1 0 ) These schemes, detailing the hospital organisation and 
procedures, are designed to gi\e instructions and guidance to the hospital 
stafT so that they know exactly \\ hat duties they have to perform. The 
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various sections cover the medical, nur�ing and administrative staff 
concerned with arrangements for assistance at the accident, and for the 
reception of casuahies at the hospital. Sections of a hospital's scheme 
may possibly be brought into action if circumstances suggest : t  may be 
needed ; the underlying principle being that it i s  preferable to institute 
an emergency procedure when not fully required, rather than to fail to 
bring it into effect unti l  it  is too late. 
Consideration of cmergenq arrangements 
96 I n  our consideration of the aerodrome medical, ambulance and hospital 
emergency arrangements, several matters arose which required amplification 
or separate treatment. I n  some cases where changes were thought neces ary 
the appropriate authorities have acted upon our suggestions without 
waiting for the Working Party to complete its enquiry. The follo\\ ing 
paragraphs contain our findings and specific recommcndations. 
Statistics 
9 7  When examining the rcsources of the medical, ambulance and hospital 
emergency services, and attempting to assess the po sible current and 
future requirements, we sought some statistical evidence on which to base 
our discussions. This was obtained from various U K  and international 
aviation sources and included information about aircraft types in service, 
traffic, passenger loads and records of fatal or other injuries resuhing 
from past accidents. 
98 I n  considering the probable number of casualties follo\l'ing a fatal 
accident we assumed the max.imum as being the seating capacity of the 
aircraft involved. \Ve made a study of the available worldwide information 
to assess the average percentage of passengers who may require medical 
aid (Table 2). These figures ga,e some guidance, but in order to obtain 
a more realistic e timale we extracted information \\hich applied only to 
accidents that had occurred on or within 2 miles of aerodromes in the 
period January 1 959 to March 1 969. This information i s  directly related 
to the area over which the Heathrow fire and rc!,cue. and the associated 
medical services will normally attend (Table 3). 
99 From Table 3 it \I i l l  be seen that the number of jet (ransport accidents 
i n  which there were fatalities, and which occurred \I,.ithin two miles of 
an aerodrome, was 1 5  per cent of the total number of accidents in  this 
area. 
1 00  Tllis table also shows that the average number of occupants kil led 
in fatal accidents was 56 per cent and that of those surviving 44 per cent. 
Table 2 sho\\s these averages as 70 per cent and 30 per cent respectively 
over the period of eight years. 
1 0 1  There are no a\ailable figures to sho\\ the number of occupants 
that needed ambulance. medical or hospital treatment. Jt can be assumed 
that of those fatally injured some may have survi,ed the crash for a 
period and needed treatment. Some of the other survivors may also 
have needed atlention. I n  a serious accident resulling in a high proportion 
of fatalities, it may be assumed that the �urvi\ ing occupant� are likely 
to be injured and need treatmenl. Department of Trade and Industry, 
Medical Branch, statistics show that of al l  categories of injured survivors, 
.\I�dica/ alfd ambllltmu sl-rticl.'s 3 3S 
Table 2 
Accidents "ith passenger fatalities on scheduled air services 1961-1968 
Type of aircraft 
Year Totals 
Turbo- Turbo- Piston 
Jet pl"opeller ellgilled 
1961 6 6 1 3  25 
1962 7 7 1 4  28 
1963 5 5 2 1  3 1  
(A) umber of fatal passenger 1964 3 6 1 5  24 
accidents 1965 5 3 1 7  25 
1 966 7 6 1 8  3 1  
1 967 1 2  9 9 30 
1 968 9 9 1 6  34 
1961 257 192 356 805 
1962 424 100 241 765 
1963 347 47 32 1 7 1 5  
(B) Number of passengers killed 1 964 1 36 252 271 659 
1965 250 39 399 688 
1 966 451  2 1 7  331  999 
1967 358 1 54 1 64 676 
1 968 361 475 140 976 
1961 105 1 3  5 1  169 
1962 79 23 8 1  1 83 
1963 88 I 1 79 268 
(C) Number of passengers 1 964 1 80 205 I 1 7  502 
Sllrvlvlng 1965 5 1  0 53 104 
1 966 80 I 5 1  1 32 
1 967 275 95 1 10 480 
1 968 271 89 29 389 
(ExtractC'd from lCAO Circular 88.A N/74.) 
ToWI passengers kIlled (B) expressed as a percentage of tOIJI passengers carried on 
turbo-jets ( B  + C) 
Tablc 3 
1961 1962 1963 1 964 1965 1 966 1967 1 968 
- 7 1 0., 8 5 0  . , 58 
• 
• (average 7000) 
World wide ciL'il jet trmHporl aircraft accidents ",hieh occurred 011 or II /,hlll 
2 11. mill'S of aerodroftJ('s il/ the p('riod Jal/uary J959-MflI"c" 1 969 
Total Total of 
Total number of Number persons Number 
number crew and of on board of crew ThIrd 
of passengers fatal aIrcraft and party 
accidenb Involved accidenb t o  fatal passengers fatalities 
(Approx.) accidents killed 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
209 1 1 ,500 3 1  1 ,878 1 ,038 93 
(Source: Depl. of Trade & Industry. Flight Safety Directorate.) 
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(Cols. 5 and 4) 
80 per cent have head injuries (this includes various degrees of concussion 
as well as facial injuries and skull fractures). Some 60 per cent will have 
l imb injuries, 25 per cent abdominal injuries, 20 per cent chest injuries, 
1 5  per cent spinal injuries and 5 per cent burns. It is obvious'y possible 
to  break do\\ n categories of injuries in  different ways, and the above 
makes no distinction between major and minor injuries; however, we 
considered i t  adequate for the purposes of planning first aid measures. 
1 02 The A merican Flight Safety Foundation published information for 
the period 1956-67 \\ i th  the object of determining the effectiveness of 
aircraft emergency evacuation systems. Their findings, so far as they relate 
to the Working Party, arc that the death rate in  survivable fatal accidents 
(which they defined 3S an accident i n  which there arc onc or more falaljties 
and onc or more survivors) had shown no steady trend during the 
eleven years that were considered. I t  had vacillated on either side of the 
50 per cent average, going as low as 22 per cent in  one year and as high 
as 84·7 per cent in another. On the average, however, it had remained 
high because of difficulties in evacuating persons from aircraft. 
1 03 I n  attempting to evaluate these statistics we took into account 5.e\'eral 
other factors. First, although statistics show an average load factor of 
60 per cent (see Table 4), i n  many 'cbarter' Hights this figure is often 
nearer 1 00  per cent of capacity. Second, the dead and injured from a 
crash in  an area similar to Heathrow could include third pany casualtie� 
besides the passengers and crew. Third, the personal I-nowledge of some 
Members of the Working Party of certain accidents already quoted in the 
above tables indicates that the statistic5. can give an erroneou� impression 
of the n umber of hospital cases. 
Table 4 
Healilroll' Airport, LOlldoll Passenger Slatistics 1 969 
Average seating capacity of aircraft 
A verage load factor 
Average passenger complement per aircraft 
105-t 10 
60- 65 �o 
67 
(Sources: BAA Operations/Statistics ,lnd DTt Flight Safety Directorate.) 
Table 5 







DC 8 (Super) 
VC 10 (Super) 
Trident lE 
(Source: BAA Statistics.) 
Passenger capacity 
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1 04 Wc decided that n figure of 50 per cent for injured survivors from 
an aircrafl disa�ter was a practical basis upon which to estimate medical 
and ambulance emergency requirements. Although we are aware that at  a 
particular accident this assessment could be grossly i n  error, particularly 
if third parties are involved. 
J\let/ira! and alllhulance equiplllfllf 
105 I n  the light of this decision \l C  c\"lunted e;l.isting and future holdings 
of medical and ambulance equipment. The adequacy of general medical 
and surgical supplies carried by the ambulance services and the hospitals' 
mobile emergency medical teams is a maller for their prores�ional 
judgement although CAP 1 68 states the minimum holdings of basic 
medical supplies required under the terms of the aerodrome licence. I n  the 
case of Heathrow, the other medical organisations have their own supplies. 
The availability of drugs and other medical equipment is the responsibility 
of BAA, �.lnd these arc augmented by the resources of the mobile teams 
in the event of an accidenl. Al l  muM en�urc that suitable arrangements 
are made 10 bring rorward additional supplies if  there is  a particular 
call on special items. 
Stretchers 
1 06 Some 50 s t retchers arc held by the BAA a t  Heathrow. These are 
carried together with 200 blankehi, on a �pecial vchicle held permanently 
in  readiness for Immediate dispatch to an accident. HO\�cvcr, these are 
of an  obsolete type and unsuitable for u�c with modern ambulance�. 
The best alternatives are the Furley stretchers "hich arc currently used by 
the ambulance services, or carrying·cal1vasses (\\ i th poles). The numbers 
required to be held take into account not only our statist ical estimate of 
likely casualty figures, but also the local authority ambulance attendance 
at an accident .  Each attending London ambulance has 3 effective stretchers. 
The London Ambulance Service planned build-up caters for l OO stretchers 
to be at  the airport with more available if required. We also note that the 
first auendance from the Surrey Ambulance Services has similar reinforce· 
ments available. 
We recommend that the BAA holds a resene of 50 Furley st retchers and Recommendation No. 12 
30 carrying·canyases with 6 pairs of carrying poles. 
(Note: We understand that during our enquiry the BAA had another 
vehicle specially modified and equipped, \\ hich replaced the existing 
vehicle. The equipment includes : 30 carrying sheets ( \I  Ith poles) and 
50 Mark 1 1  stretchers \\lth plaSlolene beds. These laller are an tmproved 
version of the Furley stretcher made e'pectally to BAA specifications.) 
\Ve further recommend that the Department of Trade and I ndustry amends Recommendation No. /3 
Scale 5 of Table V I I - I  of Section V I I  of the licensing document (CAP 1 68) 
to require a minimum holding of 80 �tretchcr� comprising 50 Furley 
type and 30 carrying can\-ascs with 6 pair� of poles. 
Blallkets 
1 07 Although the 200 blankets pro\lded by the BAA has pro\ed to 
be a reasonable number for aircraft up (0 the �ize of the Boeing 707s, 
we consider this hould be i ncreased for the larger types now entering 
service. 
We recommelld that the BAA holds 300 blankets on the emergency medical Recommendation No. 14 
equipment vehicle. 
(Note: We understand that thi, has now been implemented.) 
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Plastic bags 
108 We learnt during our enquiry of the eXIstence of specially designed, 
re-usable, plastic bags which are intended for the dead and their clotlling. 
To have a complete corpse or �et of remains, and its clothing. is important 
as an aid to  the pathologi" establishing the cause of death, and for 
identification purposes. The use of such bags i hygienic and obviously 
would help make this aspect of the police and emergency services' work 
less unpleasant. Since we fir�t heard of these plastic bags, enquiries made 
by the Metropolitan Police have shown that they are not commercially 
available ill the U K. HO\\cvcr, an American supplier has been traced 
and the Department of Trade and Industr} has obtained a sample. pon 
examination this sample proves to be morc elaborate and expensive 
( U S  30) than the article wc envisaged. 
Recommelldation No. 15 Wc recomme1ld that further enquiry and research into a more suitable and 
economical bag be made by those directly concerned. When a source of 
suitable bags is found, some should be acquired. There is. however, 
a division of responsibility involved because aircraft accidents may occur 
both on and ofT the aerodrome. Accordingly the BAA should provide 
I ()() bags to be held against IIlcidents occurring on the aerodrome; 
whilst the local authorities concerned should consider whether they have 
a similar need. 
Ambulance tn'ailabilily Gnd llJSeSsmeJII of reqlliremellfs 
1 09 We considered the adequacy of the number> of ambulance, a'ailable at 
the aerodrome within 1 5  minutes of an accident occurring. Under the 
London Ambulance Ser,ice Major Emergency Plan, 4 ambulance, arc 
senl immediately to any incident and thi') includes Heathrow Airport 
that appears likely to be a major di,."er. Having sent this first detachment. 
Ambulance Control ensure� that as the incident progresse� there is a 
steady flow of ambulances to the �cene. 40spot checks carried out o\'cr rcccnt 
months within the London Ambulance Service, to find the number of ambu­
lances available eit her in their !o.tations oroll t he road within 5 miles of J Icathrow 
showed numbers \'arying from 4 to 20, but in only 2 cases were there less than 
8. On these facts, and frolll our examination of the resources and emergency 
mobilisation plans of the London and neighbouring County Ambulance 
Services described in paragraphs 88 90 a first attendance of 4 ambulance, 
is considered to be a realistic number in the absence of more detailed 
information about the accident. 
1 10 We consider that the exi!o.ling Ambulance Service emergency pl.lns are 
capable of dealing \\ ith the potential number of casualties. Ho\,,:ever, 
regard must be given to large ai rcraft passenger loads and the Itkelihood 
of their future increase. 
Recommendatioll No. 16 We recommend that the responsible authoritIes review the change::; in 
passenger loads that wil l  be carried by the larger aircraft, both in service 
and coming into sen ice, so that the emergency plans may be amended 
to meet the new demands that may be made upon them. 
f I I  We ha'e noted in paragraph 84(iii) that an ambulance service is 
provided by the BAA at Heathrow, although this does not ari,e as part of the 
licensing requirement. \Ve arc of the opinion that an internally based 
ambulance sen ice is an important facility and should be provided at an 
aerodrome of this si/e. It� normal role is 10 t ransport sic!..., injured or 
infirm passengers or person" \\ ithin the aerodrome either as a repayment 
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service to the airline, or as part of the medical facility provided for 
injured per;ons. The fact that it is available does reduce the load on the 
G L  Ambulance Service and G LC recognises this by contributing to the 
cost. The emergency orders cover the use of this service. 
\Vc recommend that an ambulance service continues to be provided a t  
Heathrow. But, i f  the BAA withdraws its service, the most effective 
alternative \\ould be for the GLC to establish an ambulance station at the 
aerodrome. 
1 1 2  During our examination we questioned why l11ulti·berth ambulances 
were not used, and found that 4-berth ambulances tried at Gatwick A irport 
by the Surrey Ambulance Service were not a success. I n  practice 2-berlh 
ambulances are easier to load and, what is morc important, the 3llendant 
i s  beller able to look after 2 than 4 stretcher cases. 2-berth ambulances 
at presc11l in  use convert easily to accommodate 8 silting patients, or 4 
sitting in  addition to I stretcher or, alternatively, 2 stretchers. I n  the 
Heathrow area there are no ambulances with more than 2 berths, and 
there are no plans for their introduction. 
Use of other vehicles to transport injured slIrl'il'ors 
t l 3  We considered a ,uggestion that vehicles other than ambulances 
might be used in 3n emergency to transport silting patients or stretcher 
cases. We agreed there should be a pool of transport (sce also paragraph 
1 45) which it would be the responsibility of the airline or handling agent to 
supply, and upon \\ hich the Police I ncident Officer could call - through 
the Senior BAA Operations Officer - as required by the Medical 
Officer-in-Charge or the Ambulance Incident Officer. However, vehicles 
other than ambulance5. should be used only as a last resort to carry 
ca&ualtics. When they are used, the ambulance service mu�t be informed 
so that dircction� can be given \\ ith regard to the hospitals they are to use. 
Hospitals' organisation 
1 1 4  I n  an accident in\'ohing any aircraft there is always the possibil ity 
of 'third p3rties' being injured in addition to the a ircraft crew and 
passenger>. I f  the ai rcraft has the capacity of a Boeing 747 the total 
casualties resulting from a disaster of this magnitude aL Hcathrow could 
O\erwhelm the hospital> fir;[ alerted (Table 6) and \\ould involve other 
hospitals in the region. 
T�ble 6 
lIospital casualty hlllllllillg capacity 
The estimated capabilities of the three hospHals design'lIed for Heathro\\ are as follows: 
Ashford 
I l I l I ingllon 
25 major and 50 minor casualties. 
30 40 cases could be admitted, and a further 70-100 cases 
nceding comparatively minor allention could be deal! with 
10 the Accident Dept. 
West Middlesex 20 major and 40 nHnor casualties. 
1 1 5 We consider it essential that the initial hospital organisation for 
I-Ieathrow �hould be capable of expansion into and integration with the 
disaster plans formulated by the Regional Hospital Board. Heathrow 
comes within the aegis of the North-West Regional Metropolitan Hospital 
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Board and we conferred with Or S Mackenzie, the Deputy Senior 
Administrative Medical Officer, who has responsibility for the disaster 
plans of tlti region. 
1 1 6 He accepted the validity of our statistical basis for estimating l ikely 
casualties, and noted our acceptance of the principle underlying the 
present hospital disaster organisation. We recognise that besides the 
internal difficuhies involving the rc-arrangement of bed states, moving 
convalescent patients, and the al location of theatres, the most serious 
problem for the designated hospitals is to cater for the flow of casualties 
from the disaster together with other incoming emergency cases. The 
Ambulance I ncident Officer and Ambulance Control between them ensure 
that the hospitals fir�t alerted are not inundated, and bring in other 
hospitals, i n  accordance with the list supplied to them, in  support 
as required. I t  i s  emphasised that it is part of the duties of Ambulance 
Control to ensure that the hospital faci l i t ies i n  an area are not overloaded. 
( Extracts of London Ambulance Service Major Emergency Plan are at 
Appendix 3.) 
1 1 7 Because of the problems i nvolved i n  bringing i n  second and third line 
support hospitals, we decided that the London Ambulance Service, 
together with that of Surrey and of Buckinghamshire, should follow a 
list supplied by the appropriate Regional Hospital Boards. I t  was to  be 
expected that the ambulance sen ices would work through the list in  a 
pre-selected order, but they wished to retain the right to vary the order 
of selection in  the light of circumstances they may be faced with at the 
time. I f  tltis pre-selection is correlated to the appropriate ' first-designated' 
hospital according to the present arrangement, the spread of effect of a 
high concentration of casualties at Heathrow can be absorbed and at 
t he same time other emergency cases udequately catered for. 
Recommelldation No. 18 We recommend that the N \V Regional Metropolitan Hospital Board draws 
up a l is t  of second and third line hospitals. I t  should be issued to the 
Ambulance Service, ( for executi,e action), to the BAA, the Heathro\\ 
Port Health Control Unit  and to the police (for information). 
Amendments should be circulated \\ hen necessary. 
(Nole: DurIng our enquiry the NW Regional Metropolitan Hospital Board 
has consulted neighbouring Regional Hospital Boards and dra\\ n up the 
l ist of hospitals sho\\ n at Appendix 9. We understand that the Board has 
issued this list which the ambulance �ef\'ices are now using.) 
Conclusion 
1 1 8 We agree with the principle of the existing system of ho�pital emergency 
organisation as described i n  this report and we consider that the 
organisation is capable of handling a major aircraft disaster. 
AlIeudallce at off-aerodrome accide1Jls 
1 1 9 Al though part of the aerodrome fire senice attends off-aerodrome 
accidents within 2 milcs of the boundary as a maller of procedure, the 
aerodrome medical services ha\c no similar plans. This is no doubt 
because there is a country" ide ' l Iospitals Major Accidents Scheme' for 
any disaster whatever its original cause. Nevertheless we consider there 
are strong humanitarian and moral obligations to render \\ hateycr 
assistance is possible. Ho\\cyer, because of staffing l imitations there are 
t imes (eg. evenings, week-ends, Bank Holidays) when there is a reduced 
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'taO· on duty and the aerodrome emergency organi>3l1on could be placed 
In  Jeopard} If the �ole medical officer present left the confines of the 
aerodrome. 
We recommend thai , \\ hcncver possible, the medical services attend with the Recommendation No. /9 
aerodrome fire service al 'off-aerodrome' accidents within the area covered 
by that �ervice. 
Fir,H aid 
1 20 All fire seniee pe"onnel at I lcathrow are nr>t aid trained to varying. 
degrees ; but, in the event of an aircraft accident, the aerodrome fire 
scnicc is primarily commilted La fire fighting and rescue work. I f  the 
nursing sisters arc c\eluded there arc 110 first aid personnel \\ ho can be 
immediately available during the crucial init ial  stage of the accident before 
the local authority ambulance services arrive. There may be a l imited 
period, between occurrence of the accident and the local authoril) 
reinforcement of the aerodrome fire \cn ice. \",hen \cry few people are 
available to gi\c assistance to pa!'�enger� who may have managed t o  
extricate t helmehe, from the aircraft. We thought of the possibility of 
eo\ering this phase by ha\lng a �mall n"t aid part}, or sa> 6 persons, 
continuously on dut) at the aerodrome. Ho\\ e\'er, further consideration 
con\inced us that thi�  idea, alt hough init ially attractive, il1\olves insuperable 
difliculties. ot  the lea�t of these would be recruiting and maintaining 
a sufficient number of �uilablc people from the aerodrome personnel; 
al l  of \\hom would need to be trained to a recogni�ed standard of first aid 
as a prerequisite to formlllg a nucleu� from \\hich the roster of 6 would 
be dr3\\J1. There are problems i n\'ohing II1du!>trial re lat ions, ego hours of 
work and rates o f  pay, and there arc abo the more general question� of 
organisation, finance and accommodation. Furthermore, even if these 
\\ere �ellled practically and economically there remains the problem of 
alertlllg and tran!>port ing the 6-man team to  the �cene 111 time for It to 
act effectively \\ithin the critical period mentioned above. From these 
con!>iderations we decided that a permanent fir&t aid party would be 
impracticable and we make no recommendation in this respect. 
• U"injured' surt'iz:ors 
1 2 1  After an aircraft accident there arc lIkely to  be a number of passengers 
apparently u ninjured \\ho \\ill find their OWIl way from the scene and 
who may or may n01 be directed to onc of the fir!>t rtid po!>ts or casualty 
rc:cei\'lIlg cenlre� on the aerodrome. I t  is diflkult to ascertain whether 
pcf>ons presumably uOlnjured are 111 raet �o. The delayed effects of �hock 
and some II1jurie� cau!>ed by the cra�h, e.g. by rapid deceleration, are well 
known medically. Pnrt of the nur�ing �ister�' task is to  in terview such 
npparently uninjured !>urvivor!> in the recept ion centres and try to discover 
any latent injury or 'hock re�ulting from the era,h. 
� e recommend that the BAA eSlabli!>hc� procedure� for reponing or 
directing pa!>�enger!>, lO ensure that any slightly injured or apparently 
uninjured �urvi vors found away from the scene are assembled with the 
others at the casualty receiving or reception centres. 
\Ve further recommend that the limited medical facil it ies on the aerodrome 
are kept manned. \Vhen only one nursing officer i& on duty al the Airport 
Medical Centre i t  is essential that she remains there. 
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Recommendation No. 21 
Heal/zrolV Emergency Orders - Section F - actioll by medical authorities 
.
1 22 During our enquiry, this Section and related Sections and Appendices 
111 these Orders were under revision by the BAA to take account of changes 
proposed in the airport medical organisation. Or A Trueman (Ch.ief 
Medical Officer, BAA) kindly submitted for our consideration and comment 
a draft of his proposals. We examined this in detail and the various textual 
amendments that we suggested have been accepted. I n  addition we feel 
that two points merit special mention here : 
(a) Pre-packed equipmellt. Provided that adequate arrangements are made 
for regular inspection and maintenance, we support the proposal that 
pre-packed emergency medical equipment be stored on a vehicle 
reserved for that purpose. 
(b) Trallsport for the medical officer-ill-charge. We are convinced that the 
use of a BAA constabulary vehicle to transport the MO in charge and 
the nursing officer is vital, giving as i t  does both a communications 
l ink and the authority to move freely about the aerodrome. 
Cusloms alld immigrOlioll authorities 
1 23 In the case of an accident involving an 'ex-foreign' or a 'departing 
for foreign' aircraft, uninjured survivors are, if necessary, brought back 
to a passenger terminal for customs and immigration clearance. Out of 
consideration for their after·care and comfort we consider they should 
not be moved from point to point more than is absolutely necessary. 
Recommelldation No. 22 We recoil/mend that customs/immigration examination, where this is 
considered necessary in  respect of the survivors of an accident involving 
an 'ex-foreign' or a 'departing for foreign' aircraft, should be undertaken 
at the designated reception centres. 
Termillology 
1 24 A t  various times wc came across some confusion in the u�e of such 
terms as 'casualty clearing station', 'casualty receiving station,' and 'first 
aid post ' which led us to seek clarification as to which category of casualty 
is dealt with in each case. As a result of discussions between the 
organisations represented agreement was reached as to the appropriate 
nomenclature. 
Recommendation No. 23 We recommend that in future the following terms be used : 
I First aid post/casualty collectillg poillt. This will mean a point, usually 
i n  the vicinity of the accident where those persons requiring treatment 
and/or t ransport to hospital will be collected. 
2 Casualty receiving celltre. I s  a centre on the airport set aside for minor 
injuries. A t  Heathrow such centres are the ACJMS and Airport 
Medical Centres. 
3 Reception cel/lre. This is a centre for seemingly uninjured survivors. 
At  Heathrow such centres are located in the a irport V 1 P  lounges in the 
terminal complex. 
4 First aid equipmeJ/t supply poillt. This is self explanatory. 
Refrigeration 
125 It was evident from our discussions that a large number of dead could 
result from an  aircraft d isaster, and that the processes of autopsy and 
identification could take some time to complete. We were concerned that 
the Metropolitan Police should have early access to a means of preservation 
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of adequate capacity. During our enquiry, discussions took place between 
the Metropolitan Police and the local Coroner's Officer and we arc informed 
that sufficient public mortuary accommodation exists in the area around 
Heathrow to provide storage for corpses. 
Training exercises 
1 26 Full-scale exercises are normally held only once a year, and we 
con:,idcr that the hospitals' internal organisation is insufficiently exercised 
if  Ihey are in  the 'supporting' role for, say, two consecutive years. 
Wc recommend that ho:,pitals, ghen the role of supporting hospital in an 
exercise, should consider assuming that of designated hospital when i t  
appears necessary to them to train their staIT' in this role. 
Conclusions 
1 27 Wc found no cause for disquiet in the current emergency procedures 
relating to the medical and ambulance services for Heathrow. Indeed i t  is 
most encouraging to find that a number of individual organisations with 
separate responsibil i t ies can co�ordinate their activities to produce a coherent 
plan, which has withstood detailed examination so well. 
1 28 ot unnaturally there are some loopholes in the present arrangements 
which arc either subject to our recommendations, or have been taken 
care of by a revision of the emergency procedures of the organisations 
concerned. 
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Chapter 4 Pol ice 
Introduction 
1 29 We have looked at the police emergency facilities and procedures 
al Heathrow, and find that there arc only two police organisations 
concerned with aircraft accidents and emergencies there, the British 
Airports Authority Constabulary ( BAAC) and the Metropolitan Police 
( MP). While the HQ of the latter is at New Scotland Yard the local 
responsibi l i ty for action at Heathrow rests with X Division at Hayes. 
Although T Division encroaches across the southern boundary of the 
airport, co-ordination at working level is centred on Hayes. Except for 
a small area to  the west side of the aerodrome, within the Thames Valley 
Constabulary, no other police force is concerned with aircraft accidents 
within 2 statute miles from the boundary of the aerodrome. The police are 
concerned not only with aircraft accidents in their area but also with al l  
other accidents and emergencies. 
1 30 Our survey of police responsibilities was based upon schedules of 
duties currently undertaken by the police. These schedules were derived 
from relevant parts of the Heathrow, the Metropolitan Police, and BAA 
Constabulary Emergency Orders, supplemented by the personal experience 
of the officers concerned. We considered these schedules from the point 
of view first of whether the police were the most sujtable organisation to 
carry oUl these dut ies, whether any could be better carried out by other 
organisations, and whether there were any duties which ought to be added 
to those currently undertaken by the police. Wc followed this up by 
assessing, so far as wc were able, \\ het her the existing arrangements, 
both organisationally and taking into account equipment and 
communications, would enable the police to discharge their duties in  a 
satisfactory manner. I n  some cases i mprovements were put in  hand straight 
away, others awaited completion or studies of this Working Party. 
Police dulies 
1 3 1  In the event of an aircraft accident at Heathrow, the police emergency 
procedures are init iated by the BAA Constabulary stationed on the 
aerodrome. As the action progresses, control is assumed by the 
Metropolitan Police mainly from X Division, who are first alerted by the 
BAAC information room. The M P  provides an I ncident Officer with a 
communications vehicle, and police emergency teams for various pre­
allocated tasks such as :  rescue, casualty clearance, documelllation, crowd 
control, and manning of the base station, temporary mortuary and 
property bureau. We arc informed that a new procedure, recently 
introduced and tried in the Sub-Divbion, for 'calling-out' senior officers and 
off-duty officers required to perform these duties has proved satisfactory. 
132  M P  Headquarters at New Scotland Yard are also informed of the 
emergency, both by the BAAC information room which alerts the Traffic 
Control Information Room, and by the PABX a t  Heathrow which alerts 
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the main I nformation Room. As a result, few Scotland Yard implements 
certain emergency plans, including those for sending tra ffic patrol vehicles 
and appropriate area patrol cars to assist at pre-arranged location around 
the aerodrome, to the nominated rendezvous points, and to the hospitals. 
133 Our examination of these police arrangements, which are carried out 
111 co-operation with the BAA onstabulary, shows them to be satisfactory. 
rhe communications problems referred to in Chapter 5 have now been 
resolved. 
The BAAC information room 
1 34  As well as alerting the MP the BAAC information room also alerts 
a l l  staff in  its own police station. all BAAC vehicles, motorcyclists and 
foot patrols, and implements various other emergency procedures. These 
Include : sending a vehicle, containing the first aid post equipment kept at 
the police station, to collect the duty medical officer and the senior nursing 
,ister; detailing cars, as available, to the RVI' to act as lead vehicles; 
detailing another vehicle to stand by at Constabulary H Q  to transport 
personnel to the scene, and later to assist in the I ncident Officer's 
dispo,ition or root patrols; despatching motorcyclists to open access gates 
as required, and to control tranic at the access to the rendezvous point; 
detailing onc motorcycli�t to act a� a second line of communication for 
the police I ncident Officer. 
1 35 Before the establishment of the base station the BAAC information 
room rcceives incoming calls about casualties, and other enquiries, and 
records details for the eventual ,"formation of the MP.  When the base 
�tation is  set up, the information room stands by to recci\'e or transmit 
me,sages rrom al l  sources including the Incident Officer, Medical Officer 
and Rendezvous Officer, either taking the necessary action or informing 
the base station. 
Conclusion 
1 36 j n our opinion the BAAC information room emergency arrangements 
are sati,factory. 
The Rcndezvou� Point Officer 
1 37 When an aircraft accident OCCUI"> the ,enior BAAC ,ergeant on duty 
assumes c0ntrol of the rendez\'(,,1u.., point. This rendezvous point officer's 
duties include: 
(a) nominating lead cars and informing the information room of the radio 
call-sign of these cars and his own car; 
(b) arranging for traffic control at the RV I' in order to expedite the 
movement of incoming emergency service \'chicles: 
(c) ensuring the expeditious departure, with a lead car, of the first line of 
local authority fire appliances, using marshalling vehicles as a first 
lhoice of lead car whenever possible; at the same time informing the 
Incident Officer of the impending arrival of these fire appliances; 
(d) keeping i n  communication with the I ncident Officer; informing h im of 
the arrival of ambulances, and providing escorts for vehicles rcquired 
at  the scene; holding vehicles at  the rendezvous point as instructed by 
the I ncident Officer; informing the BAAC information room as 
vehicles arrive a l the rendezvous point ;  thereafter, maintaining a 
listening watch on the radio to assist the Incident Officer as required. 
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Conclusion 
1 38 We consider that the arrangements ror the R VP officer are satisractory. 
Incident Officer's responsibilities 
Operational responsibilities 
.1 3� Each elTl�rgel1cy service involved in  work in connection with a major 
Incident appo1l1ts 311 I ncident Officer who i s  responsible for the command 
and deployment or his service's resources. Whilst each agency can rulfil its 
own obligations under its own command, no one aspect of an incident can 
be effectively discharged in isolation. Consequently a considerable amount 
of co-ordination of effort is necessary. Due to the all-embracing nature of 
police duty i t  is now generally recognised that the police Incident Officer 
\\ i l l  act as the co-ordinator of effort at the scene. At aircraft accidents a t  
Heathrow this police I ncidem Officer is initially provided by the BAA 
Constabulary. However, by a long-standing arrangement with the Chier 
Constable, B A A  Constabulary, the M P takes over on arrival. 
1 40 I n  addition to the role or o\crall co-ordinator, the nature or accepted 
police responsibilities and duties are as detailed in the rollowing tables: 
Tabte 7 
Initial action 
The police Incident Officer: 
Establishes the police I Ilcident control post taking Into account wind dIrection ; 
accessibility; possible danger from other factors; location of other services' incident 
control vehicles If already present. 
Ensures that only the re-circulatmg lights of the Incident control \ehides of police, fire, 
ambulance and aIrpOrt authority are kept illuminated In order to reduce coofusion for 
both rescuers and rescued alike. 
Assesses the severity of the incident and summons assistance from other services ns 
required. (See list at AppendIX 12.) 
Directs mdl\ idual or teams of police officers as reqUired to carry out tasks in connection 
with: 
(a) Rendezl'olls poinl - marshalhng and escorting 10 scene. 
(b) Rescue - at scene and collecting uninjured persons together \\hUst awaiting 
transport to remove them. 
(c) Casualty clearance - through a casualty collecting point in liaison Wllh Ambulance 
Service Incident Officer. 
(d) Liaison officers - one posted With personal radio to fire, ambulance and airport 
authority incident control vehicles to ensure co-ordination of effort. Also to alrlme 
control room to ensure that police and airline efforts in inforrlllng next-of-kin etc. 
are not duplicated. 
(e) Security - exclusion of unauthorised persons from sceoe. 
(r) Crowd co"trol- related 10 security and control of sightseer!) and souvenir hunter!). 
(g) Traffic COl1trol- mcludmg diversions of all except essential services away from 
vicinity of incident: arranging priority routes into and away from scene (\\ ith 
escorts as required). 
(h) Mllrslwlliug essen/illl services - at scene to ensure availability and quick turn-round. 
(i) Sweep search - organised as soon as possible to safeguard uninjured. but shocked 
persons who may have wandered away from scene; locating injured or dead nung 
from wreckage on impact, also property. 
(j) Propert}' - safe custody at scene follo\\ cd by removal under police escort to a 
property bureau. 
(k) Press liaison - at scene. 
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Further actioll 
The police Incident Officer nrranges the following responsibilities which are co-related 
to the initial action: 
(a) Shelter - temporary places to be arranged for uninjured and/or shocked and 
homeless. 
(b) Documentatioll - police officers 10 be posted to places of shelter; hospitals and 
temporary Jnd permanent mortuaries to obtain particulars of persons involved and 
pass them to base statioll. 
(c) Base 510tioll - a permanent police budding with tclcphone and R/T faci l ities 10 deal 
\\ IIh the responsibilities detailed in paragraph 1 56 below. 
(d) Property bureall - a permanent building where property can be listed, accounted for 
nnd restored to Its rightful owner. 
(c) Temporary mortllary - a suitably equipped building wherein the bodies of persons 
killed in the incident can be temporarily lodged pending removal to permanent 
public mortuaries for pathological exammatlOn and identification. 
(f) Safeguarding wreckage - Illay be required for expert examination to establish cause 
of incident or IOvestigate sabotage etc. 
Staturory responsibili(ies 
1 4 1  The police I ncidenl Officer has la salisf) numerous statulDr) 
requirements, i n  addition to the operational responsibilit ies shown in 
Tables Nos. 7 and 8. 
[ncident Officer's requirements from the airline (or handling agent) 
concerned in the incident 
1 42 The follo\\ ing list shows some of the many waYl> in which the airline 
can a!)1>ist the emergency services, in this case, the police: 
(a) !- Iave readily available an accurate number of persons on board the 
aircraft. This may be supplied verbally immediately after an accidenl 
occurs. (See paragraphs 1 47 1 50). 
(b) De'patch coaches la the scene of the accidenl for the purpose of 
carrying uninjured passengers to the appropriate reception centres. (See 
paragraphs 1 2 1  and 1 45). 
(c) I f  the accident i1> on the aerodrome, ensure that the drivers know where 
the passengers should be taken in accordance \\ ilh airport emergency 
orders. At  Heathrow the uninjured should be taken to the reception 
centres \\ hich is onc of the V I P  lounges in the terminal complex. 
(d) Supply as soon as practicable a written list of the names of passengers 
and crew, supplemented later by a li1>l of names and addresses and 
next-of-kin if  available. 
(e) Supply a, soon a; practicable information relaling la the cargo which 
the aircraft was carrying, with particular reference to livestock, cargo 
of high value, a\;o 'restricled cargo' such a; explosive, highly flammable, 
radio-active, corrosive or other high risk substances on board. 
(f) Ensure lhat airline t raffic staff are direcled to telephone the police base 
station i mmediately on arrival a t  the V I P  suite or other location 
informing police that they have survivors there. Police will then 
despatch officers to those locations for documentation purposes, but if 
survivors wish to leave before police arrive, their particulars should 
be taken by the airline stafT and handed to police. 
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(g) Arrange for an airline representative la go to the police base station 
to act as liaison officer between police and airline to avoid any 
duplication of effort, particularly where informing next-of-kin i s  
concerned. Police will  also supply an officer t o  work i n  the airline 
control room after being informed by the airline that their control room 
is open and its location. 
(h) Find out from the police base station where property from the aircraft 
is being taken. A n  airline representative can then attend that location 
to receive the property frolll the police for restoration to its rightful 
owner. 
(Note: The above list could easily be for general application, although in  
our  enquiry we considered only Heathrow. We t herefore offer the 
suggestion that in an aircraft accident within a police area where, possibly, 
no previous experience of airline procedures has been met, i t  would 
assist the police if  the airline makes the police I ncident Officer aware of 
the airline's facilities i n  order that there is no duplication of efforl.) 
143 In our examination of the police Incident Officer's co-ord ination 
duties and requirements, we found several aspects of the emergency 
procedures at an aircraft accident wl ich are either important in themselves 
or have some unsatisfactory features, so as to merit separate consideration. 
In the following paragraphs we discuss these in detail and make a number 
of specific recommendations. 
Search for and collection of passengers/casualties 
1 44 A prime need im mediately after an aircraft accident is to gather 
together uninjured and slightly injured survivors, and to try and prevent 
them from leaving the accident scene before the arrival of proper escorts 
and transport. I t is  essential that these people are collected and taken to 
the designated reception centres. Although the BAA Constabulary Incident 
Officer will try to give some attention to this problem, he is obviously not 
able to organise a proper police search - a most important (ask - and one 
which is an accepted M P  responsibility (see Table No. 7). The basic 
difficulty is onc of available manpower in the first few minutes of an aircraft 
accidcLll, when the police cannot muster the necessary men and the 
fire service is unlikely to help because they are fully committed to fire or 
rescue work. 
Recommendation No. 25 We recommend that the BAA gives consideration to means of finding the 
necessary extra manpower. 
Recommendation No. 26 We recommend that the airlines introduce into the briefing given to 
passengers in an aircraft about to make a landing which is likely to 
involve an emergency evacuation, instructions Ihat they should remain 
in  the vicinity of the aircraft after the evacuation has been completed, 
and contact an official as soon as possible. 
Vehicles for collecting passengers 
1 45 To assist in the collection of uninjured or slightly injured passengers 
from an aircraft accident, i t  is necessary that sufficient vehicles are available 
to transport them from the accident scene (see also paragraph 1 1 3). 
Police 4 49 
I t  is primarily a responsibility of the appropriate airline (or handling agent) 
to ensure that adequate transport b made available. The larger airline 
operator� have terminal buses or coaches available for collecting aircraft 
passengers at an accident, but often the smaller airlines cannot do this and 
need to rely on thcir handling agents. I f  difficulty is experienced in obtaining 
coaches, the police I ncident Officer should be able, t1uough the senior 
BAA Operations Officer, 10 arrange their supply from the airline concerned. 
Wc recommend that the BAA includes ill the guidance issued La airline 
operators a reference to the laller's responsibility 10 provide adequate 
transport for passengers at an aircraft accident.  
(Note: We are informed that as a result of recent discussions between 
the BAA and the airlines, the BAA are now satisfied that all airlines have 
adequate arrangements to supply vchicles.) 
Guidance to airlines and other organisations 
1 46 We attach parlicular imporlance to the fact that the airline has 
cerlain re�ponsibilities \\ hen an aircraft accident occurs. \Ve have already 
referred above to 5.ome of the requirements from the airline, and we 
consider it essential that guidance is promulgated defining the assistance 
which the airline and other organisations on the aerodrome can give to 
the emergency se" ices. We note that the BAA is issuing a copy of the 
HeatIHO\\ Emergency Orders to a l l  airli nes on the aerodrome. 
Recommendation No. 27 
We recommend that the BAA issues a Jll:1nagement memornndum at least Recommendation No. 28 
once a year, but more frequently if necessary, to all organisations concerned 
on the aerodrome. reminding e,bting stan" and instructing new staff as to 
their responsibil it ie� and duties in  the event of an ai rcraft accident. New 
organi�alions concerned with emergency procedures on the aerodrome are 
to be issued with a comprehensive set of relevant emergency orders and 
guidance. 
Persons on board 
1 47 We have referred in paragraph 1 42 to the need for the operator to hale 
available dn accurate figure for the total number of persons on board. 
This information is required by all 5.eclions of the emergency services, 
including those searching for �urvi\'ors and casualties. Whilst lack of an 
accurate figure i� unlikely to jeopardise passengers. it could result in  
unnecessary rh.k to and effort by members of the re-;cue sen ices, at a time 
when al l  their resources are stretched to the l imit .  
1 48 Prcliou;ly the number on board \l as usually included in the flight plan 
or departure rnessage sent oyer the ATe communications network. but 
this is no longer the case. For �cheduled services, part icularly into 
Heathrow, the airli nes' own needs usually ensure that the operator or his 
handling agent will have this information at the arrival aerodrome before 
the aircraft lands. There will be the exceptional cases of diversions where 
this may not apply. In  the case of non-scheduled aircraft there is less 
certainty of the operator or his representative at the arrival aerodrome 
having this information. The lotal number on board is normally available 
to the captain of the ai rcraft, but, in an emergency, he may not always 
50 4 I'o/iu 
be able to transmit this information, or it may be i mpracticable for ATe 
to ask for i t .  
149 We considered as an alternative the possibility of issuing to the 
emergency services details of (he passenger capacities of types of ai rcraft 
using the airport. However, these can vary so much, not only i n  respect of 
changes in seating arrangements but also in  the actual occupancy on a 
particular flight. Our view was that such basic information would be of 
insufficient value to justify i ts distribution and use for the purpose 
envisaged. 
1 50 There is  no complete �olution to the problem a t  present, and we 
consider that the DTI should continue to seek in ternational agreement 
on an acceptable procedure which wil l  provide the emergency services 
with an accurate figure of the number of persons aboard. 1n  the meantime, 
the emergency orders a t  Heathrow should contain procedures for alternative 
means of getting the information from the operator, or his agent, to the 
emergency services. I n  the case of scheduled or other fljghts where the 
number of passengers on board is known a t  the airport, this 
information wil l  come from the appropriate airline office. In other cases 
the aircrew should pass the information to ATC and thence to the 
emergency services. There may be occasions when the crew will be too 
involved with the emergency situation to obtain or pass on the information, 
i n  which case it wil l  nced to be obtained at a later stage by any means 
available. We suggest that i n  the first case the preferred routeing would 
be from the airline operator to the fire scnice watchroom, then i n  parallel 
to the fire officer at the scene and to the BAAC information room, and 
thence to the I ncident Officer. In the second case ATe could pass the 
information to the fire service watch room who would then pass i t  on as 
above. 
Recommendation No. 29 We recommend that DTI seeks to obtain international agreement on 
procedures which will  ensure that accurate information as to the number of 
persons on board is readily available to the aerodrome authority or 
emergency services in  the event of an accident. 
Recommendation No. 30 We recommend that the Heathrow Emergency Orders should conlain 
procedures for obtaining from the airline operator, or his agent, information 
as to the number of persons on  board an  aircraft involved in an 
emergency, and passing i t  as soon as possible to the emergency services 
via the fire service watchroom. When this information cannot be obtained 
a t  the aerodrome arrangements should be made to try 10 obtain i t  from 
the aircraft whilst in flight, if this can be done without aggravating the 
emergency situation. 
Extinction of ".sh.ing I igbts on vehicles 
1 5 1  Although each emergency service has inlernal instructions regarding 
this, it remains a difficult problem to achieve total compliance at all 
accidents. There is a risk of confusion caused by too many vehicles 
failing to extinguish t hese lights at  the accident scene. Only the incident 
posts and the guide vehicles should have ftaslling lights switched on. 
Recommendation No. 31 We recommend that whenever possible the Rendezvous Point Officer should 
remind crews of incoming emergency services vehicles that flashing lights 
on  vehjcles should be put out on arrival at the incident. 
Police " 5 I 
Idcntification of airlinc personnel 
1 52 We recognise the problem for the police to identify airline personnel 
and other officials, not in uniform, who wish to go to the scene of the 
accident. Airline officials dressed in  plain clothcs attending the scene of an 
accident on behalf of their company are often stopped and questioned 
by the police as to  their presence there, because the police attempt as 
far a. possible to exclude unauthorised persons from the scene of any 
Incident. I t  wil l  assi,t police and the official concerned if he is supplied 
\\/ith some form of vi�ual identification mark which he can display. 
\Vc recommend that the airlines i��ue their non-uniformed personnel with 
.ome simple form of identification which \\ ill be easily recognisable by 
the police officers on duty. 
Mortuary and property bureau 
1 53 We arc convinced that adequate mortuary faci l i t ies are very important 
,ince they permit the collection and temporary storage of bodies for 
identification and po�t-mortem examination. From the latter, valuable 
medical c\ idencc is  derived as to the possible cause of an accident as well 
as the cause of death of the indi\ idua!. 
1 54 We took note of a United Kingdom paper submitted to the 
I nternational Civil Aviation Organi,ation ( I CAO), PEL/ M E D/TRG 
Di\isional meeting in  Montrcal, June 1 970. This paper proposes, 
amongst other things. that police and airport authorities should ensure 
that local preparations are made to provide a t  immediate notice mortuary 
facil i t ies ndequate to meet the needs of a major air disaster. I n  general, 
we consider that the problems involved can be satisfactorily solved if 
lhe police, local authorities and the airport authority are able to negotiate 
agreed standards for mortuary accommodation and the related facilities. 
\Vc consider that the desirable features for a lemporary mortuary nnd 
property bureau should IIlclude : 
For Ihe mOr/lIary 
Wide main doorway 
Capacity initially for 50 corpses 
Electric light 
Ventilation 
Washable, drained noor 
Washing facilities 
Toilets 
An adJ11ini�tration office. with telephone 
An identification room, isolated with a separate access. 
For tile properly bureau 
A large room of about 2,500 square feet 
with an administration office and telephone. 
We recolllll1elld that the BAA, the police and the local authority services 
ensure that plans are made to  provide adequate mortuary facilities to be 
used in the event of an aircraft accident a t  Heathrow. 
52 4 Police 
Recommendation No. 32 
Recommendation No. 33 
1 55 We note thal the BAA, although under no legal obligation to do so 
provIdes BuJldll1g 461 for temporary use as a mortuary and property 
bureau by the poilce emergency mortuary team. Unti l  recently this police 
learn had to work under bad conditions, but we are informed that the 
le�porary accommodation and facilit ies now provided are considered 
sallsfactory. 
Recommendation No. 34 We recommend that the BAA continues to provide accommodation and 
faciLities as at  �resent, to be used as a temporary mortuary and property 
bureau for accidents at Heathrow. 
Responsibilities of police base station 
1 56 Police base station is normally established in the Sub-Divisional 
Police Headquarters covering the area in which the incident occurs. For 
incidents occurring on the aerodrome or on most of the Sub-Divisions 
of X and T Divisions of the Metropolitan Police surrounding the 
aerodrome, police base station is established in  the lecture room of the 
headquarters of the British Airports Authority Constabulary by 
arrangement with the Chief Constable, BAAC. 
The officer-in-charge of base station is responsible for : 
( i )  Casualty bureau, the staff of which : 
(a) receives information relating to casualties frolll hospitals; 
mortuaries ; reception centres etc. 
(b) compiles a current list of casualties; 
(c) receives enquiries from relatives and the public; 
(d) records and compares information regarding casualties with 
enquiries from relatives; 
(e) arranges that next-of-kin are informed either by the airline or 
police. 
( i i) Assistance to be supplied on request of the Incident Officer and relief 
of personnel at  the scene and elsewhere if the incident is protracted. 
( i i i )  Press bllreall ie. press enquiries made other than to the Incident Officer 
at the scene. 
( iv) Liaison with the airline or other agency i nvolved in the incident and 
with the temporary mortuary and property bureau. 
(v) Information on the operation of base station which is passed to the 
various agencies on the aerodrome such as the telephone exchange, 
the Management Duty Officer, medical centres, passenger buildings, 
customs and excise. 
(vi) Telephol1e numbers available ror public and press enquiries which are 
disseminated t ltrough the medium of BBC radio and BBC and 
commercial television networks. 
1 57 In  the event of an incident involving large numbers of casuallies 
which would produce more enquiries than the base station could 
reasonably handle, the casually bureau operations would be transferred to 
force headquarters. In the case of the Metropolitan Police, the central 
casually bureau would be opened at  New Scotland Yard and the officer-in­
charge of base station would be responsible for ensuring that information 
on the t ransfer is passed to a l l  agencies involved. 
Police 4 53 
Conclusions 
1 58 We arc particularly i mpressed by the evidence of close liaison and 
co-operation betwcen the police forces concerned) and see no reason lo 
doubt the efficacy of the transfer of 'base station' in the BAAC HQ from 
BAAC information room to the M P organisation in the �al11e building, 
or in t he field as bet wcen t he BA A C I ncident Officer a nd his colleague 
from the M P on his arrival (see paragraph 1 39). Generally we find no 
reason to suggest that any duties currently carried out by the police should 
be transferred else\\ here, nor ha\ e wc d iscovered additional police duties. 
Bearing in mind our recommendations in thi� chapter. and the 
communications improvements dealt \\ ith in Chapter 5, we are �atisfied 
with the police emergency arrangements for Heathrow. 
54 4 Police 




We examined the communications organisation serving the emergency 
serV1ces at Heathrow 10 ensure thaI, i n  the event of an aircraft accident , 
there is a co-ordinated system which is as swift, efficient and uncomplicated 
as possible. This system may conveniently be considered in five main 
groups : 
Ca) The alerting system 
(b) 'On-airport' radio communications 
Cc) 'Off-airport' services' communications 
(d) ] ncident post communications 
Ce) Other communications problems 
The alerting system 
1 60 Figure No. I shows diagrammatically the landljne facilities available 
at Heathrow Airport for alerting and liaison between the various emergency 
services. The four types of line sho\\11 emanating from the ATe lower are: 
Ca) The crash lille A unidirectional signalling line from ATC to the BAAjFS 
north station watchroolTI1 PABX emergency supervisor, BAA 
Constabulary and the BAAjFS central area sub station watcilroom. 
This l ine is used for alerting the emergency services in the event of an 
accident and for passing the accident messages. 
(b) The emergency fine An omnidirectional line between ATC and the 
BAAjFS north station watchroom, PABX emergency supervisor, BAA 
Constabulary and the BAAjFS central area sub station w3tchroom. 
This l ine duplicates the crash line and is used for full emergency and 
standby procedures. 
Cc) The A TC BAAjFS liaison lille A bi-directional line bet\\een ATC and 
the BAAjFS north station watchroom. 
(d) The A TCjBAA Constabulary liaison line A bi-directional line between 
ATC and BAA Constabulary for direct liaison as necessary. 
1 6 1  For alerting off-airport emergency services and other agencies, direct 
Lines are available between the BAAjFS north station watchroom and the 
following: 
Cal LFBjNorthern Command H Q  Wembley 
Cb) London Ambulance Service, Kenton 
Cc) BAAjFS central area sub station watchroom. 
In  addition the BAAjFS north station watchroom and the BAA 
Constabulary are interconnected and have access to the PABX via the 
airport emergency services line '222'. There is another line from the 
BAAjFS north station watch room to the London Air Traffic Control 
Centre (LA TCC) PA BX at West DraylOn through which emergency 
services could be alerted. There is also a direct line 10 the BOAC Fire 
Service. 
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HEATHROW AIRPORT - EMERGENCY SERVICES ALERTING El' LIAISON. 
162  The presenl alerting system, which was modified subsequently to the 
G-A R W E accident, operatch over a unidirectional signalling private wire 
telephone line, known as the 'crash line', between the ATC and the 
airport services concerned. I t  provides for the simultaneous 11erting of the 
BAA/FS north station watchroom, the BAA/FS central area sub station 
watchroom, the PABX emergcncy supervisor and the BAA Constabulary 
directly from ATe, and all transmissions over i t  are recorded on tbe 
airport operational recorders. The procedure followed, as detailed in  the 
Heathrow Emergency Orders, requires ATC to initiate the 'crash alert' call , 
thereby activating visual and audio alarms at the emergency services' watch 
positions and illuminating answer lights on the ATC control desk. On 
receipt of responses to the call the respective answer lights are 
extinguished and the call faci lities are restored. The initial emergency 
message i s  then transmitted by ATC and monitored by the PABX 
emergency supervIsor. 
1 63 The injtial emergency message is usually very brief giving the 
nominated rendezvous point and containing only the limited information 
available at  the time. A second message, originated shortly afterwards 
gives further details of the accident with other relevant information and 
may nominate a revised rendezvous point. On receipt of the accident 
message the various airport emergency services are responsible for 
disseminating the details to their related outside services who in  turn may 
be required to  alert other authorities. For example, the ambulance service 
are required to alert the appropriate hospitals. 
1 64 Under current arrangements there is some delay in relaying the alert 
through the BAA/FS north station watchroom to the ambulance services. 
I t  was suggested to LIS that they should receive a warning at the same time 
as the fire services. We understand the natural desire of all the services 
concerned to  be alerted as soon as possible in the event of an accident, 
but on balance we do not consider that a change is justified. Whilst i t  
may be technically possible to  achieve simultaneous alerting, there is 
always the danger of sacrificing some degree of communication discipline, 
the effect of which would bc to delay the passing of the message to the 
most vital emergency service - the fire service. 
165  We consider that the present init ial alerting system is efficient and 
reljable. However there have in the past been alleged instances of indifferent 
discipline on the circuit which caused unnecessary delays in clearing the 
init ial alert message. 
Recommendation No. 35 After consideration of the existing alert call procedures we recommend 
that only the BAA/FS north station watchroom acknowledges the 'first 
alert call'. The 'second call' procedure whereby the PABX emergency 
supervisor reads back the message, remains unchanged. 
Recommendation No, 36 We further recommend that where any question of circuit discipline is 
involved the Station Telecommunications Officer (STO), Heathrow Airport, 
should make available t ranscripts from, or a recording of, the 'crash line' 
channel, to facilitate investigation by a l l  those concerned. 
1 66 An important aspect of communications which we examined
, 
con�rned 
alerting and R V P  indication. At present the 'aircraft crash alarm �ecelved 
by the LFB does noL include the RVP, and, initially, all LFB appliances 
are ordered to RVP north. If a differenL R V P  is subsequently nom mated by 
Commflnicoliom' 5 57 
AT . appliances are rc-directed en route by radio. This system could. \\e 
th1l1k. be ,ubstantially IInlHo'ed by a more sophisticated alarm ,ignal 
to LPS control incorporating a POSilhc indication of the nominated RVP. 
This racllity would abo allow the LFB to despatch the appropriate 
attendance from the IlcarcM stations according to the RVP nominated. 
DUring our enquiry "rrangement' were made ror LFB and BAA 
communications C\pCrb IQ consider thi!<' proposal and examine po�slblc 
solutions. 
1 67 An 111ter-""tchboard Post Omce priority signalling system. ror use 
111 aircraft alerts only. bet"een the BAA FS north station watchroom and 
LFB Northern Command HQ Wembley. was 111troduced into ser\lce 
rollow111g the accident to G-AR Wr .  'I hi' has proved operationally beneficial 
in minimising the delay 111 the initial alerting or the LFB. Under the first 
stage or the ne\\ alerting system. a visual and audible signal in the LFB 
control room. and operated rrom the BAA north stallon, indicates that the 
BAA F has recci\cd a crash alarm. On receipt of an alarm signal, the 
LFB sends fire appliances to the RVI' north, redlreCl1ng them by radIO ir 
necessary \\ hen the details or the call arc subsequently received by 
telephone rrom the BAA watchroom. 
1 68 A second stage or the system. shortly to be I Ilstalled. will enable the 
BAA fire stal l  on to 111d,cate the precise RVI' to be used, thus obviating 
the necessity for pO!o,<"lblc redirection and further accelerating the allendance 
or fire appl13nces. Wc con,ider that e\ten,ion or tl", racll l ly to the London 
Ambulance Scn ice would ha\c mcrll. ( Vole: \Vc understand that 
con'-,ldcratlOll is being gJ\cn to this by the London \mbulance Scn ICC.) 
1 69 Another question concerns the alerting of the Metropolitan Police at  
Hayes and West Dray ton Police StatIons. The BAA Constabulary are, 
under the current procedures. responsible for alerting the Metropolitan 
Pohce at I layes. Th" i, elTected by means or a telephone call over an 
Inter-..," itch board pri\3te \\ ire. Haye� In turn relay the mes�agc to West 
Dray ton via similar facilities. I t  is claimed that up to four minutes can 
elapse berore We't Dray ton obtains the message. 
1 70 I t  has been sugge>led that the l11troducllon or Po,t Office priority 
ignalling racilitie, betlleen Heathrow and Hayes and between l Iaycs and 
West Dray ton would reduce the delay. AllemaIlVel). a parallel Post Office 
priority ,ignall l11g sy'tem rrom Heathrow to both l Iayes and West Dray ton 
would reduce the delay e"en rurther. I t  should be appreciated. however, 
that in the first casc somc time must elapse for the transit of the l11e�sage 
through the I layes rclay point and 111 the second case Mrict circuit 
discipll11e \\ould need to be ob,ened or the benefits \\ hich might accrue 
would be losl. 
We recommend that the BAA and the Metropolitan Police consider the Recommendation No. 37 
cost/benefit and provision or Post Office priority signalling racilities between 
Heathrow and the Ha)'cs and We,t Dray ton Police Stations. 
(NOle: We understand that dUring our enquiry these arrangements ha\c 
been considered, and the parallel Post Office priority signalling system is 
now installed and working satisraclorily.) 
58 j Communication!. 
OAA/FS north station \\atchroolll 
1 7 1  The OAA/FS north station watchroom, during the alert and init ial 
pha�e of an accident, is
.
t�c f?cal point of operation for the ernergency 
scrvl�es. The \�atch position IS manned continuously by an attendant 
who IS responsIble for 
.
taking the alert message and relaying i t  in 
acc?rdauce with local ll1struclions. He is also required, on receipt of an 
accident alert, to  carry out other functions �uch as, announcing the 
emergency over a lannoy sy�tell1, sounding a siren cra�h alarm and 
actuating control switches for traffic lights, doors and road barriers. The 
BAA/FS VH F radio base station is operated from the watch position by 
the \v�lchroo�n attendant, who is also responsible for accepting calls over 
the PflV31C wire telephone network. 
1 72 Many of the facil i t ies now available in the station watchroom are 
developments of, or additions to the original concept, consequently the 
operatll1g console has become overburdened 11 ith appendages such as lights 
and telephone handsets. Control Sll itches and alarms installed later had to 
be mounted on an adjacent wall, gh ing 3n untidy appearance and an 
apparently complicated control position. Whilst \\e consider the facilities 
provided :Hc adequate. \Vc recognise there ic; a need for rationalisation. 
Recommendation No. 38 \Ve recommend that the BAA/FS nonh station w3tchroom console be 
ergonomically designed and re-engineered to alleviate the workload on the 
w3tchroom attendant during an emergency alert. 
'On.airport' radio communications 
1 73 Figure No. 2 shows in a simplified bloc�-schemalic form the 
organisation of land mobile radio communications at Heathrow. I t  can be 
seen thut each service has its own discrete R IT channel for maintaining 
communication between its control station and respective senice vehicles. 
Additionally BAA \ ehicles, if suitably equipped, are able to alert Air 
Traffic Control in the control tower, by a system known as "tone calling', 
that they wish to communicate with them. Air Traffic Control can then by 
selecting the appropriate channel, e�tabli,h communication \\ ith the \ehicle 
on the caller's frequency. I n  the case of BAA Con,13bular) vehicle" tone 
call to Air Traffic Control is effected through their control station. 
BAA/FS lead vehicles arc equipped lI ith multi-channel mobile set, which 
enable them to communicate directly with ATC on the Air Controller's 
rrequency. This was instituted a� a result or the difficulties experienced 
during the G-AR W E  accidenl. I t  should be noted that when the airport 
land mobiles V H  F channels have been replaced by UHF during 1 9 7 1 ,  the 
means or meeting this requirement will need to be reconsidered. 
1 74 The lOne call facility referred to Gbo\e enables any fire \ehicle 
requiring ATC clearance to cross runways or taxiw<l)s, to communicate 
with the Ground Movement Controller (G MC). The latter is r<>pon,ible for 
co-ordinating and controlling aircran and vehicle movements on the 
runways, taxi\\ays and manoeuvring areas or the airporl. I n  practice the 
Ground Movement Controller cannot always give immediate clearance and 
has to refer to the Air Movement Controller; this can cause delay to the 
Fire Service. To a\oid this difficulty, designated OAA FS lead vehicles have 
been equipped with additional V H F  channels enabling them to 
communicate directly with the Air Controller. This arrangement has proved 
satisfactory to both the OAA/FS and ATC. 
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1 75 As regards the future use of the GMC tone call faci lity, we consider 
11 would be operat ionally advantageous if tltis use were subject to some 
control. 
RecOlllmelldatioll No. 39 We recommelld that the GMC tone call facility on the BAA(FS channel 
be w"hdrawn from the vehicles and placed under the control of the 
watchrool11. Vehicles communicating with GMC first requesting the facility 
from theIr watch room control. 
(Nole: We understand that this recommendation has been implemented 
during our enquiry.) 
'Off-airport' Sen'ices communications 
1 76 'Off-airport' Services such as the Metropolitan Police, London Fire 
Brigade, London Ambulance Service and Surrey Fire Brigade have their 
own discrete channels in the Home Office Land Mobile V H F  bands. 
To facilitate operation of the incident 'base station' i n  the BAAC 
headquarters, communication equipment is provided by the Metropolitan 
Police a ligned on their own channels. The use of Metropolitan Police 
frequencies is  essential for maintaining the degree of liaison necessary 
under emergency conditions. We note that they intend to augment existing 
equipment, both at BAAC H Q  and at the scene of an incident, by the 
provision of radio equipment on their traffic control channels. (Nore: 
This has now been implemented.) We also note that Surrey Fire Brigade 
vehicles are now equipped with multi-channel radio equipment which could 
enable them to communicate with other fire brigades. However, 
installation of similar equipment in the vehicles of other fire services has 
IlOt yet been fully implemented. We consider this to be a desirable feaLUre 
so far as their attendance at Heathrow Airport is concerned. as it would 
ultimately give i mproved co-ordination between the outside brigades 
involved. 
Communications with hospitals 
1 77 When we exantined the chain of communications normally operated 
with.in the medical and ambulance emergency organisation, we were 
particularly anxious to ensure that the organisations initially alerted, as 
well  as the extra hospitals and services that may be involved later as the 
incident progressed, were able to inter-communicate effectively. 
1 78 The London Ambulance Service has responsibility for alerting the 
designated and supporting hospitals, to which the Metropolitan Police 
initially despatch patrol cars providing radio communication channels to 
the police Incident Officer. The ambulance service also sends radio­
equipped vehicles to the hospitals, for ambulance supervision and hospital 
liaison, which provides a communkation l ink between the hospitals. 
. 
Ambulance H Q  Control and the ambulance Incident Officer at the accident 
scene. Although the police R(T cars a t  the hospital are primarily intended 
to assist in the collation of information required by the police. they are 
available, where necessary, for relaying ambulance service messages thus 
providing a back up to the existing ambulance and hospital facilitie�. T�1e  
extensive telephone facilities in the BAAC HQ provide the commulllcatton 
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channels which should normally be used by the hospitals to pass 
information to the 'base station'. 
1 79 We note that the Metropolitan Police intend when possib!e to replace 
their mobiles, IOltlally despatched to the hospitals, by portable radios 
operated by police officers, which can be more conveniently situated inside 
the hospitals. This will reduce the time-lag between origination and 
despatch of an RjT message. 
1 80 The effects of an accident may involve hospitals in adjoining counties 
and require co:operation between the Metropolitan Police and the county 
pohce authOritIes. To thIs end, the Metropolitan Police have already 
established liaison with the surrounding police force . This will involve the 
police in sending radio cars to each supporting hospital, ie. expanding 
the arrangements currently adopted by the Metropolitan Police. 
ConelusiOIl 
1 8 1  We consider that the communication facilities and organisation between 
hospitals and the Incident Officers are an adequate and satisfactory solution 
to a difficult problem. However, some improvement in operating efficiency 
could be effected by ensuring that new hospital staff are fully briefed. 
Recommelldatioll No. 40 We recommelld that hospitals ensure that new staff are fully briefed on 
the facil i ties that are available and how they may be best utilised. 
lncident post communications 
1 82 Figure No. 3 is a block schematic diagram incorporating the additional 
facilities recommended in  l itis Report and showing the main lines of 
communication available at an accident scene. 
183 During the initial phase of an accident a BAA incident caravan 
equipped with a telephone and t wo radio communications channels 
(domestic and ground movement control), attends the incident post and is 
manned by the BAA Constabulary who nominate the police I ncident 
Officer responsible for co-ordinating the activity of the attending services. 
The transfer of responsibility for the co-ordinating duties to a Metropolitan 
Police I ncident Officer takes place during the build-up stage when outside 
services begin to arrive at  the scene. Liaison between Incident Officers 
of the various services is effected by police officers equipped with portable 
radio equipment, supplementing police cars stationed at strategic locations 
and at  the designated rendezvous point. 
1 84 We concur with the intention of the Metropolitan Police to provide 
and equip a special communications/incident coach to be stationed 
permanently a t  the \Vest Draylon Police Station for use in  the event of an 
accident a t  Heathrow Airport. In  addition to being equipped for 
communicating with their own force, i t  i s  proposed to install equipment 
carrying the BAA Constabulary V H F  channel; we consider this will result 
in improved liaison at  the accident scene. 
(Nole: We understand that this special coach is now i n  service.) 
Communication!> j 63 
We recommend that for incident control purposes, the Metropolitan PoUcc 
dctall:.. police omccr� to pro\ idc liai:..on bct\"ccn tl1e ambulance, fire and 
police �enices. 
COllclu.\iOIJ 
1 85 \Vc note that thi:-. recommendation has now becn implemented and 
\\e are \alisfied that it providc"'i a satisfactory communication organisation 
at the incident po�t and cnsurc� adequate liaison between the participating 
• 
serVices, 
1 86 \Ve recognbed the need for improved fireground COlll ll1ul1lcations in the 
BAA/FS to co-ordinate the operations or groups or fire appliances and the 
activillc� of rescue tcam!:. \\ hich may be \\ Ilhin the fu clage. Wc are aware 
or the Intention, or the BAA to meet tl'" requirement by the provision or 
additional portable equipment. 
Other cOlllmunication problel1l� 
It,ler·,\·erl'ice commllnical ;OIlS 
1 87 CommoJ1, emergency communication challnel. \Vc found insufficient 
eVidence. in  support of a critici\m implying inadequate communications 
liaison at the accident �cene. that would warrant major changes in the 
organi\l.lllon \\ hich has been c \oh ed from practical c\perience over past 
year>. The Criticism was probably due 10 a lack or lInde"tandl llg or the 
coml11unlcation� facilities normally available in such circumstanccs. This i� 
necessarily a complex organisation which must take into account the 
requiremenl for each senice to maintain internal liaison on its o\\ n 
communication network. This has the advantage that individual channel 
loading is kept \\ i thin acceptable l imits \\ hich would not be the case ir, 
as has been suggested, a C0O1111on emergency coml11Unicatlon channel was 
estabh,hed. 
1 88 COllclusioll. We con,idcr that the e,wblishmcnt or ,uch a channel i, 
Impracticable. 
1 89 Mlllti-chollllel mobile radio eqllipmellt. It ha, also been suggcSled that 
intercommunication between the various attending services would be 
racilitated by the provi,ion and Installation or mult i-channel mobile 
eqUlpments. The�e, it was thought, would allow "ehicles to communicate 
one with another and, presumably, with any base station or portable hand 
�et. I n  practice, thi  i� not the case because mobile equipmenL is  not 
normally manuractured which would permit operation using the different 
radio communications techniques (eg. frequency and amplitude modulation) 
and over the widely dispersed radio rrequencies employed. Furthermore 
without an integrated control station to exercise circuit discipline and 
provide the necessary inter-senice liaison, considerable confusion could 
result rrom vehicles leaving their normal operational channel and thererore 
rai l ing to respond to  base station calls. 
64 5 Con/lmmicotiolts 
Recommendation No. 41 
1 90 Conclusion. For these rea�on"i wc do not consider the use of 
multi-challnel mobile in'tallallon, for this purpose to be viable or de,,,able. 
1 9  I Termillology. The in> ohemcJ1l at  an airport accident of personnel 
from many different services could resulL i n  common terms used in one 
sen ice being misunderstood by members of another. We therefore looked 
into this problem to decide upon common terminology which could have 
general u>age. Wc find that \I hJl't anomalies may have existed in the past 
they ha\c now been rc�olved in  di�cussions bct\\cen the respective senior 
officers of the emergency serviccs. 
Recommendation No. 42 We reCOil/mend, however, that ready interchange of information on 
tcrminology and other matters be encouragcd between the services, either 
by regular discussion at an appropriate level or through the regular 
exchange of information between all scn ices. 
1 92 Exercise. An exerci,e \la; mounted by BAA in No,ember 1 970 and 
opportunity was taken to test and e,aluate the efTects of the changes in 
communication procedures and the new or revised facilit ies provided. I t  
served to famil iarise personnel with the current organisation and to give 
them an  opportunity to try it out under operational conditions, but without 
the pressure e,usting under the normal accident attendance. We note that 
CAP 1 68, Section V I ,  Paragraph 9 requires, and that the BAA carries 
out, a full scale exercise each year which enables the efficiency of the 





1 93 We find no major faults in the present emergency comll1UllIcallons 
organjsation at Heathrow and we consider it to be basically sound. 
1 94 \Ve have made \"arious recommendations - some of which ha\e 
already been implemented. They ha\"(� served, or wil l  serve to improve e\en 
further the speed, efficiency and reliability of the system. 
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Chapter 6 Rendezvous poi nts 
Introduction 
1 95 We examined the existing provision of rendezvou, points ( RYP) at  
Heathrow Airport, and considered their operational effectiveness for al l  
the emergency sen ices \\ hich re�pond to emergencies and ai rcraft accidents 
on or in  the \ iciniLy of the aerodrome. 
RVP operation� \on' the aerodrome 
The lIeed /01· fllld /UIIC/ iOlls 0/ all R V  P 
1 96 The RYP, provided on the aerodrome are necessary because i t  is 
Impracticable for emergency services to go direct to an accident scene, 
even I f  there were a system of pre-delermincd routes. 1 his is primarily 
because Air  Traffic Control must retain control of all traffic in the aircraft 
operation area and. i n  the eycnl of an accident, may Ilot be able to offer 
the expected pre-determined route. I t  would also be unreasonable to 
expect all responding appliancc� from the olltside emergency services at all 
t imes la "now of, recognise and adhere to any pre-dctcrmined roule system 
that may C\iSI, because the moblll!)ation proccs.s can lI1\ol\'e appliances 
from arcas not normally scn ing  thc aerodrome. I n  particular it i s.  essential 
that there are arrangements cn�uring that emergency i:lcrvice vehicles 
convcrging on an RVP, or an  accidcnt scene, do not penetrate any restrictcd 
or operational arca� on the aerodrome \\ ithout clearance from Air  Traffic 
Control. A n  RYP may be used 111 two ways by the emergency servIces : 
(a) as an  arrival P01l1t at which to atm and from \\ hich to be redeployed 
under guidance; 
(b) ", an  assembly area from \\ hich the polIce l ncidelll Officer, in  
co-ordination with other �cn ice�, may call up  unit� or  groups as they 
are required. 
The use of R yp, al>o help> the poltce \\ l Ih  the control of tramc to and 
from an accident scene. 
AI ill/mum arell lIlId sill/ace cOlldifiollS required at R '  'P.\ 
1 97 The size, siting, construction and surface marking of RYPs and 
a��el11bly areas arc mO�l important operational aspech. \Ve consider the 
follo\\ ing to be dewable features of an effectIve R Y P :  
(a) As d irect an aece» as pOSSIble to the RYP from public road, outside 
the aerodromc. Ideally this access roadway should be 20 ft wide and 
hard surfaced. I t  need not nece>sarily be exclusive to the emergency 
• 
services. 
(b) A waiting or marshall ing area where appliances and other emergency 
service vehicles may avoid ob�tructing the access \\ hilst wailing. I t  
should be large enough - wc suggest 1 000 sq ft - to permit large and 
heavy appliances 10 manoeuvre. 
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(c) As direct an access 3S possible to the aircraft movemcnt area. Again. thi., 
should be hard surfaced and, to permit two-way traffic, should consist 
of either a single 20 Ft wide roadway, or 2 adjacent 1 0 Ft wide road ways 
provIding a loop CIrcuit. 
(d) Where any part of a paved or consolidated area adjoins soft, 
untmproved surfaces this should, if possible be kerbed or indicated in 
some other way to avoid the risk of vehicle immobilisation. 
(e) All  the access road ways to RVPs and from RVPs to the aircraft 
movement area should have the edges marked, possibly by short safety 
posts or 'cats-eye' rcnectors for use at night or jn fog. 
(f) Emergency telephones should be housed in clearly marked boxes, with 
a locally switched light to assist users at nighl or in  fog, and be sited 
prominently at the RVPs. 
(g) RVPs should be simply and clearly marked with illuminated signs. 
Recommendation No. 43 \Ve recommend that the BAA adopts the minimum area and surface 
conditions listed in paragraph 197 as the standard requirements for RVPs 
at Heathrow Airpon. 
Number and location of existing alld proposed rellde:eolls poims at Heathrolt' 
1 98 At present there are five RVPs at Heathrow, located at positions 
designated N, N E, SE, S and W (see map at Appendix 7). Normally only 
two of Ihese, RVP north and RVP south, are used for 'full emergency' calls. 
Any one of the five may be used for aircraft accidents on the 
aerodrome or for situations where an aircraft accident js thought to be 
. . 
1 n1lTII n e n 1.  
1 99 We agree with the present geographical disposition of these RVPs at 
the centre points and ends of main runway�. \Vith the evcJ1luai addition of 
RVPs at  N W  and E, both of which the BAA proposes to reactivate, there 
wil l  be a total of seven. In our opinion this would be the ideal number and 
disposition of RVPs at Heathrow. Jt is visualised Ihat ATe will use only 
RVP north or RVP south for a full emergency, bUI \\ould use any one of 
the seven in case of an accident, selected according to the location of the 
accident. From an  ATe point of view it would be ideal to have only 
R V P  N or S from which to choose. In our ,iew the other RVPs are needed 
to assist the emergency services to be assembled as near as possible to the 
accident scene. 
200 We visited and inspected al l  the existing and proposed R VPs at 
Heathrow. The following are our findings and recommendat ions: 
( i )  Existing rel1de=voLls points 
(a) R VP 1I0rlh. This RVP is opposite the main airport fire station and 
entry is controlled by traffic lights. There is good access and a large 
holding area is available for emergency vehicle • .  
Recommendation No. 44 We recommend that the BAA retains the emergency access (pre\iously 
known as R V P  NW) leading from the northern perimeter road to Block 
as an  alternative exit point to be used in the event of an accident on 
Runway 28R/ 10L. 
(b) R VP 1I0rlheasl. Th.is is on the service road, 200 yards west of 
Hariington Corner and provides good access from the A4 t� the 
operational area. 1I will  be affected substantially by north slde 
developments and by the area of prohibition associated With the 
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in�ilrument landing system. As there may be in�umcicnt room for 
an appllanc" assembly area when the developments arc completed 
\\ e  considered whether any operat ional disadvantage would be 
imposed i f  this RVP \\ as abandoned. I t  is our view that if RVP east 
is fully reactivated by BAA (sec paragraph 200 (ii)(a)) this facility and 
those available at RVP north would be adequate for the operational 
needs of the emergency se"ices in  this sector of the airport. 
We recommelld that the BAA retains this RVP until the facilit ie; at RVP 
east are fully restored. 
(c) R I P sOl/thellst. This is on the sen Ice road l inking the tal<iway to the 
emergency exit opposite Cain Lane, and has good access both from 
the Great South Wcst Road and from the perimeter road. 
(d) R VP sOl/th. This RVP is on Green Beacon Road about 500 yards 
south of Bloc� 96. We consider that the 10ft wide access road 
known as Green Beacon Road is inadequate for a primary RVP. 
The BAA planned to double the width of some 1 250 ft of this road 
during 1 970 and to improve the turning area available around 
�ub-station 8. This work has now been completed. 
(e) R VP lI"est. 1 his is on the airport perimeter road adjacent to sub-station 
10, utilising the western cnd of the road serving Perry Oaks fuel depot . 
Wc considered this to be an undesirable arrangement unless access to 
the movement area at  Block 98 could be provided by makmg a road 
about 50 yards to the west of the police dog training ground. 
An  alternative proposal to use the existing I LS road which links the 
new perimeter road to Block 100 is acceptable provided that the 
assembly area for appliances is located on a sect ion of the old 
perimeter road "hich IS opposite sub-station No. 10. Use of this site 
makes appliance manoeuvering safer and permits the concurrent use 
of the road around the sub-station. This solution involves less 
expenditure and reduce� the number of penetfations of the security 
fence. The only works services required are the remov al of kerb-stones 
at entry and departure po"m and the re-location of the RVI' signboard. 
\Ve recommend that BAA designates the section of the old perimeter road 
opposite No. 1 0  sub-;tation as the assembly area for RVP west. 
( i i )  Proposed rel/de;vous poil/ts 
(a) Proposed R I'P east. This WI l l  be at the junction of 'Old' Eastchurch 
Road and the tax"v·a) leadIng to No. I Mallltenance Area (east of 
1lI0ck 1 0 1 ). The BAA propose, that thi; RVP should be rc-activated 
a, soon as rccon�tructiol1 of Eastchurch Road has been completed. 
We support the>e proposals which \\ i l l  provide good access to the 
aerodrome without the need for emergency vehicles to cross either 
of the main runways. 
(b) Proposed R I P lIorthll'est. RVP N W  is to be re-activated follo\\ ing 
completion of the extension of Runway 28R/ 10L. BAA proposes 
that a 20 ft wide loop road which is to be used as a holding area 
,hould be built some 1 00 yards south of the el<tended runway 
centre-line and to the west of the new perimeter road. Access 10 
the aerodrome for the emergency services \\ i l l  be through an adjacent 
gate leading from the Stanwell Moor Road and access to  the 
operational area by way of an emergency road leading direct to the 
cnd of the runway. We l:tUpport these proposed arrangements. 
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Recommendafioll No. 45 
Recommendation No. 46 
201 Apa:t �rol11 shortcomings mentioned in paragraph 200 our inspection 
of the CXlst l llg RVPs at  Heathrow revealed that the signs \\ere inadequate 
and were not I I lullllllated. However, we have already recommended in  
paragraph 1 97 above that there should be clearly marked and rroperiy 
i l luminated signs at  all R V Ps. 
202 We appreciate that practical and economic considerations may limit 
the provision at al l  RVPs of the ideal facil i t ies listed in paragraph 1 97. 
As a result of our inspection we consider a feasible solution would be to 
make ful l  use of RVP north and RVP south which should be fully equipped 
whIlst having basic facilities at the other RVPs. The facilities and conditions 
a t  RVP north and south are good as a result of the improvements carried 
out by the BAA. 
Indicating Gnd rOllle�nU1rkil1g 
203 We recognised that the emergency services had experienced difficulties 
in getting into the aerodrome entrance points and thence to the RVP. Traffic 
conditions near some RVPs are at t imes very bad, and the perimeter road 
had always presented traffic problems. I n  our opinion some of these 
problems could be overcome by having access direct to the R VPs from the 
main roads (subject to any overriding airport security requirements), and 
by having better sign posting on all the routes giving a clear indication 
which would be helpful to service drivers who may be strangers to the 
area. 
Recommendation No. 47 We recommend that the BAA considers how best to provide some form 
of traffic control to ensure freedom of movement for emergency vehicles 
within the aerodrome. 
Recommendation No. 48 We recommend that thc BAA provides conspicuous reflective directional 
signs for turn-off points from the outside roads, and access routes within 
the airport boundary. 
(Nore: We approved a suggested directional sign (Figure 4), submitted 
to us by the BAA and designed in accordance \\ i th  a Ministry of Transport 
Advisory Circular (Traffic Signs, Regulations and General Directions 
( 1 964) Schedule I Part I V). We understand that implementation of this 
improved road signposting has now been put in hand by the BAA.) 
Challging the R VP selecled ill the illilial message 
204 Once an RVP has been specified in the initial accident message it is 
not changed by ATC. This is an ATe instruction designed to avoid 
confusion. Changing an RVP could affect the use of other runways and 
hamper ATe operations and those of the aerodrome as a whole. However, 
t here may often be a tactical need for the emergency services la change an 
initially nom.inated RVP; for example units of an emergency service can 
arrive at the selected RVP and find that the accident is close to 
another. In  such cases 1 or for other tactical reasons, the Incident Officer 
may decide, after conferring with ATe and other services concerned, that a 
second RVP should be used. ATC wil l  agree to such a change whenever 
practicable. 
Recommendatioll No. 49 We recommend that the BAA introduces an operational procedure to 
permit a change in the initially nominated RVP. 








1 2 ·  
Diagram of a directional sign, designed by 
the British Airports Authortty. The design is 
in  accordance with a Ministry of Transport 
Advisory Circular Traffic Signs Regulations 
and General DIrections ( 1 964) Schedule I, 
Part IV The sign consists of white letters on 
green with a yellow surround. 
I S ' 
RENDEZVOUS PO I N T  SIGN 
Scale 3" 1 ft. 
• I • 
F I G U R E  4 
.. 1 2.  _I I 
Guides for assembly alld departure procedures 
205 Once the emergency services have arrived at  an RVP on the aerodrome 
guidance to the accident scene is necessary. This is to avoid conflict with 
' 
ai rcraft movement� and is intended to reduce to a minimum the emergency 
services' attendance t imes. The effectiveness of this guidance depends on 
the early U\ailability of a sumcient number of guides. Guidance at 
Heathrow is provided by BAA Constabulary and from BAA marshalling 
sources. ThIs has the adv3ntage� that the vehicles used have a radio 
frequency on \\ hich clearance for movements can be obtained from ATe, 
and also that the guides have an intimate knowledge of the aerodrome. 
206 There has been some criticism of the supply of guides to external 
services in  the period immediately following an accident for which there 
was 110 previous warning. When we examined RVP procedures we round 
that 110 minimum requirement ror guides had been laid down. We 
considered the estimated times involved and found that if the guides 
return to the R V P  after taking the fire brigade to the scene, then, given a 
minimum of 4 guides and an effective liaison between the ambulance and 
police Incident Officers, a two-way guidance system is possible. 
Recommendation No. 50 We recommel1d that the BAA provides in the Heathrow Emergency Orders 
that there should be a minimum or 4 guides available at the nominated 
RVP within 4 minutes of the alert. 
207 The increase in staff and vehicle strength of the BAA Constabulary 
over the past year, and the support now given by the marshalling section of 
BAA suggest that previous dimculties can be largely overcome. Il would 
be unreasonable lO expect even a few manned vehicles la be permanently 
on standby waiting for an accident to happen, and i t  is inevitable therefore 
that at any one time the police and marshalling vehicles may all be 
engaged on other duties. Nevertheless we belie'e that these duties can be 
organised so that it wil l  be possible to have tnis minimum number of 
guides at the rendezvous poinL \\ itl1in this stipulated time. 
208 As well as guidance inwards we consider there is also a need for an 
adequate guidance system away from the accident scene. This is particularly 
important if an efficient shuttle sen ice of ambulances is to be set up. 
Recommendation No. 51 We recommel1d that the BAA with the services concerned ensure that 
there wil l  be adequate guidance throughout the duration of the incident 
for ambulances conveying injured persons to hospitals; bearing in mind 
that more than one route may be needed. 
C ol1ll1llmica t iOlls 
209 Although emergency communication:, are dealt \\.:ilh in Chapter 5, 
it is appropriate for us to examine here tho:,e 3!:lpects which affect RVP 
operations. 
2 1 0  Communications at RVPs at Heathrow arc b) telephones and by the 
RVP officer's radio transmitter/receiver. 
(a) Telepholles. Each R V P  has a telephone connected to the airport 
switchboard from which any other numher may be reached. These R
VP 
telephones are tested daily by the BAA Constabulary. We conSIder 
that 
the BAA fire station telephone number displayed in each RVP . 
telephone box is sufficient for the purposes of the emergency servIc
es. 
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(b) Radio COlllllllllliclIliollS. Should the RVI' telephone facility become 
Inoperat ive. the R V P  officer can establish communications through his 
pOrlable R'T set with BAA Constabulary base station, which wil l  pass 
h" messages to any addre"ee. The RIT equipment also serves as a 
Il Ilk with the police I ncidenL Officer. 
Ha\lng e,amllled commUI1lCaLIOns a L  the ,"cident and the R VP in relation 
10 cach other, \\e are satisfied that the present radio and telephone 
arrangemenls al R VPs are adequate excepl for the need to relocate the 
telephone aL R V I' south. 
Wc recollllllelld that Ihe BAA relocate, the R V P  ;Quth telephone, now on 
the perimeter road, a t  sub-station 8.  
(NOle: This has now been implemented.) 
IdelllificlIIioll of Ihe R ,'P Officer 
2 1 1  In  s iew of Ihe numbers of uniformed officers likely Lo be on or near 
the RVI', i L  is eS>ential thaL the RVI' Officer should be easily identifiable. 
\Ve recommend that the BAA ensures that the RVP Officer wears some 
dIstinguishing mark to identify hImself. 
(Note: We undcr!!ttand that thl� Recommendation has now been 
implemented by the BAA.) 
n VP op�rations 'off' the arrodromc 
Fire Brigade operalions 
2 1 2  I n  the C\Cnl of an ai rcraft accident occurring 'ofT' the aerodrome but 
withIn 2 miles of the alrporl perimeter road, the RVI' nominated by ATe 
is used only 3\) an as�emb)y:di�patch point for scn ices attending from 
willlll1 the aerodrome. The London Fire Brigade may elect 10 lIse this 
RVI' a; \\ell a,. or i"'tead of. onc of the 10 R V Ps the Brigade have listed 
in  their o\"'n Operat ional I nMfuclions. ' ) hese London Fire Brigade RVPs 
are �Il llated out�ide the aerodrome boundary. They serve as assembly 
pOllm for LFB appliances ordered to  aircraft accidents outside but adjacent 
to the aerodrome. Each ha� an adequate 3!)sembly area and a telephone 
nearby rar communication., purpo:,cs. Experience has shown that this LFB 
!o,yMem rar attendance at 'off' aerodrome accident:, \\orks welL 
2 1 3  Durong our comlderatlon of Fire Brigade operations at RV I'. 'off' the 
aerodrome wc noted some diOlcuilies encountered \\ i lh accident location 
messages. ( DI>cussed below in paragraphs 2 1 5-2 1 8. )  
Alelropolitllll Police opera/ions 
2 1 4  We find Ihat 'off' aerodrome R\  Ps arc of no praclical significance to  
the police. This I., because the police proceed dirccl lo the accident scene, 
and their main concern is scaling-on" the accident area and establishing a 
marshalling area on the main approach route. 
Identification of accident locations 
2 1 5  When we considered the emergency procedures followed i n  a typical 
aircrafl accident we were concerned by the differenl lerminoiogies that 
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Recommendation No. 52 
Recommendation No. 53 
could be used to describe an accident locat ion to the emergency services. 
For example, that used between ATe and the BAA/FS differs from that 
which the latter must use when passing the call to the London Fire 
Brigade. We therefore looked at all the available systems and what each 
emergency service uses or reqUires in  respect of 'on' and 'off' aerodrome 
accidents 
2 1 6  Sysrems of idenri{iclIIion 
(a) The airport crash grid map. On this map the airport and immediate 
surroundings are shown divided into lettered squares each of which is 
further sub-divided into 9 numbered segments. The original map "as 
extended for varying short d istances 011 all sides, and these new areas 
identified as 'north of A', 'cast of M' and so on. An accident within the 
area covered by this map can therefore be located by, for example, 
A2, B9, or 'east of M' .  
(b)  The 'block' s),srel1l. This identifies by numbers the concreted areas of 
the airport runways and taxiway •. The sy'tem is used mostly by the 
internal airport services, but is not, however, generally required as pan 
of the emergency procedure. 
(c) Geographical references. ie. siting "ell-kno" n landmarks or building' 
round the airport. 
(d) The narional grid mllp. 
2 1 7  Systems used or required by the emergency services 
( i )  'On' aerodrome 
(a) Aircraft accidents. For aircraft accident::, 'on' the aerodromc 
all the outside emergcncy �crvices prefer 1 0  come to a given 
rendczvous point and thcn usc the guidc5 provided. 
These emergency scn ice� do not need or use the 'bloc"-' �yMel11. 
The airport crash grid map is not as imporlant to them as is the 
rendezvous point ;  although the police make some use of it, and it 
also enables the ambulancc scnice to determine their initial choicc 
of hospital. 
(b)  Domesric calls. When answering dome;!ic calls on the airport the 
LFB employ the 'grid reference' sy>tem from the airport crash grid 
map. The 'grid reference' is pro\ ided by the aerodrome fire scnicc 
as an addition to the addre::,� or location \\ hcn they pa�::, the call. 
( i i )  'Of ' aerodrome 
For aircraft accidents in the \ icilllty of the aerodrome the emergency 
services use a combination of the airporl cra�h grid map plus. when 
possible, geographic references and the 'Geographia map 
of the London area. At the time of the first 'alert' message the precise 
location of an 'off' acrodromc accident is often noL known. Later, 
when more accurate information is available this is passed on to the 
LFB. 
2 1 8  After examining thc abo\e �ystcms \\e con�ldcr that : 
(a) The RVP i s  the most Important reference for the e<ternall) -based 
emergency sef\ ices attending an accident on the aerodrome. 
(b) The 'b lock' system, although not needed by local authority ser,ices 
attending an accident, is useful to the 'on' aerodrome services. 
(c) The airport crash grid map is, in general, useful but the extended 
borders of this map. ie. 'north of A' etc . .  provide only ,ague guidance 
unless combined with some estimate of the distance involved. 
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(d)  Geographical, descriptive rererences and service-provided maps wil l  
continue 10 be u�cd for accidents outside the crash grid map area. 
Wc recommend that the BAA arranges for suitable instructions to be 
included in the l Iealhrow Emergency Orders to ensure that messages 
to the external emergency services employ slandard terminology in 
referring to locations on the aerodrome. 
Conclusions 
2 1 9  I n  our examination of the rendcLvouS POlllt operating facil i t ies and 
procedures. and in our inspection of the eAisting and proposed rendezvous 
points. \\c found a need for some impro\crnents 10 be made. These have 
been included in o u r  rccol1ll11endation�. I t  should be noted thut in several 
cases these impro\ements had been considered by the responsible authority 
berore our enquiry. and suitable proposols made or \\ork put in hand to 
Implement them. I n  other case� similar action was taken by the authorit) 
during the course of our enquir). 
220 If the authority's proposab and our rccommcndation) arc implemented, 
\\c consider the re..,ulting provision of rcndezvou'i points at I- Ic3lhrow, and 
their operation, \\ I I I  be more efTecti\'c. 
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Recommendation No. 54 
APPEN DIX I 
Note on Work i ng Party to consider the 
fire and rescue problems at Heathrow 
brought to l ight i n  the Whisky Echo 
accident report (CA P  324) 
I The Board of Trade proposes 10 sel up Ihe Working Pany, proposed in 
Recommendalion No.  2 (page 25) of Ihe rep0rl of Ihe Chief I nspeclor of 
Accidents, to review the ai rcraft fire and rescue operations in respect of 
Ihe problems al Healhrow. 
2 The Working Pany will be under Ihe Chairmanship of M r  Denys Peel, 
DireclOr of Aerodromes (Technical), and Ihe following organisalions will 
be invited to participate: 
Brilish AirpoJ'lS AUlhorilY 
Melropolilan Police 
Heathrow Airline Operators Commince 
London Fire Brigade 
Surrey Fire Brigade 
London Ambulance Services 
Surrey Ambulance Service 
Board of Trade (Soulhern Division). 
3 The Working ParlY should rep0rl 10 Ihe Dircclor-Gcneral of SafelY 
and Operalions, Board of Trade, and aim al compleling ils work by 
mid- 1 970. 
4 Owing to the number and variety of detailed local problems to review, 
Ihe Working Pany may wish 10 set up sub-groups or CO-Opl addilional 
members; Ihis should be decided by Ihe Working Pany. 
5 The general lerms of reference are: 
To review and report on the problems of fire and rescue operulions In respect of 
aircraft accidents at Heathrow, including the problem of co-ordination bel\\ccn British 
Airports Authority services and those of local authentic'), and to make 
recommendations. 
6 The following nole is provided as a guide 10 Ihe problems covered by Ihe 
terms of reference, but is not exclusive: 
(a) Liaison belH'een airport and local authorities 
Communications and interface problems between the airport fire and 
police services, and the local authority services. Emergency warning 
procedures and speed of aHendance. 
(b)  The siring of fire starions 
Review of siting of existing BAA and local fire stations, and of any 
plans for re-siting such stations. Consideration of procedures and other 
action to minimise response time. 
Cc) Fire equ;pmelll and manning 
Review of the present and proposed equipment and manning of the 
BAA Fire Service and recommendations on how it can best be deployed , 
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in con ju llction wilh local rire brigade ao;,o;,i5.tance for the most cITective and 
rapid fire cOlltrol and rescue operations following an aircraft accident. 
(d) Domesric (ires 
Consideration of extent to which arrangements for dealing with domestic 
fire; may affecI Ihe availabililY of Ihe airport fire service for aircraft 
accidents. 
(e) Ambulance COI'el" 
Cono;,idcration of arrangement!', for ambulance Co\"cr to deal with aircraft 
accidents. 
(f) Training 
Consideralion of Ihe Iraining of BAA and local fire ;en ice pe"onne! 
for dealing wilh ai rcrafl crash fires. 
7 I n  making its recommendations, Ihe Working Party should have regard 
10 CO;I effecliveness and examine Ihe benefil; likely 10 be achieved by any 
increar.;cs in facilit ies and manning against t he cost involved. 
8 The Working Party should consider It,elf free 10 recommend to  Ihe 
Board. on any o\'crall or long-term policy question \\ i th \\ hich it has not 
been able 10 deal. Ihal further ,Iudy or developmenl " required. 
Board of Trade 
7rh Ocrober, 1 969 
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APPE N D I X  2 
Membership 
Department 0/ Trade & Industry 
Chairman M r D F Peel 
Metropolitan Police 
Londoll Fire Brigade 
Surrey Fire Brigade 
M r  E D C  Cooper 
M r  S G Hall 
Mr  N F Hi ldyard, 050, 
ore 
M r  J L Mallhews 
la ter replaced by: 
M r  J R Carruther; 
M r  J E Lodge, ore 
Mr E G Luff 
Mr J Greaves 
Chief Superintendent 
F F Sargent, MBE 
Chief Superintendent 
A G Hope 
later replaced by : 
Chief Superintendent 
W H Gibson 
Chief Superintendent 
W Wykes 
[nspector P R Henman 
later replaced by : 
Inspector E Gleeson 
M r  R S Walls, MBE 
M r  L Dunn 




Southern Division, Civil 
Aviation 
Deputy Director Aero­
dromes (Technical) B 
Divisional Operations 
Officer, Southern Division. 
Civil Aviation 
Deputy Air Traffic Control 
Officer-in-charge, Heath­
row Airport, London 








Signals Officer, London 
Airports 
X Di\ isioll, Huyes 
A.8 Branch, New Scot­
land Yard 
A.8 Branch, New Scot­
land Yard 
A.9 Branch, New Scot­
land Yard 
A.9 Branch, New Scot­
land Yard 
A.9 Branch, Nell Scot­
land Yard 
Assistant Chief Officer 
Deputy Assistant Chief 
Officer 
Assistant Chief Officer 
(Now Chief Officer, 
Kesteven County Fire 
Brigade) 
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Buc,," ingholll fhire> 
Fire Brigade 








M r D R Close Deputy Chief Fire Officer 
Sir John Brbcoc, UT., Director of Operations 
DFe 
Mr E T  Williams hief Fire Officer 
Mr  J L Gilbert, ('VD, DFC Operations Officer (Heath-
later replaced by : row Airport, London) 
Mr  P Cdmund, Operations Officer ( Healh-
M r  A WoodrufT 
Mr  E Bates 
M r  J C Abboll, \In, 
row Airport, London) 
Deputy Chief Ambulance 
Officer 
Deputy Chief Ambulance 
Officer 
Fire Pr01CCl10n Manager, 
Britj�h Over�eas Airways 
orpOr3tlOIl 
The followillg penons also gene assistallce: 
British Airports Chief I nspector 
Authorit)' COIII'Il/bulary M Jone, 
Brifish Airpol'H 
AlIlhorifY 
LOJ/doll Fire Brigade 
Surrey Fire Brigade: 
A/elropo/iran Police 
Chief I nspeclor 
M Kiely 
Mr  R Smi,h 
M r R J Fergu,on 
M r  F J Gray. Mill 
Or A TrucI11all 
Mr 1\ T Sennell 
1\1 ,. r Allday 
M r J 1\ C Darton 
M,. S liallon 
VI r  Co rox 
Mr G Fuller 
Chief I nspeeto,. 
T L",hbrook 
I nspector 
G G Digby 
Station Operations Officer, 
I l eathro\\ Airport, Lon­
don 
Deput) Chief fife Officer 
OivI�lonal Fire Officer 
CllIef Medical Officer 
Deputy Assi,tant Chief 
Omcer 
Deput) A""tant Chief 
Officer 
COI11municatlons Officcr 
J\��i ... tallt Oi\ i ... ional Officer 
Telecommunica t ions 
Branch, Ne\\ Scotland 
Yard 
Tclccommunicat ions 
Branch. c\\ Scotland 
Yard 
A.8 Branch, New Scot­
land Yard 
X Divbion, I laycs 
Depar1111en1 of Trat/I! 
& Illduslry 
Londoll A mbulallce 
SenJiee 
Air Corporoliolls JOill1 
Medical Service 


















Buek inghamsh" re 
County COllllcil 
1)1' " R Swanton 
M r  R I I  James 
M r  J W MacDonald 
M r I) L Craddock 
M r J C Mo" 
Mr G Healy 
Dr A S R Peffers 
I)r P R Cooper 
Dr S MacKen7ie 
M r  I D Archibald 
M r E M  Stenens 
M r  P R J Arnold 
M r D Walker 
M r  G F Barber 
M r  B H Saperia 
M r IV C Collell 
Deparlmenl of Trade alld Illdustry 
Secretary to Working Mr D Roberts 
Party 





Deputy Chief Fire Service 
Officer 






Principal Medical Omcer 
Deputy Senior AdminiMra-









Ambulance and Tran"lport 
Officer 
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APl'r"JOI"\ .1 
Extracts from London Am bulance Service 
M ajor Emergency Plan 
Part 1 
Anlhuhlnce Service 1>lnn-Gcncra l Ilrinciple, 
I OhjeCl.' 
1 he objccl\ of the plan arc to cn .... urc lh31 : 
(a )  Sunicienl ambu lance, (plus '!lecial equipmenl) 10  deal wilh readily 
accessible casualties are available at the scene as soon as possible after 
Ihe firsl alarm ha; been given. 
( h )  A ... an incident progressc'). there i� a �Ieady nO\\ of nmhulance, al the 
... .,,;CI1C rOI the Ir�lIl .... port of n.�""cllcd ca..,uahie ... .  
(I.:) Dt!..,pllc the nUljol cmcrgcllLI; commitment occa'loned h) (�I ) �llld ( h )  
:lho\C'. adcqll�lIc emergency (o\er I .... m�linli.llned throughout the area 
co\crcd by the \mbuJance Service. 
(d )  WJlhin Ihe 1 I I1111S Imposed by (a), ( b )  and (c) abo\e, Ihere is a minimum 
dlslocallon of the routine \\or" of the sen icc and that full normal work 
1\ resumed as �oon as p05.s1ble. 
2 Dejillllio/l.\ 
Beforc gi\ ing detad� of the plan. It I� nece�sar) to define cerla1ll standard 
terms used 111 the 3mbulrmcc scn ice in connection \\< I (h a major emergency. 
(a) Huja,. ()m('r�(,IIc.\' 1\ major emergenc) I", any incident \\ hich i') 
uelcrmll1cd 3", such by the scnlor pollcc, ambulancc or fire officcr 
fir!:>t on thc sccnc, or any Incident 111 which the number of live casualties 
10 be handled " estimated 10 exceed fifty, and/or in  Wllich more Ihan 
onc of the 'ii'lcd' ho,pital> "cre likely 10 be invol\ed in  handling 
casualties. 
I I  i, important 10 note Ihal pam of the plal1 should be brought into 
opcnuion if  the c ircumstances at an incident appear to require this : 
the principle being that it is beller to operate thi.., plan when not ful ly 
reqtllred. than to fa il to bflng the plan II1to operation unti l  i t  is lOO 
late. The same ba\ic instruction \\ hich applies to a smaller �ingle 
emergency case aho applies to 3 major emergency, 'when in  doubt -
turn out'. 
( h) A1ohilisatioll. Mobil lc)3tion is the action taken to provide the m3"imum 
number of ambulance sen ice vehicles in an area, for emergency work. 
This wil l  be achieved by : 
Rc-deploying vehicles from other cOl1trol areas 
Stopping, or reducing, non urgent work 
Retaining pe",ol1l1el due 10  go oIT duty 
Where possible, and when required, calling ill officers and other 
personnel who are oIT dULY 
Splitl ing ambulance crews to man additional vehicles 
Mobil isation may be applied to one or more control areas 
(c )  Dil'isional cOl/trol (crash control). These are the controls which can 
receive a major emergency call from within their own area and can 
init iate the ambulance service major emergency pla n :  
KO 4PM"di '" 3 
Name 0/ COIlIl'OI Adtl, en Telepholle 110. Telex 
Central Emergency 150 Waterloo Road 0 1-734 4000 261405 
Control London SEI 
J Iford Control Aldborough Road 0 1 -554 9579 261 1 88 
I1ford Essex 
Kenton Control The Mall 0 1 -204 0247 261885 
Kenton 
Middlesex 
( d )  Cel/tral Emergel/cy COl/lrol. Thi, conlrol ha, two runclions :  
As a crash cOl1lrol i t  will be respon�ible for initiating the major 
emergency plan in respect of any incidents within its catchment area. 
2 As Ihe Central E mergency Conlrol il will be responsible ror co­
ordinating the facilities of the service in areas not directly involved 
and their subsequent deployment 10 Ihe support or the control 
concerned. 
(c) Incident control. A �  soon a ... po,<;iblc aflCr a major emergency has been 
notified . Ihe cra,h control will arrange Ihe e>lablishmenl or an 
ambulance incident cOl1trol at the Incident. The person in charge of the 
ambulance incident control will be "no\\ n as the ambulance Incident 
Officer. The main function� of thi"i control will be to control and 
co-ordinate the work of the vehicle� and personnel of the ambulance 
service a t  the scene. 
(r) Desigl/ated hospital. This is Ihe hospilal most accessible to Ihe incidenl 
(sec appendix). f I  wil l  be responsible ror providing a Senior Medical 
Officer (excepl ror London Airport) who will be the senior represenlal ive 
or I lle hospital  service at Ihe incident. The hospital will probably, bUI 
not necessarily, provjde the fir!)t 1110bilc medical team. 
(g) Supporting hospital. This is the term ",ed to denote other hospital> 
which are alerted and which may be required 10 support the designated 
hospital. Supporting hospitals IllU>! be dr[l\\ n rrom the li>l or designated 
hospitals as they may be required 10 carry out some or al l  of the 
runctions of a designated hospital. 
Part 2 
Iruti.1 action by crash control 
On the receipt of a major emergency alaft" the senior officer on duty \� ill 
take charge of the operations of his control and ensure that the followlIlg 
aelion is taken (not necessarily in the sequence delailed) :  
I Despatch initial attendance or 4 ambulances. . . 
2 Mobilise men and vehicle witllin working distance of the I IlcldenL 
3 Alert emergency conlrol vehicle. 
4 Inform Central E mergency Control. 
(Note: It may be necessary to u e the services of aoother ambulanc� 
authority i n  order to implement the ' initial action' phase of the maj
or 
emergency plan, particularly in  the fringe areas of the Greater Lo
ndon 
Council area, and Ihis fact should be included i n  Ihe report to the 
Cenlral E mergency Conlrol.) 
5 I nrorm police and fire brigade. 
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6 During nonllol hOllr< despatch to the scene the Divi,ional Omcer or Area 
Superintendent, \\ hoc\cr I� nearc!)1 10 3et as I ncident Officer. I f  the ArCH 
Superintendent is sent, the Divi:,ional Officer is 10 be informed. 
Out>lde normal hours respon,ibillty for the provision of a senior officer 
at the scene b that of the Senior Control Superintendent at the Central 
Emergency Control. The crash control wil l  act on his instructions i n  this 
matter. 
I n  addition to the above use ,hould he mode a, necessary of the near"'t 
\tallon \upcn I\or. 
7 Notify appropnate ho,pital that it " the 'designated ho'pit:t1· by 
IOforming the hospital ", itch board (not casuait) departmen t )  of: 
(a) T) pe of incident 
(b) Location 
(c) Time of incident 
(d) Estimated number and type of ca,uaities ( if  available) 
(e) Names of supporting hospital,. 
8 Notify two other hospitals 10 the area that their services may be 
required as 'supporting hospitals'. The message wil l  be ", in 7 above 
and \\ i l l  include (a). (b) and (c), piu, the name of the deSignated 
hospital. Detatls from the I nCident Omcer regard lOg the use of 
additional ho'pitals mUSt be passed to the Ceotral E mergency Control for 
the information of New Scotland Yard and the emergency bed service. 
The hospitals in  question mu't al,o be alerted 3) 'supporting hospitals'. 
9 Arrange transport for the mobile medical team. I f  requested by t he 
hospital, or I n  the light of local conditions. 
10  I ncrease initial a!lendance of ambulances in the Itght of additional 
mformatlon received. 
1 1  Despatch ambulance service emergency control vehicle. 
1 2  Impose radio ... lIcncc on al l mobllcs except for essenlial lransmjssions. 
A radio channel wil l  be al located for the use of vehicles working a 
major emergency. 
1 3  Close in  avatlable ambulances to reinforcing points. 
1 4  MalOtain contact '\l th the I ncident Omcer and implement Ili, 
requirement''!. Pa.., ... all requc..,t\ for \upport to the Central E mergency 
Control. 
1 5  DC':Ipatch an onicer to ':Iupcn I\C the unloading and turn round of 
ambulances at the de':lignated and 'or �upport ho)'pllals, 41<; required. 
Thc:,e officers IllU\t be prcpnred to hal..,e with the hm,pital authorities 
on any point concerning the ambulance service, eg., the co-ord ination 
of arrangement... 10 free ho�pilal bed,; by discharging pauent<; or 
tran:,ferring them to other ho\pitah. 
1 6  Mallltain a log of al l  message>, and complete working sheets as 
necessary. 
( VOles: Control<; mu�t be prepared 10 a\\ist other 3mbubnce authorities 
in the operation of a major emergency \\ I Ihin the area of the other 
authority; implementing part or whole of the London Ambulance Service 
Major E mergency Plan, if this is necessary. 
Crews sent 10 aSSI\t another authority will report 10 t he ambulance Incident 
Omcer of that authority, and the control concerned wi l l  ensure that a 
lIai�on officer from the London Ambulance Service IS sent to the scene.) 
Visual A ids 
ro facilitate easc of reference each Divisional Control and the Central 
I mcrgency Control are suppl ied with 'major emergency' boards: 
I To outline the action to be taken at thc cmsh control. 
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2 For use as a plolting aid for ,ehicle deployment. 
Visual aids \\ i l l  also be �upplicd for use ill special Incidcnt�, �uch a� 
London and Northolt Airport>, the motom ays, and the Port of London. 
Emergellcy control vehicles 
Four emergency control vehicles \\ i l l  be located as follows: 
Oval Ambulance Station 
Whipps Cross A m bulance Station 
Hanwell A mbulance Station 
Croydon Ambulance Station. 
Part 3 
Action at Central Emergency Control 
fhe Duty Senior Control Superintendent \\ill  be re'ponslble for actIOn 
taken a 1  the Central Emergency Control in  the event of a major emergenq, 
and wil l  ensure that the follo\\ I l1g is carried out although not nece5�arily 
i n  the sequence detailed: 
I Outside normal hour::. direct the mo�t senior a\ailabJe officer IQ the 
scene to act as ambulance I ncident Ofticcr. 
2 Alert al l  other control; to 'major emergency' standby. 
3 Notify Chief Ambu lance Officer/Deputy Chief Ambulance Officer, 
Chief Control Superintendent, and outside normal hours the 
appropriate Divisional Ambulance Officer. 
4 Direct the movement of \chicJes, personnel and equipment from other 
divisions, as necessary. 1 he emergency lramJer of cOl1trol �tafT to the 
crash control should be cOJ1�idered and implemcnted If  nece�sary and 
practicable. 
5 I f  not already arranged by the crash control, despatch an officer to the 
designated or supporting hospitals as required, to aS�lsI in the turn 
round of vehicles, and to act as liaison officer \\ llh the hospital sen icc�. 
6 Alert other neighbouring ambulance authorities. un less already deployed 
as pan of ' init ial  action' by the cra�h control. 
7 Authorise the suspension or adjustment of general \\ork in the affectcd 
areas. 
8 rnform the emergency bed service, giving names of 'de�ignatcd' and 
supporting hospitals. Keep advised of any additional ho>pllals 
alerted. 
9 Maintain liaison with policc information rool11. The namcs of additional 
hospitals alerted must be passed to the information room , New Scotland 
Yard to enable the police to despatch radio cars and documentation 
teams 10 them. 
1 0  Alert Service Public Relation� Officer and m3111talll press Jiai�on. 
1 1  Alert the British Red Cross Society. 
1 2  Ensure that at the completion of  the major cmergcnc} , a '�tand dO\\J1' 
mc sage is given to a l l  parties alerted during the operation. 
1 3  Maintain a log of all messages. 
The Duty Senior Control Superintendent will be responsible for the 
submission of  a report on the incident to the Chief Ambulance Officer 
and the Chief Control Superintendent. He will ensure that reporls are 
d
· . .  
I received from the I ncident Officer, the oflkcr in  charge of the 1\'ISlona 
control and any other relevant source. 
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Part 4 
Dutie, of .Incident Ollicer 
At the start of an incIdent the dutie, of I ncident Omcer WIll be undertaken 
by the members of the crew of the first ambulance to arrive at the scene. 
Controls mu"" ensure that a sen ior officer is despatched to the scene as 
,oon a, po,,,ble to ta,e over the dut ie, . TIll> omcer will be Identified by 
the yellow top to I", servIce cap. (Spare yellow cap cover> will be available 
111 the emergency control \chicle .) The efficiency \\ilh which the sef\lCe 
can deal with a major emergency depend) \'cry largely upon the receip t  at 
control of lip 10 date and accurate �It UaIlOI1 reporh. 
I mmed iately on arnval the I ncident Officer \\ 1 1 1  make H qUIck appreciat ion 
of the IIlcidcnl. and �cnd a radio mcs�age to the crash control la 
announce hi� arrival, toget her with an up to dall: �lluatlon report. If  
necessary this report must make reference to  the need 10 advise the 
'de"gnated ho,p lta!' to pro' ide a mobIle medical team. Req ue>t, ror 
addItional ,ehicle, ,hould be made quoting the total number or veh.icle, 
thought to  bc req utred to clear the incIdent, eg. ' 8  ambulanCe> required' , 
" QuId be �l Il Instruction to the cont rol to �cl1d four \chick::, in addition 
to the four �t l rcildy �It the �ccne . 
.2 1 he Incident OOlccr \\ i l l  c'!'wblish and m:'l1ntalll c1o'!'c lit\l�on w i t h  the 
poilce, fire brtgade and the hospital doctor, and WIl l  e"ablish the 
ambu lance Incident control 111 close proximity 10 the control unit:, of 
the other ,en ICC'. Fire brtgade omce" attached to the brtgade control 
U l1 I t  can be itien lJficd by a chequered red and while arm band. 
3 I hI.! I nc ident Onkcr \\ 1 1 1  c'!'tab lbh. or con firm the ��lab l ishmCll l of: 
(a) Ambulance control point 
(b)  Ambulance loadll1g POll1t(,) 
(c) Ambulance parking POll1t(,) 
(d) Casualty co l lect ing point>, and 'or. lir;! aId POll1t, 
(e) Fir>! aId equIpment po ints 
(f) The org;lJ1is3tion of stretcher bear ing part ies. and \\ I I I  formulate the 
casua l ty C\<.Icuatlon plan i n  coJlabor:lllon with the senior medical 
ofliccr prc,>cnl. If  Jl is decided to Include in Ihe plan hospi lab that  
" ere not alerted l Il il ial ly. the cra�h contro l and the �enlOr police 
ollicc.!r on the �Ile mu�t be advl�ed accordl llgly. Pendlllg the arrival 
of the sen ior medical oflicer the I I Icldent Officer \\<i l l - unles� 
operat ional considerations dictate ot hen\ i�e spread the casua l ty 
load bet"een the dc"gnated ho'pl lal and all other ho'pitals alerted 
�IS support l llg hospitals. If thiS action is taken the crash control and 
the �enior po l icc ofiiccr must be informed of the hospi tals to which 
pat ients are being removed. Efforts must be made \ 1:.1  cont ral to 
keep all hospital::, advised of the n u m ber of ca�lIa l t ics bClIlg sent to 
them. 
4 I hc I nCident Officer wil l  control a l l  ambulances and per:,onnei from thc.= 
ambu lance �cf\ice at t he scene, and wil l  keep the crash control fully 
i nformcd of the progress of the incident ensuring that sufficient ambulances 
arc available at the ambulance load ing point. M uch or the value of an 
I ncIdent Omcer depend, upon h is abi l i ty to anticipate his possible needs 
at the scene :.IIld to  IIlform t he control of hi\ req uirements in sufficient 
l ime to allow for the implementation of his inSlrUClioll\ . 
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5 Action must be taken al the ambulance loading point, in conjunction 
with the hospital doctor at the scene, to ensure that correcl priority is given 
when arranging the removal of casualties. A record must be maintained 
of the total number of casualties removed, and the h05pital to which they 
have been taken. 
6 I n  the event of a lengthy wait by ambulances at either the ambulance 
loading point or the ambulance parking point, the Incident Officer will 
issue instructiOlls to conserve vellicle batleries by closing ambulance radio 
sets with the exception of the first vehicle to be used at both points. 
Flashing beacons should also be switched off at the incident if there " 
the possibi lity of a delay prior to further use of the vehicle. 
7 The I ncident Officer will maintain a log of action taken and this will 
form part of the report that will be 5ubmitted by this officer at the 
completion of the incident. 
8 Finally, the I ncident Officer will notify the crash control and the Central 
Emergency Control as �oon as the incident is closed insofar a� the 
ambulance !)ervice is concerned. The !)cene will be checked for ambulance 
service equipment, and \chicles sull at the scene will be dlsmbsed. 
Part 5 
Action by ambulance crcns 
I Action by crell' of tlte firJI (Imbulollce 10 al/ell(/ 
The first ambulance may \\cll arrive al the scene of a major emergency 
before the ambulance I ncident Officer and in these circumstance� the 
crew will act as follows : 
(i) The driver must confirm with control that the incident IS a major 
emergency and also pass any information \\ hich can be speedily 
obtained without leaving his \ehicle. Requests for additional \chiclc� 
,hould be made quoting the total number of vehicles thought to be 
required to clear the incident, eg., '8 ambulances required' would be an 
instruction to control to �end another 7 \ehicles. The driver will remain 
i n  radio contact with control and will not leave his vehicle without the 
permission of control. 
( i i )  The attendant will contact the omcers in charge of police and fire 
brigade at the scene, and liaise with both of lhese service!). He �hould 
carry out a reconnaissance. give a situation report to control and then 
in consultation with the senior police and fire brigade omcer� cstabli�h 
the following pending the arrival of a senior officer. 
Ca) Ambulance conlrol point 
Cb) Ambulance parking point 
Cc) Ambulance loading point> 
Cd) Casualty collecting point (or first aid point) 
(e) First aid equipment supply point 
(f) Stretcher bearing parties. 
He wil l  maintain a record of his actions and will continue to act as 
Incident Officer until relieved by a more senior officer. 
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( i i i )  I t  i, of the utmost imporlance that the information passed to  control 
by thi> crew, 1\ hd.t conci;e, ,hould be a, descriptive as possible. Their 
i n rormation may have a cOI1!:aiderable bearing on the manner i n  which 
the early stage; of the incident are dealt with. 
2 Action by crews subsequel/tly direCfed to file illcidellf 
Crews subseq uently directed la the incident must watch ror the ambulance 
par�ing point and park their vehicle accordingly. Routes laid down by the 
police must be strictly adhered to. 
On arri�al at the parking point the driver will remain with h.is vehicle 
and the attendant wil l  go forward la the ambulance control point or 
contact the ambulance I ncident Officer who can be recognised by the 
) cllow top to hi� �crvicc cap ;  t hereafter the crew wil l  act on orders 
received. 
3 Procedure for aI/ iTCH'.)' 
( I )  As �oon H't Il become!) clear that the incident I:' a major onc i.l nd 
immediately !)uflicienl ambulances are available steps should be taken 
to convey the seriou;ly injured to the designated hospital, as notified 
by control. I t  is important to give priority to the removal of the most 
�el iously injured casualties and care should be taken at the ambulance 
loading point to CIl')ure thi�. 
( i i )  Records of patients conveycd ( by description if it is impossible to 
obtain namcs and addre"e;, eg., clderly female. teenage girl, etc.), and 
or the ho;pitals to which they have been taken will  be maintained on 
Form LA ! .  
( , " )  After each trip to ho'pital, ambulances will  report their availability to 
the cra�h control and aCI on instructions from that control .  
I n  a large incident ca"ualtics may havc to be taken to distant hospitab 
and the number o f  ambulances a \ a i lable for this  task \\ i l l  always be 
I imi tcd. Thc specdy e\acuation or casualties (and t h us the saving or 
l ife and the avoidance of un nece��ary suffering) wi l l  depend on a quick 
turn round for ambulances. Thcre JllU�t be no avoidable delays, and 
hospitals \\ ill  have been �pecially requcsted to release incoming 
ambulance, as quic�ly as pos;ible. Crews should not delay at hospital 
to collect blankets, etc., - ample stocks will  be available at the 
Incident when the major emergency vchicle has been mobilised. 
( i \ ) At the incident all  \'ehicles will  ob;crve radio silence except those 
de"ignated by lht.! I ncidcnt Officer. I f  a \chicJe on radio silence \\ishes 
to send an urgent mcssage, it mW, t  be sent through the ambulance 
control pointjl ncident omccr. 
4 Fire rilk 
Because of thc congestion and other dangers (ie . •  the risk of explosions 
from ga\ or petrol vapour 111 the case of crashed aircraft. broken g�iS 
mains and wrecked railway lanker�, etc.). Smoking i� prohibited a t  uny 
major incident, unless definite permi\sion i� gi\ cn at  designated places 
(eg., refreshment points. etc.) .  The in�tructions of fire brigade officers 
must be obeyed at  all  times if  there is a risk of lire. 
5 AssistaNce to olher authorities 
Crews sent to assist with a major emergency in the area of  another 
authority will report to the ambulance I ncident Officer of that 
authority. 
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Part 6 
Action at tbe hospital by ambulance service bospital liaison officer 
An officer will  be despalched in a radio equipped vehicle 10 Ihe designaled 
hospital, and each support hospital if  required, and will carry out two main 
fUllctions : 
( i )  To ensure the quick turn·round of ambulances bringing caslIailies to 
Ihose hospilals. 
( i i )  To act as a liaison officer with the hospital authority in any matter 
wluch may affect the ambulance service, eg. : 
To keep Ihe lncidenl Officer advised of any change in  Ihe abililY of Ihe 
hospital to receive casualties. 
The co-ord ination of requests la move patients fr0111 wards, either as 
transfers to other hospitals, or as urgent discharges, to free hospital 
beds for incoming casualties. 
I n  clinic hours to liaise with the Transport Officer concerning t reatment 
of patienls already in Ihe hospital. 
O n  his  arrival at the hospital the officer will make himself known to the 
hospital authorities and, in this context i t  should be realised that some 
hospitals have arrangements to set up a special control centre for the hospital 
in the event of a major emergency. Throughout his time at the 
hospital t he officer will make certain that he can be quickly contacted by 
the crash control, i f  required. 
Delays to vehicles at hospitals will have the effect of reducing Ihe number 
available to move casualties from the scene, and elimination of delays by 
the officer at the hospital wil l  greatly contribute to the efficient managemel1l 
of the incident. 
As soon as equipment is released at the hospital, it should be returned to 
the scene, and the officer must ensure that full advantage is taken of the 
facility offered by some hospitals to exchange equipment. 
The hospital involvement with casualties will continue for a long time after 
the closure of the incident and there will  be many requests from them for 
ambulance transport to return home treated casualties, normal treatment 
and clinic patients, plus the continuing need 10 transfer patients out of 
wards. The officer will remain at the hospital unlil directed to leave by 
control. 
Part 7 
Emergency control vehicles (ECV) 
1 Description 
Each of Ihe four emergency conlrol vehicles of Ihe London Ambulance 
Service consists of a Land Rover wjt h  an equipment trailer. These vehicles 
are painted white and bear the London Ambulance Service markings. 
The Land Rovers are surmounled with a blue flashing light, which is flanked 
on both sides by orange flashing lights. 
These vehicles are provided with multi-channel radio sets netted to all 
controls, 'walkie-talkie' and master set, maps, information references, etc. 
The equipment trailers contain sufficient dressings, blankets, stretchers, etc., 
ApPl!lI{lix 3 87 
to ensure that adequate su ppl ies arc available to deal w i t h  a large scale 
Im.:iden l .  A. full I nventory of thi� equipment is set out as an appendix to 
lltl) �ecllon. 
2 Purpose 
The e mergency control velticles are designed to  provide : 
(a) A rorward-based extension or the 'crash control' at t he scene or t he 
incident. 
( b )  A communications and co-ordinating centre 10 assist the I ncidcnt Officer 
in  the perrormance or his dutie . 
(c) A rocal point ror al l  medical and casualty evacuation services. 
I n  order to meet the demand for the rapid establishment of a control a t  
the scene or an incident, the Land Rover may be deployed without trailer. 
3 Locatioll 
Emergency control vehicles wi l l  be located at the rollowing stations : 
Oval Ambulance Station 
WhipI" Cross A mbulance Station 
I l anwell A m bulance Station 
Croydon A m bulance Station. 
4 AI milling 
The emergency control vehicles wil l  normally be manned by a crew of 
three, consisting of: 
( i )  A S!<ltion supervisor (to act as, or l ink  up with, the I ncident Officer) 
( i 1 )  A driver attendant ( to man the  master walkie-talkie radio set) 
(iii) A control officer (to man the normal radio position - acting under the 
instructions or the I ncident Officer). 
I t  may be neces!)ury to vary this according to the resources 3vaibblc at  the 
t I me of the incident. I f  necessar) control \\ il l obtain the services of an 
OfT-dUlY cOl1trol officer la complete the crew of  the Eev in  which case the 
driver may be Instructed to coJlect the cOlltrol officer en-route. or rende7-
\'ou.., at the !',ccne. 
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APPENDIX 4 
h �tegration o� aerodrome fire brigades 
wIth the public fire brigades 
The following extract i s  from the 'Report of the Departmental Committee 
on the Fire Service' (Cmnd. 437 1 ) .  
Airport fire brigades maintained by local authorities 
1 40 The standards of fire cover to be provided at each civil airport are 
laid down by the Board of Trade in  accordance with internationally agreed 
standards. The requirements are included in the licence for the airport and 
the brigade provided for the purpose i s  subject to annual i nspection by 
(he Board of Trade. The latter maintains an airp0rL fire service training 
school, where training in airport fire fighting techniques is pro\ided and 
certificates of competence are issued to airport firemen of supervisory grade'). 
The arrangements for providing fire cover at  each airport i n  accordance 
with the required standard are, however, a matter entirely for the licensee 
of the airport. We understand that at  all local authority airports, except 
Liverpool and Leeds/Bradford, fire cover is provided by a separate civilian 
fire brigade. A t  Liverpool and Leeds/Bradford, however, the airport is 
fully integrated with the public fire service, which provides the necessary 
airport cover. 
• 
1 4 1  We asked a number of local authorit ies who maintain separate airport 
fire brigades why they do so. They take the view generally that an airport 
fire brigade is  an industrial unit  whose work differs in type and extent 
from that of the public fire service. An airport fire brigade is seen as an 
integral part of the airport organisation, working in  close liaison with air 
traffic control s taff, the operating companies, freight agents, fuel companies 
and other units at the airporl. Airport firemen have to have 3n intimate 
knowledge of the airport, its organisation and air traffic control procedure:." 
together with a sound knowledge of different types of aircraft which is bC'\1 
gained by the performance of other airport dut ies. They carry out a wide 
range of duties additional to their fire and rescue responsibilit ies, slIch as 
snow clearance, frost-precaul ion measures, bird dispersal, pro\ision of 
emergency lighting and assistance with unserviceable aircraft on runways, 
which might be inappropriate for members of the public fire service. Airport 
firemen are trained in  the specialised techniques of fire fighting in aircraft, 
ill aircraft rescue techniques and in the use of specialist appliances. If  the 
public fire brigade were to  provide full-time fire cover at airports. additional 
staff would have to be employed lO perform the extraneous duties 
undertaken by airport firemen. Intcgnllion of the airport with the public 
fire brigade, we were told, would lead to staffing problems, because airport 
firemen are on different pay and conditions of service and many might not 
satisfy tbe statutory quali fications for appointment and promotion in the 
public fire service. At some of the smaller airports the scale of operations 
would make jt uneconomical jn manpower to provide airport fire cover 
from the public fire service. We were informed that satisfactory Ijaison had 
been establjshed between airport and public fire brigades to ensure that 
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adequate �uppon fJcllitic� were 3\.lI lablc in an emergency and for the 
pro\ i-'IOIl of joint lrallllng arrangements. h W3!o.. al.3o pointed out that many 
a!rpoll. were located geographically out.ide tbe area or the controlling 
local authority, and thi. would make integration with their public fire 
.3crvice marc dinicult. 
142 \Ve rccogni\c the force of many of the\c arglll1lcnto; and \\<c arc 
grat eful to tho\c aUlhorit ic"i \\ho gave lh informat ion on thelllc malters. 
Nevertheless. \\c con":.idcr that. from the point of \,ic\\ of prOviding 
elTcctl\'c firc cover at airports and maximum opcratJonal efficiency, there 
are .3t rong arguments In  fa\'our of integrating local authority 3 1rport and 
public fire brigades. Fcw aircraft crashes occur at airports and as a result 
airport firemen ncce�saflly can obtalll only l imited e_xperience of operational 
fire fighllng in thc course or their carccrs. Although rrequent and realistic 
exercises arc carried oul by airport fire brigadcs. these cannot be a 
subslIlute ror actual fire fighting experience. We do not accept that fire 
fighting and rescue techniqlle� at air crashes arc baSically dilTerclll from 
those carried out by the public f-ire service. Many ai rcraft crashes occlIr 
away rrom airports and hmc to bc dealt with by the public fire service. 
\Ve can scc advantage from the POll1t of view of command and control in 
integrating the two o;cn'ices. \Ve took the opportunity. therefore, of visiting 
LIVerpool Ai rport, where the airport fire brigode has been completely 
integrated \\ ith the Clly brigade. The al fport appliances are pro\ided 
;olel) ror airerart crash and rescue \\ ork and officers and men or the City 
brigade perrorm a two-yearly term or duty at the airport. Under this 
�ystel11 many of the men 111 the brigade become conversant with airport 
traffic control and airport crash fire fighting procedures. I t  also ensures that 
all men hen ing at the aIrport ha\ c had regular fire fighting experience of a 
general nature, which ha":. an important enect on maintaining morale. We 
were parllcularly Imprcsscd with the command and control advantages of 
intcgralloll. \\ hich ensures that the full resources of the brigade including 
Its senior officers arc available for �lIrport fire fighting operations. A further 
advantage \\e noted IS that design and development or equipment ror the 
alfport and the public fire services take into account the supporting role or 
the laller. Wc accept that rull in tegrallon of local authority airport fire 
brigades and public firc bngadc.3 Inlght lead to some increase in the cost 
of providlllg aIrport I1re cover and that, because of the d ifferent conditions 
of servIce of airpon firemen, specml arrangements would be necc�sary, 
requiflng goodwill by all concerned, to sareguard the position or these men 
during the transitional period fol lo\\ ing integration. But the issue which 
has to be raced " \\hether integrallon \\ ould prOVIde a beller .tandard or 
fire safety, particularly having regard to the increasing size or pa .. enger 
tllrcrart and the general increase III air traffic which will occur ," the future. 
With the proposed reorganl!�atiol1 of local go\'crnment arcas. it seems 
likely that most local authority al l"ports wil l  roll within the geographical 
area of the controlling local authority, which would facilitate integration. 
\Vc have no doubt that full integrallon of the two senices would be more 
efficient operat ionally. The only maller for considemtion is whcther the 
additional costs that might be involved would be just ified. We recommend 
therefore. that following the reorg.H\ i�ation of local government and the 
formation of fewer and larger fire authorities which we recommend in 
Chapter I l l , those local authorities which control civil airport should 
review their arrangements for providing airport fire cover and consider the 
operational advantages or full integral ion or their airport and public fire 
brigades. 
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British Airports Authority Fire Service 
1 43 The Brit ish A irports Authority is responsible for Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Slansted and Prestwick airports and maintains its own fire brigade to 
provide fire cover at these airports. 'We have not taken evidence from the 
Brit ish Airports Authority but the report on the accident of the Bocing 
707-465 G/ARWE at  Heathrow Airport on 8th April, 1 968, served to 
reinforce the views which we had already formed that there would be 
substantial operational advantages at local authority airports in integrating 
the airport and public fire brigades. We note that the Heathrow accident 
report recommended that a broad based working party should study and 
report on the  problems of aircraft fire and rescue operations, and suggest 
that the working party in the course of its deliberations should consider 
whether similar operational advantage would flow from integrating other 
airport fire brigades with the public fire �crvice. 
Industrial fire brigades 
1 46 Many works fire brigades date from the time before the e>tablishment 
of a nation-wide public fire service, \\ hcll they were the only means whereby 
an industrialist could ensure the prompt availability of reasonable 
fire fighting facilit ies at  his premises. The position is now very different, 
particularly in urban Iligh fire-risk areas, \\ here an early and substantial 
first attendance can be provided by the public fire service. The present 
trend and one which we expect to continue is for more industrial 
establishments to concentrate their own private efforts on fire prevention 
measures and 10 leave actual fire fighting to local authority brigades. This 
does not mean that works fire brigades will d isappear. We have 
recommended in  Chapter V that there �hould be 110 change in the statutory 
position whereby a fire authority is only required 10 provide a fire brigade 
of sufficient strength to meet all normal requirements; and, accordingly. 
that flre cover should continue to be a�sessed in relation to the general 
character and risk of the area and not in relation to an isolated fire risk. 
For a variety of reasons, some high rish ind ustrial installations ""ill continue 
1 0  be erected in relatively remote areas and their owners or occupiers will 
wish as hitherto to include the provision of a works fire brigade in the 
arrangements which they provide to deal initially with outbreaks of fire on the 
premises. In addition, some industrial organisations \\ith complicated high 
fire risk processes will  wish lO have their own works brigades becau�e the 
initial attack on a fire has lo be made immediately and also requires a 
more detailed knowledge of the processes than can be possessed by a local 
authority fire brigade. 
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Section V I  Aerodrome fire and rescue 
• 
erVlces 
Scale of protection to be provided at licensed aerodromes 
1 . 1  The Fire and Rescue category of aerodromes shall be asses>ed 
whenever necessary in accordance with this pamgraph on the basis of 
the preceding 1 2  months' traffic which shall be adjusted to reneet any 
change in the number of movements and types of aircraft expected. 
Where there is no record of past traffic, the category wil l  be assessed 
from the c t im31cd (rante likely to use the aerodrome in the three 
busiest months. The term 'movement' means a take·oIT or a landing, 
and the phra:,c 'number of mO\CmCl1h' mean ... the a\<crage number of 
Illo\crncnls per 1110l1lh for the three bUSiest monlh� of the year. 
Only acroplanc� cng:.Jged 111 the public t ransport of passcngcr\ shall 
be cOllllled 
2 rhe categO lY  of Fin! Sen lcc and thereby the 1l1 l 1 1 1 1llUIll quantit ies of 
media to be pro\ ided shall be that related to the heaviest weight 
category of aircran using the aerodrome and whose number of 
movements is morc than 1 50. The quantit ies of media shall be as 
specified 111 Table V I  I .  
1 .3 When the 'number of movclllcnb' I I I  aircraft I II  the heavic�1 weight 
categol y " le» than 50. the category of Fire Ser"ce 10 be provided 
may be onc catcgor) less than \\ Quld he required b) paragraph 1 .2 
�\bo\'e. 
1 .4 When the 'number or movement ... • I n the heaViest weight category is 
between 50 and 1 50. the quantllic, of media and discharge rates shall 
be nol less than a figure mid way between the media pro\ is ions for 
the 'over 1 50' Fire and Rescue category and tho;e for onc category 
less. 
1 . 5  When an out of hours movement ta"es place the normal Fire and 
Rescue SCf\ticc is to be provided, except that if the concerned 
a;rcraft\ maximulll lotal weight authorised i s  less than the scale for 
which the aerodrome is l icensed the quantity of media appropriate 
to the lower �cale may be �lIb�titllted. rhe appliance� on watch are 
to be fully manned and in addition \\ here appropriate ambulance 
coyer �hould be available. The�e �er"icc� �hould be maintained for a 
minimum period of firteen minutes after the actual time of depanure 
of an aircraft. 
1 .6 For l icen�ed aerodrome� where no public tran�port movements are 
expected the minimum level of provi�ion shall be a� given for 
Categor) I "' Table V I- I .  The board ,hould be consulted on the 
lire and rescue requiremellt� in case� where the ai rcrart \\cight is 
greater than 3,000 lb. 
2. Guidance on fire fighting prmisions 
2 . 1  Foam liquid water solution 
The quantities of foam liquid in Table Vf-I  Column 4 arc calculated 
on a foam liqu id/water �olution strcngth of 5 per cent which i� 
-,ultablt:: for mo.,t types of cqulpment. I f  the equipment require., a 
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Table VI-l 
Minimum Quantilies of Extinguishing Media H.C(luired 
Principal SupplemeJllary 
aget/ls agems 
Fire 11lox;11I11111 Waler Foam GPM CO' or dry or approved 
Service lIulhorised (gclls) liquid !l'aler (lb) cflem;cal " opouris;lIg liquid 












0/ aeroplalle fiquid 
soluriol/ 
2 J 4 5 7 8 
3,000 lb. or 30 5 20 25 )0 Experience in  the use 
under of vapourising liquid 
is insufficient to 
3,001 to 100 5 40 50 )0 permit precise quan-
6,500 lb. tilies 10 be specified. 
Ho\\-cver when such 
liquids arc used in 
6,501 tQ )00 1 5  100 100 50 combrnalion with 
1 5,000 lb. foam they should be 
provided in  amounh 
1 5,001 to 600 )0 15U 200 I Ut) representing an C"(,-
30,000 lb. tinguishing capacity 
at [cast equivalent to 
30,001 to 900 45 200 300 1 50 the amount of CO� 
60,000 lb. or dry chemical 
shown in  the 
60.001 to 1,300 65 250 600 )00 adjacent columns. 
90,000 lb. Toxic vapourising 
liquids should nOI 
90,001 10 1 .800 90 300 I , :WO 600 be used, bul if this 
1 20,000 lb. is unavoidable the 
degree of toxicity 
120,001 to 2,400 120 500 J .500 750 must be within 
200,000 lb. acceptable limits. 
200,001 to 5,280 265 880 1 ,500 750 
500,000 lb. 
Over 500,000 lb. 8,000 400 J ,300 1 ,760 880 
higher solution strength then the quantity of foam liquid shown i n  
Column 4 shall be increased to maintain the appropriate ratio with 
the water. 
2.2 Supplementary agents 
2.2. 1 Dry powder agents to  be employed in dual-agent applications shall 
be of a foam-compatible Iype. 
2.2.2 When dry powder is the supplemenlary agent separale equipment 
should be available for engine starting fires. This equipment may 
deliver CO, or any other suilable agenl and should be designed 10 be 
used wi th  engines. 
2.3 Extinguishing media 
The required quantities of mcdi a  shall be readily available. I n  addition 
a 200 per cenl reserve of foam liquid and 1 00 per cent of 
supplementary agent shall b e  held in  stores. These reserves mu::,t be 
stored in suitable conditions to mini mise the risk of detcrioration. 
Consignment::, should be used in order of delivery to avoid a 
prolonged shelf-life. 
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3. Appli.nce, 
3 . 1  The e.lInguI>hmg med,a and re,cue eqUipment 'hall be carried on one 
or morc appliances each with a chassis capable of cross-country 
performance and capable of rcaching any area within the airport 
bounda"e,. If the;e appliance, arc not self-propelled they shall be 
connected 10 a suitable 10\\ ing vchicle whenever aircraft movements 
are taking place. The appl iances ;hall be capable of carrying the fire 
and rc�cuc personnel. \Vhere an aerodrome l icence is endorsed 
'For IlIght use' at least one appliance ;hall be provided with a 
suitable light 10 �\ld search and rc�cue operations in darkness. 
(Guidance on de,ign features for cross-country appliances is given at 
Section VI  append,x A . )  
• 
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APPEN D l X  6 
DAT M emorandum No 1 /70 
Memorandum from the Director of 
Aerodromes (Technical) Board of Trade 
Operations at ai rports with depleted 
fire services 
I This revised edition replaces Memorandum 3/69 issued in May 1969 and 
i ncorporates the Addendum issued in October 1 969. 
2 The following advice i s  for the guidance of the l icensees and managements 
of civil aerodromes and is intended to ensure that operations involving the 
public transpon of passengers are appropriately restricted when the fire 
service i s  seriously depleted and consequently unable to provide an adequate 
service i n  the evelll of 3n emergency. I t  provides for the circumstance in 
which the fire and rescue services are depleted partially or totally for any 
reason including their being committed to an accident or other incident 
from which they cannot disengage ; or because the contents of the 
appliances have been d ischarged. 
3 I t  is the responsibility of the aerodrome management to keep itself 
informed on the state of availability of the service and to take appropriate 
action when fire cover is depleted. This should include notifying pilots and 
operators of the deficiency and, when the depletion is serious, by restricting 
or suspending operations by public transport passenger-carrying aircraft 
unt i l  such time as adequate cover is again available. 
4 The scale of fire cover required for licensing is set out in CAP 1 68 
Section VL There have been amendments subsequclll to its publication; 
a recent revised draft promulgated by DAT shows the categories of 
aeroplanes as I to X, the latter being intended to cover the future jumbo 
jets. The categories are related to classes of aircraft, determined by 
maximum perrrussible weight. When the fire cover available is reduced by 
two or more categories below that required by the l icence under the 
CAP 1 68 scale, aerodrome management should, subject to the exceptions 
in  paragraph 4, initiate the following action. 
( i )  Reduction of available fire cover by the equivalent of two categories 
The operation of public transport passenger-carrying aircraft within the 
category which determines the amount of fire cover requi red by the 
aerodrome licence, and aircraft of greater max..imum permissible weight, 
should be suspended until adequate cover is again available. This means, 
for example, that an aerodrome at which fire cover is  provided to 
category VI J l  requirements should suspend the operation of aircraft which 
come within category V I I I  or Iligher if the fire cover available falls to the 
equivalent of category V I .  
( i i )  Reduction by more thall two categories 
The restriction of operation of public transport passenger-carrying aircraft 
should be progressive, category by category. For example, in the case of 
the aerodromes quoted in (i) if the fire cover falls to the equivalent of 
category V the operation of aircraft which come within category VIr  or 
higher should be suspended. 
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( i i l )  Al'ai/ah/c jire COCet rel/ueed 10 lIi/ 
All  pa senger carrying public transport aircraft movements should be 
,u,pcndcd. 
What is stated in  ( i )  and ( i i )  above is not intended to d iscourage aerodrome 
managements from laking earlier action or increasing the scope of the 
restriction if, having regard to  the circumstances of the case, they consider 
this advisable. 
5 Exception, to paragraph 4 arc : 
(a) the aerodrome should remain open for emergency landings. 
(b) a"craft should be permilled to land when, in the pilot'; opinion a 
di'ersion or holding may bc a greater potential hazard. 
(c) operations may be continued by ai rcraft which are not required by the 
Air Navigati n Order to u,e only l icensed aerodromes. 
6 Promulgation of the decisions by acrodrome management should 
normally be through the NOTAM service and through Air Traffic Control. 
7 Messages pas<cd from the aerodrome authority to Air Traftic Control for 
onward transmis�ion to aircraft should be suitable for immediate relay 10 
ptlots. I t  should not be necessary for ATC to refer to  table, in order to 
decide to which aircraft the message should be passed. 
8 To meet this requirement the message should be along the fol lowing 
lines: 
' Message from aerodrome/airport authority. 
Aerodrome fire service depleted ; take off/landing suspended, except in  
emergency, for all aircraft operating for the public transport of 
passengers with max..imul11 permissible weight . . . . . . . . . .  Ibs or more'. 
D F Peel 
Director of Aerodromes (Technical) 
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APpeNDIX 8' 
Sect ion V I I  M ed ical services 
I Al every aerodrome, arrangemenls shall be made whereby local 
prnclising doctors can be called upon t o  render assistance i n  the event of an 
aircraft accidenl and local hospitals 10 accepl any resulling casualties al 
any hour. 
2 Emergency orders shall be issued al each aerodrome which shall include: 
(a) arrangements for summoning medical assistance and local ambulances 
immediately a n  accident occur�; 
(b) arrangemenls for warl1lng Ihe appropriale hospital Ihal accommodalion 
for casualt ies is required ; 
(c) t he di\pJay in  an nppropriate position of the names, addrcs�cs and 
telephone nu mbers of the medical pract it ioners with whom arrangement.;; 
have been made for 3ltcndancc at accidcn h ;  
(d) Ihe di'play i n  a n  appropriale posilion of Ihe names, addresses and 
lelephone numbers of hospitals or medical eSlablishmenls Ihal \I i l l  
accept casualt ies ; 
(e) Ihe display in an appropriale po,ilion of Ihe addresses and lelephone 
num bers of ambulance stations that will  provide faciljtie� for the 
conveyance of casuahic\. 
3 U nless an ambulance or ambula nces from outside sources can arrive at 
the aerodrome within 1 5  minutes of being su mmoned an ambulance or 
olher vehicle capable of conveying nOI less Ihan 111'0 slreleher cases shall be 
prO\ ided on Ihe aerodrome. 
4 Where i l  is necessary for an ambulance or olher vehicle capable of 
carrying casualties to be stationed on the aerodrome the driver shall be 
a \ ailable dUring Ihe hours Ihal Ihe aerodrome is open. I f  Ihe driver is nOI  
qual ified in firs! aid an addilional per50n so qualified shall be available 
during the hours the aerodrome is open. 
5 Medical supplie, and equipment as shown in Table V I I - I  shall be 
available o n  Ihe aerodrome and arrangements shall be made for such of 
Ihe5e as may be necessary 10 be conveyed by rapid means IQ Ihe scene of 
a n  acciden!.  They should be i n  charge of a n u rse or olher person qualified 
i n  firsl aid, who should be available during Ihe hours Ihe aerodrome is 
open. 
6 To allow a small measure of Oexibilily provision of medical supplies and 
equipmenl appropriale 10 Ihe neXI higher scale wi l l  nOI be required so long 
as occasional movements of aircraft appropriate to the next higher category 
do not exceed six in  any onc month, subject to an upper limit of 52 i n  any 
yea r . 
... CAP J68 Licensillg 0/ Aerodromes, 2nd edition, 1971 
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Table Vll-I 
Minimum Scales of Medical Equipment 
Category of aeroplane' to be provided for 
Scale I Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5 
maximum maximulII maxmllllll maximum maXW1fI1II 
certift- cer/ift- certifi- cerrifi- certifi-
ca/cd caIn/ cated cated cated 
weight weigh, weight ,,'eight weight 
3,000 Ib 3,001 to 30,001 to 200,001 to o/:er 
or muler 30,000 16 200,000 Ib 500,000 16 500,000 16 
Bandages 
Elastic adhesive, 3 jn�. 
by 3 yds. Rolls 2 3 12  24 72 
Crepe, 3 inches Rolls 6 6 1 2  36 100 
Loose wo\'en, 3 ins. Rolls 1 2  1 2  48 96 200 
Triangular No. 6 1 2  24 48 1 50 
Dressings 
Medicated wound 
dressing, large sizc No. 6 1 2  24 48 150 
Medicated wound 
dressing, medium size No. 6 12  24 48 150 
Gauze, absorbent, 
8 oz. packets Plo.ts. 3 5 1 2  36 
100 
Adhesive plaster, 
zinc oxide, 3 ins. Reels 1 4 12  50 
Wool, cotlon. 
absorbent 1 6  oz. Pkts. 2 4 1 2  36 
100 
Miscellaneous 
Tablets, Aspinn, soluble Tabs. 25 50 100 
200 500 
Salvolatile in screw-top 
bottle 0". 1 2 3 6 1 2  
Spirit, methylated or 
surgical Pints 1 1 
2 2 4 
Tourniquets No. 2 2 
4 12  25 
Pins, safety, cuped Dozens 2 4 8 
24 50 
Scissors, 6 inches No. 2 2 4 
12  30 
Stretchers No. 2 4 
1 2  36 70 
Blankets, single No. 6 1 2  
36 100 300 
Bottles, rubber, 
hot water No. 4 6 
1 2  36 70 
Bottles water, with 
1 8  30 
sling and cup No. 1 2 
6 
Antiseptic cream Oz. 2 4 
1 6  48 80 
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APPEN D IX 9 
H ospitals' organisation 
The following list, compiled by the North-Wcst Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board, 
1 0  conjunction wllh the South-West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board, shows the 
'designated' or 'supporting' hospitals which the ambulance services will use in the event 
of an aircraft accident al Hcathrow Airport (sce paragraph 1 1 7): 
(A) Designated hospitals 01' supporting hospitals 
Straight line mileage 
from ce1l1re 0/ airport 
, -
4 6 
(8) SlIpporting "o�pila'� 
Straight l ine mileage 
from centre of airport 6� 










Wcxham Park (Ducks) 
SI Peters Chertsey (Surrey)· 
Kingston· 
Central Middlesex 




• S.W. Melropolltan Regional Hospital Board 
U Boards or Governors of Teaching Hospilals 
Hammersmith Hospilal is In the N.W. Metropolitan Region. 
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APPENDIX 1 0  
Ext�acts [r<?m The West M iddlesex H ospital 
M ajor AccJdent Procedu re 
1 Definition of 'major accident' 
A 'Major Accident' is defined as follows: 
(a) i n  which the number of live 'casualties' to be handled is estimated to be 
i n  excess of 50 to 60. 
(b) which necessitates the despatch of onc or more mobile medical teams 
to the scene of the accident. 
(c) i n  which more th.n one of the 'listed' hospitals (Appendix 'A') is 
l ikely to be involved i n  handling d isaster c.sualtio;. 
4 Raising the alarm 
(a) Other tholl LOlldoll Airport 
The 'alerting' message will  be prefaced with the word� ' Major Accident'. 
The 'Designated' hospital wil l  receive : 
(a) Brief details of the accident, the location and time; 
Cb) the estimated number of casualties and type, if this I nformation is 
available; 
(c) the names of any other hospitals which are being alerted to support 
the 'Designated Hospital'. 
'Supporting' hospitals wil l  receive the ame Information and will be told 
which i s  the 'Designated' hospital. 
(b) Londoll A irporl 
r n  the event of a major accident occurring at London Airport in the 
area of squares M, T or Z of the London Airport Crash Grid Map, 
West M iddlesex Hospital would be the 'Designated Hospital' and the 
Port Health Medical Officer may ask for medical assistance at the scene 
of the accident. I n  other area this hospital will be the 'Supporting 
Hospital'. 
Action by co-ordinating officer (secretary) 
(a) Immediately pass the information to 
( i )  Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon or 
Chairman of the Medical Committee or V icc-ChJlrlllan 
( i i )  Duty Consultant Physician who will act as Senior Medical Omcer 
at  the accident i f  West Middlesex Hospital is the 'Designated 
Hospital'. 
( i i i l  I f  Mobile Medical Team required, the Orthopaedic Regi;trar, 
together with Duty Casualty Officer. 
(b) Request Telephonist to advise other officer; a; listed in paragraph (c) 
see page 5. 
(c) Organise transport for Senior Medical Officer at ;cene of accident. 
and 
Mobile Medical Team (tlus is done by calling the ambulance sen Ice on 
a 999 call). . 
(d) Establish Control Centre in  Reception Office Out·Patlent Department. 
(e) I nstruct Ambulance Authorities to take other emergencies to other 
hospitals. 
(f) Obtain bed state from Bed Bureau. 
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(g) Give instructions to the Duty Registrar and organise the evacuation of 
Wnrd 3 and other wards in readiness La receive casualtie . 
(h) Delegate an administrative officer to arrange the transport of patients 
from the Accident and E mergency Department to the wards and the 
evacuation of patients from the wards if necessary. 
< i )  Establish clo,e liaison with Major Accident Officer, Senior Matron, 
police, Prcss Officer etc. 
(j) Organise in conjunction with departmental heads, the resources to deal 
with the anticipated number of casualties. Evacuation Centres are 
Silting Rooms of Nurses Homes, empty beds on staff and other wards. 
(k)  If requested by the Senior Matron, call in members of the Hospital 
Service Reserve and voluntary services, etc. (See Appendix D.) 
( I )  If  necessary notify Chaplains. (See Appendix D. )  
(m) Keep Senior Medical Officer at  scene of accident informed of beds 
remaining for casualties by mcans of the Ambulance R/T Network via 
the Ambulance Liaison Officer or via land line to Ambulance Control. 
(n )  On recei, ing ' Disaster Cancelled' message from Telephonist, the 
II1formation should be passed to the Major Accident Officer and 
1 elephonist etc. inst ructed accordingly. 
(0) To liaise with the officer from thc Ambulance Service stationed at the 
hospital when necessary, ego the co-ord ination of arrangements to 
free hospital beds by discharging patients or transferring them to other 
hospitals. 
Action by Senior Medical Officer at the scene of the accident 
( Duty Consultant Physician) 
Before leaving the hospital 
I On bell1g advised by the Co-ordll1atll1g Oniccr notIfy the Duty House 
PhYblcian and proceed with him to �cene of the accident and take a copy 
of this document with you (spare copy in Major Accident Cupboard). 
On arrival at the accident 
2 Except London Airport a�Mllnc IInmcdialc command of a l l  the medical 
bcrVICCS. 
3 Conlaet the Senior Ambulance I ncident Officer who wi l l  be identified by a 
yellow top to his service hat (at London Airport, the Port Health Medical 
Officer) together with other services and make appreciation of the situation. 
If ncce>sary ,ummon mobile team(s) from designated and supporting 
hosplla\; (Appendi, A) , i a  the Ambulance Incident Onicer who wil l  
(.:ontacl the Ba�e Control by radio to make the necessary arrangements. 
4 Establish a Medical ServIces Report Centre at  the Mobile Ambulance 
Control. This i:> a Land Rover with an equipmcnl lrailer. Both vehicles arc 
painted white and bear the Ambulance Service markings. The Land Rover 
is surmounted with a blue flashing light which is flanked on both sides by 
orange nashing lights. These vehicles are provided with mult i  channel radio 
sets. They carry white coals for the doctors use. 
5 Decide where the Casualty Post(s) is to be established which must be 
easily identifiable. 
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6 Report to Major Accident Omcer, Designated Hospital as soon as 
possible through Mobile Ambulance Control an estimate of the number and 
type of casualties. 
7 Formulate Casualty Evacuation Plan in collaboration with Senior 
Ambulance Officer. 
8 Allocate dut ies to any additional doctors who reach the scene and to all 
helpers (eg. members of voluntary services) who offer assistance. 
9 Arrange for the collection and return of medical equipment on 
conclusion of activities on �itc. 
Action by Mobile Medical Team 
I The Mobile Medical Team \I i ll con,ist of 
Orthopaedic Registrar 
Duty Casualty Officer 
Sister and 4 trained nurse, 
2 Assemble in  Accident and Emergency Department and await arrival of 
ambulance vehicle for conveyance to scene of accident. 
3 Collect key to Major Accident cupboard which is in  glass box, Sister's 
Office, Accident and Emergency Department and help collect and load 
equipment hampers (as detailed in Appendix C) together with identification 
uniforms and wellingtons on transp0rL which will be sent by the 
Ambulance Authority. 
4 I f  already so instructed, proceed to the site of the accident. Otherwise. 
reassemble in Accident Department to await despatch. 
5 A t  the site of accident, report to Senior Medical Officer at Medical 
Services Report Centre at  the Mobile Ambulance Control. Tills is a Land 
Rover with an equipment trailer. Both vehicles are painted while and bear 
the Ambulance Service markings. The Land Ro\'er is surmounted with a 
blue flashing light which is flanked on both sides by orange flashing lights. 
If  the Mobile Team arrives before the Senior Medical Officer, the doctor in 
charge of the team will assume responsibility unt i l  the arrival of the Senior 
Medical Officer. 
6 Establish a Casualty Post in accordance with the directions of the Senior 
Medical Officer on the site. (This should be in the vicinity of the Medical 
Services Report Centre and the Ambulance Loading Point). 
7 Emergency c�nical work \I i l l  be carried out a t  the Casualty Post which 
will act as a filter to ensure that ambulance priority is given 10 the seriously 
inj ured and this may involve holding back slightly injured cases and 
treating them on the sile jf  ambulance resources are limited. 
8 Documentation of drugs given must be recorded on the labels provided 
and affixed to the patient. 
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APPENDIX I I  
A i r  Corporations Jo int  M ed ical Service 
Aircrart Disasters 
London Airport 
I NotIfication of an aircraft disa�tcr - affecting any airline - will be 
received by Central Area Medical Uni t  which wI l l  act as the co-ord inating 
medical centre. 
2 Central Area Medical Un ll ",ll  immediately notify t he doctor-on-call, 
PMO(A I R), DDMS and DMS i n  that order and prepare to receive 
casua It ics. 
3 Central Area \ledlcal unl l  \1111 I I1form other 24-hour Ulllts to stand-by or 
provide assistance as necessary. 
4 The doctor-on-call, \\ ithout \\a l l lng for further detaIl;, wil l  proceed 
forthwith to  the Central Area MedIcal Un i t  irrespective of the t ime of day or 
night. The doctor-on-call \11 1 1  u'e h" discretion whether to proceed with 
any available nurslIlg �laff to the scene of the accident. 
5 Under no circum,tance, ,hould a 24-hour mcdlcal un i t  be left unmanned 
as c3!otuallics may be brought from any quarter. 
6 The detail; of any passenger, \\hether injured or un injured, brought to 
any medical unit must be notified Immediately to the British Airports 
AuthOrity Constabulary Conlrol Room. 
7 All  medical units should al,o ensure that the details of any passengers arc 
nOllficd to the doctor-on-call at Central Area Medical Unit .  
Aircraft Disasters 
Outside London Airport O,erseas 
I Central Area Medical Uni t  \\ i l l  Immediately notify the doctor-on-call, 
PMO(AI  R), DDMS and DMS in that order. 
2 The doctor-on-call should proceed to London Airport and be prepared 
to proceed overseas at short notice. 
A S R Pelfers 
DDMS 
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From : Deputy Director Medical Services 
To : See Distribution List 
M . 1 . 5  6th January, 1 969 
London Airport - Emergency procedures 
I n  vic\� of the changed rune
,
lion of certain medical unil�, and particularly 
the re' tsed ambulance location (sec I (c) belo\\) and control instructions . . , 
It IS necessary to amend and simpl ify prC�C111 emergency orders. 
The various Standing I nstructions arc outlined in the BEA/BOAC Manuals 
on Aircraft Accident>, London Airport Station Orders, and General Staff 
Notices, bUI the salient points an'ceting medical staff are as follows: 
I Location of ambulances 
(a) British Airports Authority all/bull/llces 
These are controlled b) the British Airport' AuthOrity Fire and 
Ambulance Sen ice and arc located in the BAA Central and North side 
Fire Stations. If, in emergency, the BAA ambulance i,  ordered off the 
airport the Senior Sister Health Control Uni t  should be informed. 
(b) A CJMS passellger all/bulallce 
This is located in the BOAC MT Uni t  in the Central Area and may be 
used to cover any emergency notified to the Central Area Medical Unit 
when the 2222 emergency call procedure has nOl been used. 
(c) A CJ MS occ/lpatiollal health all/blllallce 
As from 1 st January, 1 969, the occupational hcalth ambulance will be 
located i n  the BOAC Fire Post in No. I Maintenance Area where i t  
wil l  be manned by Firc Section stafT throughout the 24 hours. 
2 Aircraft accidents/ incidents at London Airport 
Three categories of call may be notified to the Central Area Medical Unit : 
( i)  Local standby 
( i i )  Ful l  emergency 
( i i i )  Aircraft disaster 
No action is required by nursing staO- for a local standby call. When a full 
emergency is declared, Central Area Medical Unit will ensure that a nur�ing 
sister is available to man the telephone for the duration of the emergency_ 
No further action is necessary at that �tage_ 
A ircraft disaster 
I Notification of an aircraft disaster - affecting any airline - will be 
received by Central Area Medical Unit  which will act as the co-ordinating 
medical centre. 
2 Central Area Medical Unit wi l l  immediately notify the doctor-on-call, 
PMO(Air), DDMS and DMS in that order and prepare to receive casualties. 
3 Cenlral Area Medical Unit  \\ i l l  inform other 24-hour unllS to stand-by 
or provide assistance as necessary_ 
4 The doctor-on-call without waiting for further details, wil l  proceed 
forthwith to the Cen;ral Area Medical Unit irrespective of the time of day 
or night. The doctor-on-ca l l  wi l l  use his discretion whether to proceed with 
any available nursing staff to the scene of the accident. 
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5 Under no clfcum,lance, ,hould a 24-hour medical unit be lert unmanned 
"' casuallie, may be broughl rrom any quarler. 
6 The dewil, or any pas,enger, whelher Injured or uninjured, brought 10 
any medical unil  must be notified immediately to the British Airports 
Authorily Constabulary Control Room. 
7 All  medical ul1ll' ,hould also ensure Ihal Ihe dewil, or any passengers 
arc nOll fied 10 Ihe doctor-on-call at Central Area Medical U nit .  
8 Emergency medical klls arc maintained at Central Area Medical Un it ,  
OH U Speedblfd Hou,e, and 0 1 1  U (West). 
3 Aircraft accidents incident� out�ide London Airport/O\crscas 
I Cenlral Area Medical Ul1It \\1 11 immediately notiry the doctor-on-call, 
PMO(Air), DDMS and DMS in that order. 
2 The doctor-on-call should proceed to  London Airport and be prepared 
IQ proceed Qversca., at short notice. 
3 Arter reporting at Central Area �Iedical Unil ,  the doctor-on-call should 
proceed as necessary to the BEA operation, conlrol centre or BOAC 
control centre. 
4 Ground accidcnb or seriou� il lness at London Airport im'ohing 
BEA/BOAC personnel passengers 
(a)  Repor/lllg procedllre 
When BEA/BOAC stafT or pa»enger; arc im olved in a n  accident or 
taken seriously I I I  any\\ here at London Airport. the person reporting Ihe 
incident nu"t d ial 2222 on any BOAC or BEA telephone. 
Such call, \\ i l l  be an,"ered by the Board or Trade emergency switch­
board operator \\ ho \\ i l l  !)talc ' Emergency, \\hich Senice do you 
require?' For medical a��i!)tance the caller must reply 'ambulance', 
After the emergenc) operator has obtained the name and extension 
number or the caller. the call \\ i l l  be relayed to the BAA Fire and 
Ambulance Sen Ice. 
The caller I11U�t then repeat the requc�t for an ambulance, stating the 
nature of the incident, giving the exact location and the number of 
persons 1I1vohed. 
All slIch 1122 e//lergellcy calls jro//l BOAC alld BEA eXlellsiolls are 
//Iollilored hy BOAC Fire COII/rol. All BEA 1121 calls are also //Iollilored 
by A CJ AlS O /I V/ IV EST 10clI/ed ill Ihe BEA //Iaill/ellallce base. 
(b) IlIcidellls ill Ihe BEA BO I C  \laill/ellallce Area 
On monitoring a 2222 call, BOAC Fire Control will : 
( i )  Note details or the call and t ime received. 
( I i )  Turn oul the ACJ M S  ambulance to O H U  Speedbird House, collect a 
nursing sister and proceed to the incident. 
( i i i )  NOllry BAA Fire and Ambulance Sen ice that ACJMS ambulance 
i& altending. using the direct telephone line. 
(iv) otiry O H U  Speedbird I-louse giving all kno\\ n delails. 
Cv) I r cal l  was received \ ia BEA 2222 confirm with O H U  West that they 
monilored the call. 
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( Note: Ir  ror any reason the ACJ M S  ambulance or nursing sister is 110t 
available when a call i s  received BOAC Fire Post will notiry BAA Fire 
and A mbulance Service that their ambulance is required, and notiry 
OH U Speedblfd House and OH U West accordingly. Whenever the BAA 
ambulance is used to attend BOAC/BEA staff in the Maintenance Area, 
BA A  should be instructed to take the casualty to OHU Speedbird 
House or OHU West as appropriate.) 
(c) IlIcidellts ill the North alld Celltral Areas 
2222 calls in the Central Area and London Airport North should be 
actioned by the BAA A mbulance Service. They will normally take any 
casualty to  the Health Control Uni t  in Queen's Building but if BEA/ 
BOAC staff are involved, the Airport Authority watch keeper should 
notiry Central Area Medical Unit .  
Where the correct 2222 procedure is not rollo\led and such incidents 
are reported direct to Central Area Medical Unit, the duty sister will use 
her discretion whether to use the ACJMS passenger ambulance or 
dial 2222 ror the BAA ambulance. 
5 National Healtb Service ambulances 
When a ational Health Service ambulance is required [0 transport a case 
rrom London Airport to hospital, medical units \I i l l  be responsible ror 
calling the outside ambulance. 
A list or a l l  appropriate N HS ambulance numbers should be kept in all 
ACJMS units at London Airport. 
6 Emergency store/equipment 
Some emergency medical equipment will continue 10 be located in the 
medical store on the 4th floor or Technical Bloc� A, outside the rormer 
O H U  i n  the centre or the building. The ke) will be attached to the 
emergency medical ki t  held in O H U  Speedbird House to deal \lith such 
calls. 
I n  the BEA Maintenance Area, there are 1 2  stretchers and 24 blankets held 
i n  the Main Stores which is adjacent to the OH U West and is open ror 
24-hours per day. 
7 Serious or fatal accidents/illness . 
I n  the event or a ratal accident or ill ness, authority to 1110\ e  the body/bodies 
rests with the police and any such occurrence should be notified immediately 
to the British Airports Authority Police Control Room. 
The same action should be taken ir any individual dies arter having been 
brought to a medical unit and resuscitative measures have failed. . 
I t  would be the responsibility or the police to initiate any rurther action 
necessary. . 
The sist�r on duty, i n  the event of seriou<; or fatal accident,'illness. will 
notiry: 
(i) The Personnel Manager/Officer concerned. 
( i i )  The doctor-on-cal l .  
( i i i )  The appropriate PMO/or deputy who \I ill advise DMS or D
DMS. 
A S  R Peffers 
Deputy Director Medical Services. 
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A PPEN DIX 1 2  
Assistance 
I n  assessing the se,erity of the incident the Police I ncident Officer wil l  
consider \\ hat �\I,\hlanCe jl) required at the ,",ccne and elsewhere. This may 
",clude: 
(a) Transport to remove uninjured person"i, dead bodies and property. 
(b )  Fire Service heavy lifting gear etc. 
(c) Ambulance Service - extra blankets and 'tretche". 
(d) Hospital Emergency Teams police escort may be required. 
(e) Local Doctors. 
(f) St Johns Ambulance Brigade and British Red Cross Society. 
(g) Lightll1g floodlight� from Special ly Equipped Traffic Accident cars 
ctc. 
(h )  L1ectricity and Ga< Board, \\ here main� supplie, are i ll \ oh ed .  
( i )  GPO - lI1,tallation of e\tra line, ; mobile call office etc. 
U) Bntit.,h Railway ... - train in\ olvement. 
( k )  Local Authority - high-rise buildings involved. 
(I) Public Address Equipment. 
(m)  Ropes and signs for crowd and t raffic control and dive"ion,. 
(n) Photographers - (official not Press) in cases of incendiarism, bombs 
ctc. 
(0) Mobile Police Station for protracted incidents. 
(p) Wireless Control Vans and Area Communications Officer 10 assist in  
protracted incidents.. 
(q)  Cu�tOI11� and Excise Officers \\-here internat ional tr�l\el b invoh"cd. 
(r)  Veterinary Surgeons (animals in tran,it). 
(s) Mliitary Aid �erious nODding; evacuation; crowd control etc. 
( t )  Local Borough Emergency Corps i n  shoring up  buildings etc. 
(u )  Pre» Bureau Liaison Officer. 
(v) Mobile Canteens and Women, Royal Voluntary Service. 
(w)  Protecti'e clothing for officers handling bodtes etc. 
(x) Police Aid from Special Patrol Group; C I D  Officers and other 
Division,,; or Forces. 
(VOle: Request' at (b) to (f) abo'·. are made through the respecti,. Fire or 
Ambulance Incident omccr.) 
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A PPE DIX 1 3  
Action taken by the Br itish A irports 
Authority at H eathrow subseq uent to the 
accident to Boeing 707 G-AR WE 
I Selected fire appliances have been filled with additional R/T equipment 
on the A i r  Controller's frequencies ( 1 1 8 ·2 m cls and 1 1 8 ·5  m c/s). This 
enables the fire appliance crews to get clearance for crossing runways direct 
from ATC instead of as hitherto calling up the watch room allendanl. 
2 Loudspeakers connected to the crash l ine have been installed in the duty 
Fire Officer's oftice and in the men's quarters. This enables the duty Fire 
Officer and the men to receive details of an incident at the same time as 
they are received by the watch room allendanl. 
3 The internal fire alarm system has been modified and a siren substituted 
for the alarm bell> for use only in the e\ent of an aircraft Incidenl. 
4 A new console desk is being provided in the \\3tchroom in the main 
Fire Station in order to achieve a more efficient layout of communication) 
equipment. 
5 New arrangements are in force which provide for marshalling vehicles to 
assist the BAA police in leading outside services to 3n accidcm on the 
aerodrome. 
6 I mproved training facilities have been provided at Heathro\\ so that tht! 
firemen can have morc frequent and realio;tic 'hot' fires practices. 
7 Fire hydrant maintenance has been improved. A ll hydrant outlets have 
been reamed out to remove all I races of paint and wear. An improved 
liaison between the Fire Service and the Engineers at lIeathrow ensures 
that delays in reponing hydrant faults and their rcclification are kept to an 
absolute minimum. 
8 Two changes in the command structure have taken place: 
(a )  The former Fire Oniccr-ill-Charge is now at lIead Office as full-time 
Deputy to the Chief Fire Officer alld the Fire Officer-ill-Charge at 
Heatluow no longer has extraneous responsibilities. 
(b) The Sub-Fire Station is now commanded by a Section Leader instead 
of a Leading Fireman. There is also a Section Leader at the main Fire 
Station and an AFOI I in overall charge. 
9 Additional and larger fire appliances have increased the amounts of 
water and foam compound available. 
1 0  The practice of using a mall from a fire appliance to act as " dUly 
driver has been discontinued. 
I I  Additional breathing apparatus equipment has been pro\ ided. 
1 2  Hose testing procedures have been revised. 
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1 3  The Authofltj ha� onc-piece li re rc,btant garment') under tesl. 
1 4  Arrangement� have been made with most of the main user airlines for 
them to switch to the Fire Service radio frequency ( 1 30'5) in  the event of 
an emergency affecting onc of their aircraft. This establishes immcdiate 
communication between the aircrart Captai.n and the Fire Officcr-in­
Charge. 
1 5  A sophisticated ' I ncident Indicator Board' has been constructed in the 
Appliance Room of the main Fire Station. It takes the form of a display of 
the airporl, and by il luminating selected areas and \\ i th signals the location of 
an incident is vbually presented to personnel as they man their appliances. 
1 6  To eliminate the possibility of a delay a new system of communications 
with the London Fire Brigade has been instal led and is in use. Under this 
�ystem a \ isual and audible signal in the London Fire Brigade's Control 
Room operated from the BAA Fire Station indicates that the BAA Fire 
Service has rcceived a crash alarm. 
1 7  Enlargement of the Central Fire Station. 
(Source: BAA Firc Service) 
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